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ABSTRACT 
Despite the hundreds of conunentaries on the individual pieces 
comprising the Landa.rzt collection, very few scholars have concern-
ed themselves with the work as a totality, and none of them has 
adequately accounted for the quite specific ordering of the pieces, 
although Kafka, himself, clearly set considerable store by the 
matter, as is evident from his letters to his publisher and his 
eventual withdrawal of the piece Der KilbeZreiter before publication. 
The overriding aim of this study is to make good the omissions of 
previous scholars, not only by providing detailed analyses of all 
the texts as they occur in the collection, but also by defining 
the structural-thematic principles which underlie their sequence, 
modify their meaning through contextual interaction, and unite 
them into a coherent whole. 
As a preliminary to interpretation, however, an attempt is 
made to isolate and describe the main features of Kafka's fictional 
rhetoric, particularly as exemplified by the collection. In part, 
this is undertaken through a critical survey of previous Kafka 
scholarship, concentrating on four dominant, historically successive 
attitudes to the interpretation of the author's work (Eindeutigkeit, 
VieZdeutigkeit, Undeutbarkeit, suspensive Interpretati~n) and the 
four main theoretical concepts associated with them (AZZegorik, 
ParaboZik, E'insinnigkeit, Paradoxie). Although this survey leads 
to the conclusion that most of the conflicting views about the 
meaning of Kafka's works can be attributed, not to the intrinsic 
nature of the texts, themselves, but to the inadequacy of the 
critical theories applied to them, it also seeks, more positively, 
; i 
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(vi) 
to clarify all of the issues concerned, especially those factors 
which actually form part of Kafka's rhetoric, namely, parable, 
point of view and parado~. From these more general, theoretical 
considerations, the third chapter then proceeds specifically to 
analyse the principal elements of Kafka's rhetoric in the collection 
itself, namely, _structure as indirect .commentary, point of view as 
reinforcing structure, and symbol as indicating the direction of 
meaning •. Al though limitations on length prevent this analysis from 
being more comprehensive, other important factors such as temporal 
perspective, irony and the grotesque have not been entirely ignored 
and are, in any case, mentioned or discussed at the appropriate 
places in the subsequent interpretations. 
Basing itself on the preceding examination of Kafka 1 s rhetoric, 
the last chapter endeavours to fulfil the already stated, overrid~ 
ing aim of the study. Briefly, it concludes that the opening piece 
raises the question of a valid modus vivendi in modern times, and 
that this problem is not resolved until the last piece of the 
collection. Within the framework provided by these two pieces, 
the remainder are arranged in thematic pairs according to the·parti-
cular aspect of modern life they portray and its implications in 
the search for positive existential purpose. Furthermore, with~n 
each pair, the second always displays a more controlled, distanced, 
often ironic attitude than the first, and the progress from one 
pair to the next is determined by the movement from the more general 
to the more specific, so that the collection traces a gradual 
reduction in scope, an increasing restriction to a more narrow, 
more particular and more tangible aspect of existence. Finally, 
in its concluding remarks, the study tries to explain why the 
collection was ultimately dedicated to Kafka's father, why the 
(vii) 
author chose to call it Ein Landarzt, and how its concerns are 
related to the corresponding period in Kafka's life and times. 
,1 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
In order to reduce annotation to the absolute minimum, the 
following procedures have been adopted: 
1. All references to and quotations from Kafka's writings and 
reported conversations have been identified in the text by bracketed 
inserts containing an abbreviated title and the relevant page 
number(s), e.g. (Se 123). The abbreviations used and the volumes 
to which they refer are as follows: 
, Se Siimtliche ErzoJtZungen3 
hrsg. Paul Raabe, Frankfurt/M Fischer, 1969 
Pz = Der ProzeB, 
hrsg. M. Brod, New York Schocken,1953 
BkI = Beschreibung eines Kampfes, 
hrsg. M. Brod, New York : Schocken, 1946 
Bk II Beschreibung eines Kampfes. Die zwei Fassungen, 
hrsg. M. Brod & L. Dietz, Frankfurt/M : Fischer, 1969 
Hv Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande, 
hrsg. M. Brod, 
Tb = 2.'agebilcher 1910-19 2 3, 
hrsg. M. Brod, 
Br Briefe 1902-1924, 
hrsg. M. Brod, 
New York 
New York 
New York 
Schocken, 1953 
Schocken, 1951 
Schocken, 1958 
Em = Briefe an MiZena 
hrsg. W. Haas, New York : Schocken, 1958 
Bf = Briefe an Felice und·andere Korrespondenz aus 
der VerZobungszeit, 
hrsg. E. Heller & J. Born, New York 
Bo Briefe an OttZa und die FamiZie 3 
hrsg. H. Binder & K. Wagenbach, New York 
Gk Janouch, G.: Gesprache mit Kafka, 
erw. Ausg., Frankfurt/M 
Schocken, 1967 
Schocken, 1974 
Fischer, 1968. 
'I 
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(ix) 
2. All references to and quotations from secondary literature 
have been identified in the text by bracketed inserts containing 
the author's surname (plus initial, when two or more scholars with 
the same surname need to be distinguished), the original year of 
publication and, where necessary, the relevant page number(s), of 
the edition used, e.g. (Frye, 1957:89f.), except when the text 
innnediately preceding the quotation or reference clearly indicates 
the latter's author and publication date, e.g. "As Frye '(1957) has 
said: ... ", in which case the quotation or reference has been 
identified simply by 'op.cit, 1 , 'ibid.' or 'loc.cit.', as applic-
able, plus the relevant page number(s) when required. Full 
details of the studies concerned are to be found in the biblio-
graphy. 
These same two procedures have also been adopted in the 
notes, which, for practical reasons, have had to be placed at the 
end of the text. 
I! .. I 
' J, 
' 
' j. I ; 
I:;· 
'' 1. I I 
.:I. 
1. SCHOLARSHIP AND THE COLLECTION 
"' 
During the lengthy period that elapsed between the compilation 
of the Landarzt collection in July-August, 1917 (Br 256ff.), and its 
delayed publication at the end of 1919 (Binder, 1975:235), it is 
now well known that, on several occasions, Kafka had cause to write 
to his publisher and insist on the particular order he had given the 
individual pieces (Br 228, 245), an order which research has clearly 
shown not to be chronological according to date of composition (cf. 
Pasley/Wagenbach, 1964; 1965; Binder, 1975). It is also equally 
well known that, for some undisclosed reason, Kafka eventually 
decided, at the earliest during the autumn of 1918 (Binder, 1975: 
233), to withdraw Der Kubelreiter from the collection, although it 
had been liste~ in the original table of contents q,etween the title-
piece and Auf der Galerie (Br 258) . And the obvious inference to 
be drawn from these firmly attested facts is that Kafka regarded 
the collection, in its published form, as an organic unity, each 
piece being assigned to a fixed position in keeping with its intend-
-ed, individual purpose vis-a-vis the collection as a whole (cf. 
Sokel, 1967:276). 
r 
Yet, despite the scores of commentaries on such works as Ein 
Landarzt., Auf der Galerie and Vor dem Gesetz (cf. Beicken, 1974; 
A, Flores, 1976), extremely few scholars have attempted to analyse 
the collection in its entirety. Furthermore, even among these few, 
by far the most common procedure has been to ignore the questions 
raised by the quite specific order of the texts and to limit discus-
sion, instead, to the elaboration of an ostensibly unifying theme, 
" 
! 
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on which, it is claimed, each separate piece provides an individual 
variation. The earliest example of this approach is to be found in 
the first scholarly account of the collection, that by Tauber (1941), 
who maintains: "Eine innere Gegebenheit macht die Einheit des 
Samme1bandes Ein Landarzt aus ( .•. )..Diese innere Gegebenheit ist der 
Verlust des Sinnes, des Ziels, der Substanz, des MaBes" (op.cit.:70). 
Twenty-one years later, in the next analysis of the whole collection, 
Politzer (1962) reaches a rather different, though not incompatible 
conclusion: "The process of dehumanisation is~ with many variations, 
the unifying theme of the Country Doctor stories" (op.cit.:92). 
Unlike Tauber and Politzer, Kauf (1972) derives his alleged 
• 
principle of unity from material extrinsic to the collection, namely, 
Kafka's correspondence with Martin Euber, founder and editor of the 
journal Der Jude. On 22nd April, 1917, Kafka wrote to Buber offering 
him twelve pieces for publication, but mentioning only two titles, 
Der neue Advokat and Ein Landarzt. Eventually, however, Buber 
rejected ten of the twelve, in the same way that he had previously 
rejected E-in Traum (Bf 704f .) • The two works he did choose to pub-
lish as Zwei Tiergesahiahten (cf. A. Flores, 1976:5) were .Sahakale 
und Araber and E-in Beriaht fUr eine Akademie. At the end of his 
handwritten note offering the twelve pieces, Kafka remarked: 
"Alle diese Stilcke und noch andere sollen .spater einmal als Buch 
erscheinen unter dem gemeinsamen Titel: 'Verantwortung'" (Kauf, 
1972:420). On the basis of this far from conclusive evidence, Kauf 
nevertheless deduces that "Kafka originally intended to publish the 
stpries, or at least most of the stories, that were later to appear 
under the collective title of Ein Landarzt under the heading of 
Verantwortung" \op .cit.: 423). Without thoroughly investigating 
Kafka's notion of responsibility, he then proceeds to analyse all 
I' 
,, 
3. 
the pieces of the collection as variations on this theme. Quite 
apart from the difficulties presented by Ein Tra:wn, which he can 
explain only as 11a foil to the other stories" (ibid.:432), this 
approach leads to a series of contrived and shallow interpretations, 
not the least of which is his assertion that Elf Bohne "suggests the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of making value judgements. And 
if value judgements can be made only in the most tentative manner, 
how is it possible to lead a responsible life?" (ibid.:430). 
The most recent attempt to interpret the Landarzt collection 
solely in terms of theme and variations 1 is that by Neumann (1979). 
This, too, depends heavily on extr~nsic information, namely, the 
details of Kafka 1 s life at the time he wrote the majority of the 
pieces, and thus tends to reduce the collection to a supposedly veiled 
autobiography. Otherwise its connnents are so general as to be true 
of a whole range of literature, including virtually every Bildungs-
roman ever written. It is for this reason that they can so readily 
assimilate the most disparate of other views, from the Zionist to 
the Marxist. In summary, Neumann 1 s argument runs thus: "Der Landarzt-
Band scheint ( ... ) der Versuch zu sein, Redeordnungen zu erproben, 
die der Frage: 1 Wer bin ich?' und der Gegenfrage: 'Wer hist du?', 
'Wer seid ihr?' angemessen sind. Er laBt sich als Mythos (Redeord-
nung) begreifen, der die flir Kafkas Entwicklung wesentliche Lebens-
und Selbsterfahrungs-Krise zu organisieren sucht, die die wenig~n 
Monate der Arbeit im Alchimistengii!3chen im Winter 1916/1917 begleitete. 
1 
( ••. ) Sicher ist, daB d{e im Landarzt-Band erprobte sprachliche 
Selbstfindung an die Frage des Verhaltnisses zum Vater und die 
Tatsache, daB diesem das Buch gewidmet wird, geknlipft bleibt" (op. 
cit.:347). 
Despite their failure to address the crucia-1 question of order 
: . I· 
I 
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among the Landarzt pieces, all of the studies discussed so far do 
at least attempt to view the collection as a thematically unified 
whole. The same cannot be said, however, of the analyses by Osborne 
(1967), Flach (1967), Gray (1973) or Hibberd (1975). For, although 
they differ considerably in their approaches, none of these scholars 
provides any more than a series of disconnected, frequently tentative 
and generally superficial remarks about the texts in question.~ 
Indicative of their stance is Hibberd 1 s description of the fourteen 
pieces: "Tliey vary from a few lines to several pages in length; 
some are related in content, but there is no one clear, unifying 
theme. Signs of' a happier outlook on life are few, but the first 
• 
and last piece (and Kafka was concerned about their order) have a 
note of renunciation and whimsy" (op.cit.:82). 
In sharp contrast to the preceding studies, by far the most 
detailed and, in some respects, still the most perceptive is that 
by the East German scholar, H. Richter (1962). Because of his ideo-
logical bias, it is true, Richter introduces a great deal of inappro-
priate political jargon and evaluation into his commentary, talking 
about Ein. altes Blatt_, for example, in terms of the "Machtlosigkeit 
des kleinen und mittleren Blirgertums, das stets okonornisch und 
politisch von groBeren Mnchten abhangig ist und kaum selbstandige 
Macht besitzt" (op.cit.:139). At other points, he also refers to 
Kafka as a sensitive "Vertreter der blirgerlich-humanistischen 
Intelligenz" (ibid.: 164) and criticises him for ignoring the "Pro le-
tariat als kampfende Klasse" (ibid.: 165). Ultimately, therefore, 
he construes the whole collection as a set of variations on the 
socio-political theme of modern, capitalistic society's allegedly 
-, 
fundamental contradictoriness and senselessness, to which, in the 
long run, its citizens can accorrnnodate themselves only by accepting 
:1 
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their unalterable situation, even if with a degree of irony, as in 
Ein Bericht fiJ:x> eine Akademie (ibid.:159-166). Despite the obvious 
prejudice of his views, however, Richter does make one very important 
advance on all the studies mentioned so far. This consists in the 
suggestion that Der neue Advokat embodies a form of thesis about the 
situation and laws of Kafka's time, a thesis which is then tested in 
the subsequent pieces: "Das Vorhaben, den Beweis in den folgenden 
Stlicken im einzelnen anzutreten, konnte Kafkas Konzeption des Zyklus 
zugrunde liegen" (ibid.:129). As the later, detailed analyses of 
the present study will attempt to show, this notion does, in fact, 
constitute one of the most basic principles of the collection's 
• 
structure, but certainly not in the ideological sense or system of 
values expounded by Richter. 
Although they disregard Richter's very significant hypothesis 
about Der neue Advokat~ Binder (1975:235f.) and Kittler (1979:212ff.) 
take critical appreciation of the collection a step further by sug-
gesting that the whole work is "eingerahmt" (Binder, 1975: 235) by 
the first ~nd last pieces. Within this framework, they then propose, 
the remaining texts are arranged, often in pairs, according to links 
in motif, e.g. death in Ein Brudermord and Ein Traum~ the "Vater-
Pen;pektive" (Binder, loc.cit.) in Elf Sohne and Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters. As Kittler, who openly acknowledges his deep indebted-
ness to Binder, sums up their joint argument: "Die Erzahlungen der 
Sammlung Ein Landarzt sind also ahnlich angeordnet wie in der 
·Betracht;ung. Ihr Verknlipfungsprinzip ist das der Serie. Fast jeder 
Text greift ein Detail des vo~hergehenden auf, es gibt aber auch 
Verbindungen zwischen Texten, die innerhalb der Sammlung weit aus-
einander liegen. Die letzten Stlicke flihren in die Nahe der ersten 
zurlick" (op. cit.: 213) . 
'l 6. 
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·Regrettably; however, neither of these scholars provides any-
thing approaching a detailed ~nalysis of the collection's fourteen 
texts, so that their attempts to·explain the work's underlying system 
of coherence lack any depth. Thus the concept of a framework, for 
example, is bas~d solely on the observation that, in the first and 
last pieces, "sich Tiere in Menschen verwandeln" (Binder, loc.cit.). 
Even if this were true (and it certainly does not apply to the human-
equine Dr. Bucephalus), it would still not account for the fact that 
Kafka insisted on placing DeP neue Advokat at the very beginning of 
the collection, despite the latter's title; and Kin BePicht fil.P eine 
Akaderrrie at the end. Clearly, any adequate explanation of the 
collection's order must make the elucidation of this fact its first 
priority, although so far H. Richter is the only scholar to have 
even tentatively broached the matter. Yet, as later analysis will 
demonstrate, once the opening piece has been understood in its full 
implications, the remaining structural principles of the collection 
wlll tend to reveal themselves. But before that analysis can be 
undertaken, the immediate requirement is a sound critical theory 
from which to develop valid interpretative practice, and that 
entails a survey of the diverse approaches to Kafka's fiction, from 
Ef,ndeutigkeit to Vieldeutigkeit, UndeutbaPkeit and "suspensive 
Interpretation" (Steinmetz, 1977) . 
7. 
2. ISSUES IN KAFKA INTERPRETATION 
Given the recent publication of two extremely comprehensive 
and erudite surveys of Kafka scholarship (Beicken, 1974; Binder,' 
1979), it may seem unnecessary to preface a new interpretation of 
the Landarzt collection with yet another critical review, especiaily 
one which cannot even aspire to a similar bread"th of scope. However, 
despite the enormous value of those two works, they are not without 
their shortcomings. In particular, they fail, either totally or 
in part, to come to terms with certain literary concepts which are 
not only fundamental to the interpretative act in general, but also 
of outstanding importance in evaluating and focussing the history 
of Kafka criticism. It is with these concepts that the following 
discussion will attempt to deal. 
Allegorik 
Contrary to the impression conveyed by A. Flores' recent and 
very deficient list of Max Brad's contributions toKafka scholarship 
(A. Flores, 1976:37f.), the first phase of Kafka's posthumous 
reception was dominated by his long-standing friend and literary 
executor. For, apart from preparing and publishing the first edit ions 
of Der Pr•oze/3 (1925), Das Schlo/3 (1926), Amerika (1927) and 
Beschreibung eines Karrrpfes (1936), he also produced numerous short 
commentaries, including an afterword to each of the volumes just 
mentioned, and in 1937 the first edition of his biography (s. Jarv, 
1961:70ff.). Above all, however, Brod and, in the English-speaking 
world, Edwin Muir (cf. Crick, 1980) established a critical approach 
which was to be adopted by friend and foe alike. Essentially~ this 
consisted in attempting to interpret Kafka's works by assimilating 
8. 
them to some existing, but extrinsic form of ideology: Judaism, 
Zionism, Christianity, Existentialism, Freudianism and so on (cf. 
Ackermann, 1950; Poltizer, 1950; Krusche, 1974:77ff,, 130ff.; Beicken, 
1974:175ff.;Beicken, 1979a). 
In employing this interpretative method, Brod and his contempor-
aries were, of course, making certain crucial, though unproven 
assumptions, not only about the nature of Kafka's world-view, but 
also about the structure of his art_, and it was not long before the 
fact was brought to their attention. Indeed, as early as 1948, E. 
Heller sought to oppose them by pointing out that they were treating 
Kafka's work as if it were allegory, whereas an examination of this 
concept and at least Das Schlo£ showed them to be wrong (E. Heller, 
1948:209f.; cf .. E. Heller, 1974:116f.). Not long afterwards, Anders 
(1951:39ff,), Martini (1954:321f.) and Wiese (1956:325) developed 
similar arguments, and their views were soon firmly supported in 
what, for years, was to be regarded as the standard work on Kafka's 
oeuvre, the comprehensive study by Emrich (1958:75ff.). 
Yet, despite the well-founded objections of these scholars, 
they failed to stem the tide of allegorical interpretations, which 
still continues to flow, albeit in more subtle and circumspect 
channels. Why this should have been so, it is impossible to say 
with any certainty. However, among the many plausible explanat.ions, 
one of the more obvious is that, in their interpretative practice, 
Anders and Emrich contradicted their critical theory. At an early 
stage in the former' s study, for example, it is arbitrarily asserted 
that a considerable part of Kafka's work is actually about the Jews: 
"Ja, in den Chines1:sche Mauer genannten Stlicken ist das Wort Jude 
durchweg <lurch da s Wort Chinese ersetz t" (Anders, 1951: 1 O) . And in 
9 . 
an equally unfounded, allegorical fashion, Emrich summarily equates 
the America of Kafka 1 s novel with "der modernen Industriegesellschaft" 
in general: "Der geheime okonomische und psychologische MechanismU:s 
dieser Gesellschaft und seine satanischen Konsequenzen werden hier 
schonungslos blo~gelegt" (Emrich, 1958: 227), while Klamm of Das 
Sch"lo13 becomes for him merely an "iiberpersonale Liebesrnacht" (ibid.: 
312) . 
A more likely and substantial explanation, however, is to be 
found in the theoretical statements of these scholars. For although 
they are united in the view that Kafka's works are not to be regarded 
as allegories, they are at odds about possible valid alternatives . 
. 
E. Heller, for example, favours symbolic interpretation, bu~ Anders, 
Wiese and, to some extent, Martini reject this argument, while Emrich 
goes a step further in denying the validity of parabolic interpre-
tations as well. But if Kafka's works are neither allegorical, nor 
symbolic, nor parabolic, then how is one to interpret them? To offer 
as an answer a series of metaphors taken literally (Anders, 1951:40ff.) 
or a "Gleichnis-und Bilderwelt" (Emrich, 1958:8!; cf. Emrich, 1960: 
249ff.) is simply to evade the issue, since none of these terms is 
-qecessarily incompatible with those which have been rejected. It 
can scarcely be a cause of wonder, therefore, if this line of argu-
ment should have given rise to more confusion than before, or that 
it should have been widely ignored. 
From the viewpoint of later Kafka interpretation, however, by 
far the most influential aspect of the positions adopted by E. Heller, 
Anders, Martini, Wiese and Emrich was almost certainly not the points 
of difference among them, but rather the area of agreement. l?or, in 
their united rejection of an allegorical approach to Kafka's works, 
I I 
I I 
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'each of them had recourse to a definition of allegory which derived 
from early nineteenth century poetics, especially the value-laden 
antithesis betuect.m symbol and allegory enunciated by Goethe (s'. 
Sorenson, 1972:126ff.). And from at least the late 1950's onwards, 
this form of definition has been continually under attack, although 
even the latest edition of Frenzel's handbook on the subjec~ takes 
no cognisance o~ the fact (Frenzel, 1963,4 1978:14-23, 35-45). With 
varying degrees of detail and, in some cases, with reference only to 
Coleridge, who transposed Goethe's theory into English, Frye (1957: 
89f . 1; 1965: 14), Honig (1959:44ff .) , Fletcher (1964: 13ff .) , Hayes 
(1968), Hopster (1971), Sorenson (1972:264ff.), Clifford (1974:8), 
Todorov' (1977:235ff.).,. Quilligan (1979: 15, 32) and Kobbe (1980:314ff.) 
have all examined this question, and they are unanimous in denying 
'\ 
the Vqlidity of Goethe's distinction. "Irmner deutlicher erkennt man 
heute die geschichtliche Relativitat des im 19. Jahrhundert als 
absolut gesetzten Gegensatzes ,zwischen dern 'echt' klinstlerischen 
Symbol und der als kalt und trocken verschrienen Allegorie. Diese 
Einseitigkeit sowohl der klassischen als auch der romantischen 
Symboltheorien sowie die Bindung dieser Theorien an bestimmte 
asthetische und weltanschauliche Voraussetzungen batten Schon Fr. 
Creuzer und Ferd. Solger gesehen ( .•. )" (Sorenson, 1972:266). 
Regrettably, however, the unanimity shown by these scholars 
in criticising nineteenth century theory is singularly lacking in 
their attempts to supersede it. Indeed, Sorenson and Todorov, like 
MacQueen (1970), offer no explicit definition of their own at all, 
while Hayes and Hopster so limit themselves to theoretical discussion 
in the terms employed by Goethe that their alternative definitions 
are ultimately as arbitrary as those they are opposing. Clearly what 
is needed is not abstract debate about allegory, but a revised, 
I'' •' I< I[ 
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value-free definition, based firmly on the re-examination of liter-
ary works which are universally accepted as C:onstituting allegories 
or containing allegorical elements, And to find this, one has to 
turn to a group of predominantly American scholars. 
Confronted with the works of Frye, Honig, Fletcher, Clifford and 
.Quilligan, the reader's initial reaction might well be one of utter 
bewilderment about the meaning of allegory, so radically do their 
analyses differ from one another and from traditional discussions of 
the term. Yet, amid their undeniably perplexing array of divergent 
interpretations, it is possible to find at least three fundamental cri-
teria about which there is general, if not total agreement and, for 
the purposes of this study, they are sufficient to permit of a decision 
about the central issue of the p~esent discussion, namely, whether 
Kafka is, even in the terms of contemporary critical theory, the 
allegorist which so many scholars, including those now under consid-
. 1 . h" b 1 eration, c aim im to e. 
In his extremely influential essay of 1957, Frye has the fol-
lowing to say about the nature of allegory: "We have actual allegory 
when a poet explicitly indicates the relationship of his images to 
examples and precepts, and so tries to indicate how a commentary 
should proceed. A writer is being allegorical when it is clear that 
he is saying 'by this I also (allos) mean that'. If this seems 
to be done con_tinuously, we may say, cautiously, that what he is 
writing 'is' an allegory" (op.cit.:90). By 1965, however, he had 
become less tentative: "We have allegory when the events of a narra-
tive obviously and continuously refer to another simultaneous struc-
ture of events or ideas, whether historical events, moral or philo-
sophical ideas, or natural phenomena.( •.. ) there are two main types 
of allegory: historical or political allegory, referring to characters 
or events beyond those purportedly described in the fiction; and 
12. 
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moral, philosophical, religious, or scientific allegories, refer-
ring· to an additional set of ideas" (Frye, 1965: 12) . 
Allowing for the mistaken notions that all allegoris.ts are 
poets and that the Greek allos mean 'also', when in fact it means 
'other(wise)', it is nevertheless clear from Frye's remarks that he 
considers one fundamental characteristic of allegory to be a dual or 
parallel system of meanings, the text of the work providing the sur-
face or primary meaning, but at the same ttme 1 obviously and continu-
ously' signalling a different (allos), secondary meaning, which must 
be grasped if the allegory is to be understood as such. In other 
words, however radically Frye may ~epart from conventional wisdom 
in some of his other utterances, here he is restating one of the most 
traditional descriptions of all allegorical method and structure, 
that embedded in the literal meaning of the term itself, namely, 
"speaking otherwise than one seems to speak" (S .O .E .D.-). Furthermore, 
his definition is strongly echoed in other modern studies of the 
subject. 
Honig (1959), for example, maintains that the allegorical 
narrative "builds up the sense of the distinction to be drawn among 
'the levels of meaning'", that a "constant layering of meaning" is 
decisive in the narrative's effect, and that "this transla tive use 
of narrative method and cultural ideal ( •.. ) characterises the 
concept of allegory" (op.cit.:53) .- Similarly, but in terms much 
closer to Frye's, Fletcher (1964) explains that, put most simply, 
"allegory says one thing and means another. It destroys the expecta-
tion we have about language, that our words 'mean what we say'. When 
we predicate quality x of person Y, Y really is what our predication 
says he is (or we assume so); but allegory would turn Y into something 
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other (allos) than what the open and direct statement tells the 
reader" (op.cit._:2). Later in his study, he also states that 
allegories 11are based on parallels between two levels of being that 
correspond to each other, the one supposed by the reader, the other 
literally presented in the fable 11 (ibid.: 113). Much the same idea 
is then expressed by Clifford (1974): "allegory invites its readers 
from the outset to see the particular narrative as being also a series 
of generalised statements, and demands that concepts be identified 
simultaneously in their fictional and ideological roles 11 (op.dt.:7f.). 
Finally, even Kobbe (1980), who argues purely theoretically, appears 
to support Frye's definition, albeit in a somewhat opaque technical 
jargon: "Die Allegorie ist die klinstlerische Vertextung einer jeweils 
enzyklopadisch identifizierb.aren Wahrnehmungsstruktur (einer Aktivi-
td.t/eines Prozesses/eines Zustandes von bzw. an Lebewesen oder Sachen). 
Es wird jeweils nur eine solche Wahrnehmungsstruktur verwend~t die -
unabhangig von der kilnstlerischen Vertextung - als Pradikator 
innerhalb metaphorisher und/oder metaphysischer Pradikationen (mit 
der zweistelligen Elementarform 'A ist p') fungieren kann" (op.cit.: 
326). 
With the exception of Quilligan, then, most contemporary 
scholars tend to unite in regarding allegory as being characterised 
by the type of structure or method described by Frye. The first 
question, therefore, to be asked about Kafka's allegedly allegorical 
texts is whether they actually exhibit the structure these scholars 
attribute to them. And an answer to this question would seem, very 
obviously, to require a structural analysis of at least all the texts 
comprising the present collection. But since any such analysis would 
presuppose a considerable amount of interpretation, no matter how 
oqjective the analyst attempted to be, the whole undertaking would 
' I 
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clea~ly be futile, for it would simply amount to placing yet another 
interpretation beside the many that already exist and arbitrarily 
declaring it to be the mqre accurate. 
This does not mean, however, that the question is incapable of 
being decided. Rather, it implies that a different approach must be 
adopted, one which is more likely to produce valid results. And the 
most promising would appear to lie in an examination of Kafka's com-
mentaries on his own works. After all, whether one accepts the views 
of Dante in his Convivio and the famous letter to Can Grande della 
Scala, or those of Spenser in his equally famous letter to Sir Walter 
Raleigh about The Faerie Queene, o~ those of contemporary theorists 
in the studies already mentioned, the fact remains that 'the making 
of allegory' is obviously a very conscious act. Consequently, one 
would naturally expect an author to be well aware of any intended 
allegorical structure in his works, and to furnish clear evidence of 
it in his commentaries on them. 
Yet, among the admittedly infrequent and generally brief inter-
pretations Kafka provides of his works in his letters (e.g. Br 116, 
117£., 150; Bf 53, 87, 218, 278f., 394, 396f., 445, 56lf.; Bm 14f., 
20f., 214), his diaries (e.g. Tb 296f., 297, 481, 535f.) and his 
conversations with Janouch (e.g. Gk 43f., 52f., 53f., 55f., 132f., 
247), there is none that indicates any intention, on his part, to 
create a structure of the type now considered to be a defining charact~ 
eristic of allegory. Nor, it needs to be added, does any of them 
substantiate the alternative allegorical criteria proposed by Quilligan 
(1979): "cosmically extended verbal echoing and wordplay" (op .ci t.: 
41), a Biblical pretext - pre-text (ibid.:97ff.), etc. To demonstrate 
these points, the longest of his commentaries, that on Das Urteil, 
should serve: 
I 
'I 
AnlaBlich der Korrektur des UrteiZ schreibe ich alle 
Beziehungen auf, die mir in der Geschichte klargeworden 
sind, soweit ich sie gegenwartig habe. ( ... )Der Freund 
ist die Verbindung zwischen Yater und Sohn, er ist ihre 
groBte Gemeinsamkeit. Allein bei seinem Fenster sitzend 
wlihlt Georg in diesem Gemeinsamen mit Wollust, glaubt 
den Vater in sich zu haben und halt alles, bis auf eine 
fllichtige traurige Nachdenklichkeit flir friedlich. Die 
Entwicklung der Geschichte zeigt nun, wie aus dem 
Gemeinsamen, dem Freund, der Vater hervorsteigt und 
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sich als Gegensatz Georg gegenliber aufstellt, verstarkt 
<lurch andere kleinere Gemeinsamkeiten, namlich <lurch die 
Liebe, Anhanglichkeit der Mutter, durch die treue Erinnerung 
an sie und <lurch die Kundschaft, die ja der Vater <loch 
ursprlinglich flir das Geschaft erworben hat. Georg hat 
nichts; die Bra.ut, die in der Geschichte nur <lurch die 
Beziehung zum Freund, also zum Gemeinsamen, lebt, und die, 
da eben noch nicht Hochzeit war, in den Blutkreis, der 
sich um Vater und Sohn zieht, nicht eintreten kann, wird 
vom Vater leicht vertrieben. Das Gemeinsame ist alles 
um den Vater aufgetlirmt. Georg flihlt es nur als Fremdes, 
Selbstandig-Gewordenes, von ihm niemals genug Beschlitztes, 
russischen Revolutionen Ausgesetztes, und nur weil er 
selbst nichts mehr hat als den Blick auf den Vater, 
wirkt das Urteil, das ihm den Vater ganzlich verschlieBt, 
so stark auf ihn. 
Georg hat so viel Buchstaben wie Franz. In Bendemann 
is:t 11Mann11 n;.n· eine flir alle noch unbekannten Moglichkeiten 
der Geschic.hte vorgenommene Verstarkung von "Bende". 
Bentle aber hat ebenso viele Buchstaben wie Kafka und der 
Vokal e wiederholt. sich an.den gleichen Stellen wie der 
Vokal a in Kafka. 
Frieda hat ebensoviel Buchstaben wie F. und den gleichen 
Anfangsbuchstaben, Brandenfeld hat den gleichen-Anfangs-
buchstaben wie B. und <lurch das Wort "Feld" auch in der 
Bedeutung eine gewisse Beziehung. Vielleicht ist sogar 
der Gedanke_ an Berlin nicht ohne EinfluB gewesen und die 
Erinnerung an die Mark Brandenburg hat vielleicht eingewirkt. 
(Tb 296£.) 
Much has, of course, been made of the last two paragraphs of 
this commentary, especially by those with a penchant for biographical 
and Freudian allegoresis (cf. Beicken, 1974:24ff.; Binder, 1975:123ff.; 
A. Flores, 1976a). However, what many of such interpreters fail to 
point out is that the somewhat contrived nominal correspondences pro-
posed by Kafka did not occur to him until llth February, 1913, that 
is, almost five months after he had written the story. As he, him-
self, was to say of them in a letter to Felice on 2nd June, 1913: 
"das sind natlirlich lauter Dinge, die ich erst spater herausgefunden 
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habe" (Bf 394). Furthermore, when Janouch, referring to the central 
character of Die Verwandlung suggested a similar equation between 
the names 'Kafka' and 'Samsa', Kafka firmly rejected the idea: 
"Kafka unterbrach mich. 'Es ist kein Kryptogrannn, Samsa ist nicht 
restlos Kafka. Die Verwandlung ist kein Bekenntnis, obwohl es -
im gewissen Sinne - eine Indiskretion ist'" (Gk 55). It is clearly 
wrong, therefore, to suppose that Kafka's attempt to equate Georg 
Bendemann and his fiancee, Frieda Brandenfeld, with himself and 
Felice Bauer (to whom, at the time, he was not engaged) testifies to 
an allegorical literary intention. Rather, in making these remarks, 
Kafka seems merely to have been indulging a personal idiosyncrasy, 
namely, the tendency to regard his works as being prophetic of his 
life, a further example of which is provided by his comment about the 
diagnosis of his tuberculosis, in part of a letter where he is addres-
sing Brod: "Auch habe ich es selbst vorausgesagt. Erinnerst Du Dich 
an die Blutwunde im Landarzt?" (Er 160). That Kafka, in seeking to 
create such biographical correspondences, is tending to allegorise 
his texts cannot be denied. However, as Frye (1965:13) and Quilligan 
(1979:3lf.) have both pointed out, allegoresis does not transform a 
work into an actual allegory. And, according to the structural 
principle enunciated by the majority of contemporary scholars, there 
is no evidence that, at the time of their composition, Kafka intended 
any of his works to be actual allegories. 
A second defining characteristic of allegory about which recent 
studies reveal general agreement is the nature of its purpose -or aim 
and, by implication, its source. This, most scholars now maintain, 
is to be described as ideological or idealistic. Honig (1959), for 
example, regards allegory as communicating "a vital belief" (op .cit.: 
12) and "serving the expression of ideological aims" (ibid.: 179), 
/ 
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while Fletcher ( 1964) believes that it has "an ideal character" (op. 
cit.:349) and is "classically used for didactic and moral suasion" 
(ibid.: 120). Similarly, Clifford (1974) observes that, in allegory, 
"the structure of the fiction is dominated or preceded by the idea-
logical structure", so that it becomes "overtlymoralistic or didactic" 
(op. cit.: 7) . Finally, Quilligan ( 1979), who generally condemns and 
studiously avoids notions associated with the traditional definition 
_of allegory, nevertheless shows a close affinity with the views 
already quoted, when she asserts that "all allegories incorporate 
the Bible into their texts" (op .ci t.: 96) and, soon afterwards, abandons 
the Bible in favour of "any text which offers a legitimate language in 
' 
which to articulate the sacred" (ibid.:100). Earlier she also declares 
that the experience of allegory brings the reader to a consciousness 
of "his relation to the only 'other' which allegory aims to lead him 
to, a sense of the sacred" (ibid.: 29) . In other words, she, too, 
considers that allegory proceeds from, and strives to guide the 
reader towards, a form of ideological or idealistic awareness. It 
is simply that she would rather ignore the obvious political allegory 
in, for example, Dryden' s AbsaZom and Achitophel- or Swift' s Tak of 
a Tub 3 and limit this awareness to the religious. 
Given this broad consensus, the question now becomes whether 
Kafka actually accepted or adhered to some coherent system of 'vital 
beliefs', some 1.Jeology or form of idealism, since if he did not, it 
would obviously be impossible for him to proceed from it or to attempt 
to persuade his readers of it. And, despite the contrary views of 
Zionists, theologians of crisis, Existentialists, Freudians, Marxists 
and so on, the ~lear answer to this question, on the basis of avail-
able biographical and literary evidence, is that he did not. 2 Cert-
ainly his works, both literary and otherwise, imply a set of personal 
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values, even an individual view of life. But the same may be said 
of any number of writers, including many that no-one would ever con-
sider calling allegorists, for the simple reason that a set of 
personal values does not amount to an ideology. Indeed, in Kafka's 
case, 'it does not even amount to an individual system of 'vital 
beliefs', let alone a form of idealism (cf. Foulkes, 1967). As he, 
himself, put it, on 25th February, 1918, in a statement that no 
allegorist could ever have written: 
Es ist nicht Tragheit, boser Wille, Ungeschicklichkeit~wenn 
auch von alledem etwas dabei ist, weil 'das Ungeziefer 
aus dem Nichts geboren wird' - welche mir alles miBlingen 
oder nicht einmal miBlingen lassen: Familienleben, 
Freundschaft, Ehe, Beruf, Literatur, sondern es ist der 
Mangel des Bodens, der Luft,' des Gebotes. Diese zu 
s chaff en is t meine Auf gabe, nich t dami t ich dann das 
Versaumte etwa nachholen kann, sondern damit ich nichts 
versaumt habe, denn die Aufgabe ist so gut wie eine andere. 
Es ist sogar die urspriinglichste Aufgabe oder zumindest 
ihr Abglanz, so wie man beim Ersteigen einer luftdlinnen 
Rohe plotzlich in den Schein der fernen Sonne treten kann. 
Es ist das auch keine ausnahrnsweise Aufgabe, sie ist gewiB 
schon oft gestellt worden. Ob allerdings in solchem 
AusmaB, weiB ich nicht. Ich habe von den Erfordernissen 
des Lebens gar nichts mitgebracht, so viel ich weiB, 
sondern nur d'ie allgemeine menschliche Schwache. Mit 
dieser - in dieser Hinsicht ist es eine riesenhafte 
Kraft - habe ich das Negative meiner Zeit, die mir ja sehr 
nahe ist, die ich nie zu bekampfen, sondern gewissermal3en 
zu vertreten das Recht habe, kraftig aufgenomrnen. An dem 
geringen Positiven sowie an dem aul3ersten, zum Positiven 
urnkippenden Negativen, hatte ich keinen ererbten Anteil. 
Ich bin nic.ht von der aller~ings schon schwer sinkenden 
Hand des Christenturns ins'Leben gefiihrt worden wie Kierke-
gaard und habe nicht den letzten Zipfel des davonflie-
genden jlidischen Gebetmantels noch gefangen wie die 
Zionisten. Ich bin Ende oder Anfang. 
(Hv 120f.; cf.Bk.I 281f.) 
According, then, to the two fundamental criteria accepted in 
most modern studies of the subject, there is no justification whatever 
for the still common view that Kafka wrote allegories or for those 
numerous interpretations which treat his works as if they were 
allegories. Unfortunately, however, that is not an end to the matter. 
For, in his essay of 1957, Frye also advanced a related, radical 
: ' 
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view of interpretative connnentary, which has since been fully endorsed 
I 
by,Honig (2958:285), Fletcher (1964:8), Clifford (1974:33) and 
Quilligan (1979: 15f.), and runs thus: "It is not often realised 
that all connnentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of 
ideas to the structure of poetic imagery. The instant that any critic 
permits himself to make a genuine connnent about a poem (e.g. 'In 
Hamlet Shakespeare appears to be portraying the tragedy of irresolu-
tion 1 ) he has begun to allegorise" (Frye, 1957:89). 
Assuming, as it does, that all interpretative connnentary employs 
the same methodology, this statement would, if it were ~rue, justify 
any and all interpretations of Ka~ka's works, since it allows of no 
criterion by which to distinguish the valid from the invalid. And · 
even if, as Frye { (965: 13) later admits, this would not turn struc.tur-
ally non-allegorical works into genuine allegories, such a distinc-
tion would make no material difference at all to the possible range 
and variety of equally yalid, even if totally conflicting and mutually 
exclusive interpretations permitted by his theory. Unless, there-
fore, the continuing babel among Kafka scholars is simply to be 
sanctioned, it must be shown that Frye's view and its underlying 
assumption are false. 
One simple means of achieving this end is to compare several 
different interpretations of the same literary text, e.g.' the title-
piece of the present collection. Towards the end of his analysis, 
Brinkmann (1961) conunents thus: "Nicht das Absurde, das Widersinnige 
und Widervernilnftige triumphiert bier. Vom Ende her falit ( .•• ) 
aus manchen bis dahin verborgenen Tliren das Licht auf die Vorgange. 
Es sind die schreckhaften Visionen der Existenzangst, die Wider-
sprilche zwischen dem gewollten, rnotivierten, dem zweckvoll ausgerich-
teten Leben und der Wirklichkeit, die sich hier in den sich jagenden 
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Bildern vorn Landarzt kundgeben, der vor dem unlosbaren Widerspruch 
des eigenen Planens und groBen Wollens irn Dienste der Menschheit und 
der aus der Unzulanglichkeit des Menschen unberechenbaren Gegerunachte, 
die ihn zu vernichten drohen und die er als Verhangnis, als ausweglose 
Kette des Schicksals erlebt, steht" (op.cit.:41). Five years later, 
Sokel ( 1966) provides a very different picture: 11 lrnages and plot of 
this tale enable us to see Kafka' s works as pie.;es of an autobiography 
in metaphoric disguise. The 'call' of the night bell is a transla-
tion into sensory terms of Kafka 1 s 'call' to literature, which he 
understood as an art of healing and self-preservation, a 'doctor's' 
art. ( ... ) 'A Country Doctor' presents in the hieroglyphic language 
• 
of dreams a clear and exact presentation of Kafka's inspirational 
process and the problems it posed for his life 11 (op. cit.: 6f.) . 
Tiefenbrun ( 1973) varies the meaning even more radically: "Kafka 
indicated within the totality of his writings that he was extremely 
ambivalent about his homosexual orientation. In 'The (sic!) Country 
Doc tor', he regards it as a pigsty which provides him with unearthly 
horses which transport him figuratively; however, his homosexual 
inclinations also banish him to an icy realm in which he must live 
in uncompromising loneliness" (op. cit.: 20) • Finally, Bridgwater 
(1974) construes the work thus: "It is all too easy, when reading 
Ein Landarzt3 to misapply a Christian admiration for self-denial to 
the country-doctor's behaviour. To do so is necessarily to misinter-
pret the story. The simple fact of the matter is that the would-be 
'Reiland' is in a 'heillos' position at the end of the story. ( .•• ) 
Essentially Kafka 1 s story is concerned with Nietzsche's distinction 
between the Christian-ascetic view of self-denial as a virtue, and 
the Dionysian "",Jiew of it as folly" (op.cit.:lil1f.). 
Whatever one may consider to be the individual merits of these 
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four interpretations, the clear and undeniable fact is that they ar~ 
' 
not methodologically identical. On the contrary, whereas the first 
moves from a consideration of the particular figures and events of the 
story to a generalisation of their significance, the last three pro-
ceed from the assumption that, although Kafka is creating a specific 
set of meanings within the story, he is actually intending or signal-
ling a quite different, though equally specific set of meanings out-
side the story. Thus the interpretative method of the last three 
consists in replacing the particular, literal terms of the work with 
another, equally particular set of terms borrowed from autobiography, 
psychoanalysis and philosophy, respectively • 
• 
In other words, whereas 
the last three interpreters quite arbitrarily treat Kafka's text as if 
it were an allegory, the first one does not. And from this it follows 
that Frye's notion of commentary is to be totally rejected. So, too, 
are ~11 commentaries which assume Kafka's works to be allegorical 
when, even according to the criteria of the most recent, allegorical 
theory, they demonstrably are not. 
!I>'! 
Deserving of special mention, in this context, are those increas-
ingly prevalent interpretations'which reduce Kafka's oeuvre to a series 
of covert variations on the implicitly egotistic themes of .Kafka 
writing about Kafka's reading3 and Kafka writing about Kafka's writ-
ing.4 Indeed, one example of this last approach has proven to be so 
influential and is still so widely accepted that it merits a detailed 
critique, particularly since it has also been adopted as an ostens-
ibly reliable basis for dating the composition of several works in 
the present collection (Pasley/Wagenbach, 1964:157). The commentaries 
in question are, of course, those of Pasley. 
As is now well known, in his biography of Kafka, Brod ·made the 
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following remarks about the piece called Elf Bohne: 11Das Prosastiick 
'Elf Sohne' ( ••. ) ist meines Erachtens als Wunschbild einer Vater.-
schaft, einer Familiengriindung zuverstehen, die dem Vorbild des 
Vaters ~twas Gleichwertiges, das heiBt, ebenso Patriarchalisch-
GroBartiges, in aller Lebensschlichtheit ans Mythische Grenzendes 
entgegenhalten kann. Dieser Erklarung widerspricht es nicht, daB mir 
Franz einmal sagte: 'Die elf Sohne sind ganz einfach eH Geschichten, 
an denen ich jetzt gerade arbeite"' (Brod, 1954: 145f.). Rejecting 
Brad's commentary, however, Pasley decided, to take Kafka's explanation 
quite literally and search for some clue to the allegedly literary 
identity of these sons. This he e~entually found in a list of works 
originally contained in the so-called sixth octavo notebook (Hv 447). 
There the title Elf Bohne appeared as the last in a series of t-welve 
pieces, the other eleven being, in order: "Ein Traum, Vor dem Gesetz, 
Eine kaiser Zic he Botschaft,, Die kuxize Zei t . (d. h. Das nachs te Dorf), 
Ein altes Blatt, Schakale und Araber, Auf der Gallerie (sic!), Der 
Kiibelreiter, Ein Landarzt, Der neue Advokat und Ein Brudermord" 
(Pasley, 1965:22). These pieces, he therefore concluded, were the 
sons being discussed in Elf Sohne~and their order, he attempted to 
show, corresponded to that of the sons as portrayed by their father. 
Pursuing the metaphor of literary paternity, Pasley then moved 
on to Die Sorge des Hausvaters. Here further clues were provided by 
the worry Kafka suffeYed because of his inability to complete so many 
works, as well as the fact that the central character of -the piece 
is referred to as a child. From this and other extrinsic evidence 
{e.g. Italian 'gracchio' =Czech 'kavka'), he proceeded to identify 
Odradek with the fragmentary work, Der Jager Gracchus. Finally his 
attention was drawn to Ein Besuch im Bergwerk,, where "eine scheinbar 
willklirliche und gar sinnlose Aufzahlung einzelner Figuren, die 
'I 
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dennoch eine zusanunenhangende Gruppe bilden" (op.cit.:31) reminded 
him of Elf' Sohne. However, this time there was no question of a 
father-son relationship, but rather of an inferior worker portraying 
his superiors. Translated into literary terms~ this became Kafka 
being visited by ten authors represented in Wolff 1 s Der neue Roman, 
ein Almanach (1917), writers such as Heinrich Mann, Hofmannsthal, 
Sternheim and Brod, all of whom Kafka considered his betters. And 
the self-important Kanzleidiener accompanying the engineers is identi-
fied with the employee of Wolff's press who provided 48 pages of 
editorial information at the end of the almanac. 
Since the publication of Pasley's startling theories, there has, 
of course, been no lack of opposition to them. Politzer (1965), for 
example, regards them as reducing Kafka' s work to the "Ni veau eines 
Gesellschaftsspiels ''Wer ist Wer bei Kafka?" (op.cit:l51). In a 
similar vein, but referring only to Elf Bohne, David (1971) rejects 
Pasley's commentary as "eine positivistische Interpretation" that 
robs the text' of "jeder tieferen Bedeutung" and reintroduces the 
allegorical methods of earlier Kafka criticism (op.cit.:249), although 
it should be pointed out that his alternative interpretation is meth-
odologically little better, since it, too, becomes allegorical in 
arbitrarily identifying the eleventh son with Kafka and the religious 
belief that eleven represents "die Stinde" (ibid.:259). Gray (1973) 
also limits his remarks to Elf Bohne, maintaining that Pasley's 
"suggestion, if true, does little honour to Kafka, and attributes 
to him a mode of writing found nowhere else" (op.cit.:127). Beicken 
(1974: 146£.), on the other hand, agrees with Kobs (1970:80) in endors-
ing Pasley's explanation of Elf Bohne, because it is allegedly 
attested by Kafka. But both reject the other two 'mystifications' as 
unproven, allegorical theses, a view also shared by Hillmann (1967) 
! ' 
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and Krusche (1974:82), at least in the case of Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters. 
Despite these criticisms, however, Pasley, (1971) has more 
' 
recently defended his position and even extended the significance of 
his method, while Mitchell (1974), following a suggestion in Kobs 
(1970;80), has attempted a revised version of Elf Sohne, using the 
same "allegorisch-genetische" method (Hillmann, 196 7: 206), but revers-
ing the order of the 'sons'. For the rest, acceptance has been 
general, and no-one at all has proposed re-examining the dates of 
composition derived from such extraordinary interpretations. Yet, 
quite apart from the preceding arguments of this study about Kafka 
and allegory or allegoresjs,there are several, very good reasons for 
submitting that, even in the case of Elf Sohne, the only work of the 
three where there is any justification whatever for Pasley'~ approach, 
his views are misguided and should be rejected. 
When Kafka explained to Brod: "Die elf Sohne sind ganz einfach 
elf Geschichten, an denen ich jetzt gerade arbeite", he also tacitly 
confronted the would-be interpreter with two central pr'ob lems. The 
first and more specific, based on a literal understanding of his 
statement, consists in the challenge to discover which stories he 
could possibly have had in mind. And since that issue has already 
been settled by Pasley, at least to the satisfaction of the vast major-
ity, it would seem unnecessary to pursue the matter further. However, 
if the actual wording of Kafka's explanation is considered more care-
fully, it becomes apparent that Pasley's solution cannot possibly be 
correct. For, implicit in Kafka's remark are not only the facts 
that he had already written Elf Sohne and that Brod had read it, but 
also the clear indication that the stories allegedly representative 
I 
of' the sons were, at that stage, incomplete or at least not yet in a 
form the author regarded,as final. However, according to reliable 
evidence from other sources (Pasley/Wagenbach, 1964:164; 1965:67; 
Binder, 1975:223f.), it is known that Elf Bohne was, almost certainly 
composed towards the end of March, 1917, which must be regarded as 
the datum ante quem for the conversation between Kafka and Brod. Yet, 
by that time, two of the pieces in the list adopted by Pasley were not 
only complete; each 0£ them had also appeared in print no fewer than 
three times. The works in question are Vor dem Gesetz and Ein Traum. 
As Dietz (1982) has just demonstrated, the former was first published 
in the journal Selbs-twehr, in September, 1915, then in the literary 
almanac Vom jilngsten Tag, 1916 (actually 1915) and in a second, re-
' 
vised edition of the same anthology, printed ~n November, 1916 (op.cit.: 
62, 74, 82), while Ein Trawn was published in two separate literary 
journals during 1916, Das judische Prag and Der Almanach der neuen 
Jugend auf das Jahr ·1917,, then in the Prager Tagblatt of 6th January, 
1917 (ibid.: 83f .) . In the light of this information, it would obvious-
' 
ly be nonsensical for Kafka, at some time after the end of March, 1917, 
to refer to either of these works as "Geschichten, an denen ich jetzt 
' gerade arbei te". Consequently the list adopted by Pasley and his. 
resultant series of ostensible identifications must both be rejected, 
while the related dates of composition clearly need to be reconsidered. 
The second, more general problem raised by Kafka's statement 
is the necessity to decide whether it is to be taken literally or not. 
In other words, given the fallacy of Pasley's argument, should 
scholars continue to cast about for a group of stories that Kafka 
evidently had in mind, or should they construe his remark to Brod in 
some other way? To answer this question'with complete certainty is 
now, of course, impossible. However, there are certain indicators 
which make it very improbable, indeed, that Kafka meant his words to 
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be taken literally. Not the least among these is the fact that Brod, 
himself, did not understand him in this fashion. After all, he was 
not only present when Kafka passed the remark, but has also reported 
that, even when Kafka was discussing his will, the two of them spoke 
"in jenem scherzhaften Ton ( ..• ) , der unter uns i.iblich war, jedoch 
mit dem heimlichen Ernst, den wir dabei stets einer bei dem andern 
voraussetzten" (Pz 318). It would not seem unreasonable, therefore, 
to suspect a degree of irony or 'jocular seriousness' on this 
occasion as well. 
Much weightier evidence against a literal interpretation, however, 
is to be found in Kafka's conception of the creative writer and of 
literat9re as art. At the end of September, 1917, he noted in his 
diary that he would find true happiness as an author only if he could 
raise "die Welt ins Reine, Wahre, Unveranderliche" (Tb 534), and 
years later, in his exchanges with Janouch, he attributed this aim 
to the creative writer in general: "Literatur bemiiht sich, die Dinge 
in ein angenehmes, gefalliges Licht zu stellen. Der Dichter ist 
aber gezwungen, die Dinge in den Bereich der Wahrheit, Reinheit und 
Dauer emporzuheben" (Gk 84). Indeed, lasting truth and its light 
are frequently associated, in his recorded connnents, with the nature 
and purpose of creative writing: "Dichtung ist immer nur eine 
Expedition nach der Wahrheit ( ••. ).Die Wahrheit ist das, was jeder 
Mensch zum Leben braucht und <loch von niemand bekormnen oder erstehen 
kann. Jeder Mensch muB sie aus dem eigenen Inneren irmner wieder 
produzieren, sonst vergeht er. Leben ohne Wahrheit ist unmoglich" 
I 
(Gk 224); "Unsere Kunst ist ein von der Wahrheit Geblendet-Sein: Das 
Licht au1f dem zuruckweichenden Fratzengesicht ist wahr, sonst nichts" 
(Hv 46, 93f .) ; nDie Kunst fliegt um die Wahrhei t, aber mit der 
e~1tschiedenen Absicht, s ich nicht zu verbrennen. Ihre Fahigkeit 
j 
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besteht darin, in der dunklen Leere einen Ort zu finden, wo der 
Strahl des Lichts, ohne daB dies vorher zu erkennen gewesen ware, 
I 
kraftig a'ngefangen werden kann" (Hv 104). From these and other 
I 
examples that could be quoted (e.g. Br 27; Tb 563f.; Bf 595; Gk 74£., 
191, 231), it must surely follow that, unless Kafka was being total-
ly untrue to himself, he could not possibly have indulged in the 
form of literary mystification which is now so widely attributed to 
him. But in case there should still be some lingering doubt, one 
final sentence from his conversations with Janouch should help to 
dispel it: "Die Kunst ist nicht eine' Frage der rasch dahinschwindenden 
Verblliffung, sondern des lange wirkenden Beispiels" (Gk 220). 
Assuming, then, that Kafka's remark to Brod was not intended 
to be taken literally, what meaning, if any, is to be attached to it? 
The only valid means of answering this question is to undertake a 
detailed, non-allegorical analysis of the text in question, since, 
from the literary point of view, it is the work that gives signifi-
cance to Kafka's explanation and not vice versa. And although such 
an analysis will be provided later in this study, it now becomes 
necessary to anticipate its findings, if this discussion, itself, is 
not to conclude in mystification. 
Like Die Sorge des Hausvaters, Elf Sohne implicitly challenges 
the notion of fatherhood as an unequivocal and enduring existential 
value. This it does by indirectly presenting a father whose loving 
dissatisfaction with his children derives not so much from the particu-
lar faults of each son as 1from the father's own knowledge that, in 
them, he has failed to overcome himself. The positive fulfilment he 
had evidently hoped to find in procreation has been ·denied him. In 
his sons he has merely propagated his own imperfection. 
'To anyone familiar with Kafka' s constant criticisms of his own 
28. 
work, the ironic meaning of his statement will now be only too 
apparent. So will the futility of attempts to identify the individ-
ual sons with particular texts, since at various times Kafka was 
inclined to incinerate the lot. As for the specific number of eleven 
sons and eleven stories, an explanation will be offered in the appro-
priate place. At this juncture, the crucial point to be reiterated 
is that Pasley's admittedly ingenious and profoundly influential 
interpretations of Kafka's three works are simply an extreme fonn of 
that pervasive, but entire'ly ill-founded, critical method which 
either deems Kafka's literary texts to be actual allegories or 
arbitrarily treats them as if they were. Once and for all, it 
should be acknowledged that there is no reliable evidence to support 
this allegorical theory or practice and that, regardless of the 
multifarious fonns it may assume, it should finally be abandoned by 
serious Kafka interpreters (cf. Gk 205). 
ParaboUk 
At the same time as E. Heller, Anders and Emrich were attempt-
ing to reduce the confusion in Kafka studies by rejecting what they 
regarded as false interpr~tative methods and proposing various alter-
natives, another group of scholars began to adopt a radically differ-
ent approach. Led by Politzer, who, within a decade of Kafka's 
death, had asserted that analysis of Vor dem Gesetz·demonstrated 
"die Unmoglichkeit eines eindeutigen Ergebnis ses" (Politzer, 1934: 
77), these writers inclined increasingly to the belief that the reason 
for the ever widening range of views about Kafka's works lay not so 
much in the preconceptions of misguided ideologues as in the actual 
nature or structure of the texts themselves. In other words, whereas 
previous interpreters, whether allegorical or not, had tacitly 
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assumed that each of Kafka's works could have but one meaning and 
that the task of explication consisted in uncovering and defining 
that particular meaning, this school of thought maintained, to the 
cpntrary, that all of the works were actually and inherently mehr-
deutig, vieZdeutig or ambiguous and thus open to a potentially infin-
ite number of valid, divergent readings. 
Although this theory had been anticipated in earlier statements 
by Pol:i.tzer (1934; 1939; 1946; 1950),Bense (1952:90),Martini (1954: 
303) and even Emrich (1954:230), its first explicit proponent seems 
to have been Busacca ('I 958). Discussing Ein Landarzt~Busacca argued 
' tp.at the story was structured acco.rding to a "comparatively simple" 
I 
system of "prima.ry relations'.' (op.cit.:49) based on two age-old 
notions about the nature of earthly reality: 
The world assumed by Aesop is rational and orderly. 
The only variables. are the sentient beings. But such 
a construction of the world has, in human history, 
stood only as Working Hypothesis A. Working hypo-
thesis B, equally ancient, assumes a world in which 
tragedy is natural and inevitable, assumes that order 
is not a fact of nature but a limited and fallible 
human construct. In the 11B" world, which is perhaps 
as valid as the "A", any rationale of behaviour which 
assumes a thoroughly orderly universe must be more or 
less mistaken, tragic to participate in, comic to view 
- if viewed, with detachment, from a "B" world standpoint. 
Franz.Kafka, who properly regarded his writings as 
comic, is clearly of the "B" world. 
(ibid.: 45£.) 
Having thus defined the 'primary relations', Busacca then gives 
his explanation of the story: "A man glimpses the 'B' world, and is 
shocked, out of 'rationalistic complacency', out of the 'A' world, 
for the shock transforms his sense of his own human role, jolts him 
into a new ontology" (ibid.: 49). And since this sytem of 'primary 
relations' is, of necessity, very general, it allows of many specific 
interpretations: "Taken as oracle ( ... ), if one picks vocabulary 
' from' the 'B' worl.d, or as sZide ruZe, if from the 'A', the story may 
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be particularised, for those who insist upon particularisations, in 
the contexts of numberless analogues; for once the primary relations 
are apparent, there is no problem in providing termini" (ibid.:51). 
Furthermore, all of these "analogues offered by the explicators are 
perfectly sound; what is ridiculous is the insistence of each expli-
cator that the others are wrong" (ibid.: 46) . 
However extreme Busacca's views may appear, even today, they 
were nevertheless very quickly and firmly supported by the much more 
detailed, wide-ranging studies of Pongs (1960), Dentan (1961) and 
Politzer (1962; 1965). For, despite obvious differences among these 
three scholars in their approach, ,terminology and degree of tolerance 
towards previous interpretations (cf. Politzer, 1962:10£.), they 
were unanimous in affirming the notion that the very essence of Kafka's 
works resided in their intrinsic VieZdeutigkeit, and that this 
quality derived from what a contemporary grammarian might term their 
'deep structure' or as Hillmann (1964:165; I967:208ff.), borrowing 
from Mahler (1958:46ff.), was to put it, theModeU they embodied. 
Thus there became established a mode of critical theory and practice 
which was to dominate Kafka scholarship throughout the 1960' s and 
beyond, as is witnessed by the writings of Garaudy (1963:177), 
Altenhoner (I964:67f.), Hillmann (1964:166; 1965: 270; 1967:210), 
Hasselblatt (l964:144f.), P. Heller (1966;1974), Fingerhut (1969:299), 
Gaier (1969) and Sussman (1977:49). 
Yet, for all the valuable insights provided by these-scholars, 
not least in their attempts to define the actual structure of Kafka's 
works, their central argument is profoundly flawed. Quite apart from 
the unjustified relativism implicit in their regarding all forms of 
Kafka interpretation as being equally valid or invalid, they also 
assumed that Kafka's work was essentially static, a long series of 
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variations on one bnsic, abstract structure of relations or ideas, 
I w~en their own analyses clearly show that it is not. By far their 
most serious error, however, was their failure to realise that, in 
proposing Modelle of Kafka's works, they were also engaging in 
interpretation and thus falling victims to their own argument. For 
if it is true that Kafka's works are inherently mehrdeutig, viel-
deutig or ambiguous and that all interpretations of them are therefore 
equally valid or invalid, then the second of these propositions must 
apply to the first as well, since that, too~ is an interpretation. 
I 
Consequently, the argument is self-defeating. The same conclusion 
can be reached in another way as well. To maintain that Kafka's 
works are intrinsically vieldeutig is simultaneously to assert, at 
least in the terms of these scholars, that the works are incapable 
of being reduced to a single interpretation. Yet, in order to assert 
that the works are vieldeutig, one must do precisely what, according 
to these scholars, their own proposition precludes, that is, one 
must reduce the works to a single interpretation, nam~ly, that they 
are vieldeutig. Thus, as already pointed out, such an argument is 
10gically impossible and should be totally repudiated. So, too, 
should t~e use of that now ubiquitous, but generally quite inappro-
priate term 'parable', which these scholars popularised as a 
description of some, if not all ofKafka's literary structures in 
' their allegedly inherent Vieldeutigkeit. 
The first to designate one of Kafka's works a parable seems to 
have been Politzer (1939), but critical discussion of the term's 
applicability did not begin until the 1950 1 s, when the studies of 
Heselhaus (1952) and Heldmann (1953) appeared. And according to both 
of these scholars, the nature of the parable resides essentially in 
its content, which relates the contingent and human to the absolutef 
I I ~ 
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divine. Referring to the various transformed beings in Kafka 1 s 
works, Heselhaus puts the matter thus: 
Die Kafkasche Metamorphose ist weder marchenhaft noch 
mythisch: sie gehort in einen theologischen Bereich. 
Ich wtirde sie ( ... ) als paPaboZische Metamorphose 
bezeichnen; d.h. sie weist schon als Phanomen, als 
bloBes Geschehnis Uber sich hinaus.( ..• ) Die Geschlagen-
heit der Kreatur, die Erfahrung des Menschseins als 
eines kreatlirlich - gefahrdeten Zustandes wird das Tor 
zum Absoluten,· indem der sinnbildliche Charakter - die 
Bezogenheit des Menschen auf ein Hoheres, Absolutes -
in der Sprache, in den Bildern, im Vorgang des Erzahlten 
faBbar wird (op.cit.:366). 
In a very similar vein, Heldmann asserts: "Es wird namlich 
die Erfahrensweise eines bestimmten Verhaltnisses des Menschen zum 
Absoluten sichtbar. In Anlehnung an diese - in der Parabel 
vorherrschende - Thematik soll die Erfahrensweise dieses Verhaltnisses: 
das Parabolische genannt werden" (op .cit.: 7). 
Despite the obvious weaknesses in these statements, which, if 
they were correct, would render virtually all religious art para-
bolic, the criterion of content remained a frequent means of attempt-
ing to define the concept under consideration. Emrich (1958), for 
example, maintained that parables were possible only "vor dem Hinter-
grund einer fest umrissenen Religion, Philosophie oder Weltanschau-
ung. Der Hintergrund der Kafkaschen 'Parabeln' aber ist leer" (op. 
cit.:77). Pangs (1960) disagreed with Emrich, but apart from 
acknowledging the didactic purpose of the genre, still discussed it 
very largely in terms of content: "Wie einst parabola die Gleichnisreden 
Jesu bezeichneten, erwachst hier die gleichnishafte Lehrform, einer 
absurden Zeit ihr Gleichnis des Absurden vor die Augen zu bringen, 
damit sie sich selbst in den Fangen des Bosen erkennt, ein licht-
loses Geschlecht in der Welt als Labyrinth 11 (op.cit.:.53; s.a. 60ff.). 
Finally, Politzer (1962), while adding the ostensibly structural 
notion of VieZdeutigkeit, also equated the parable with a particular 
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Kafka ever wrested from the silence surround-
' 
ing him was the insight 'that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, 
and this we already knew' . The phrase is taken from a longer aphor-
ism with the revealing title, ,on Parables. ( ... ) (Kafka' s) parables 
are as multilayered as their Biblical models. But, like them, 
I 
I 
I 
they·are also multifaceted, ambiguous, and capable of so many inter-
, 
pretations that, in the final analysis, they defy any and all" (op. 
cit.:21). 
Recognising.the fallacy of attempting to define a literary 
genre exclusively or· even primarily according to its thought-content, 
Mahler (1958) sought to provide a more adequate justification for 
applying the term 'parable' to the works of Kafka and other modern 
writers. Accepting, like Heselhaus (1966:9), the definitions in 
Jiilicher' s unfortunately quite outdated two-volume study Die Gleich-
nisreden Jesu of 1888/89 (cf. McDonald, 1966:1827) and adopting 
Kahler's view (1953) that the modern novel was transforming itself 
"zur Parabel,, zur Beispielsgeschichte, deren Vorgang von vornherein 
nur das Medell einer spirituellen Erfahrung, wenn nicht gar einer 
Lehre ist" (op.cit.:34), Mahler undertook a structural analysis of 
the genre and arrived at the following conclusions: 
Dieser Typ de:~r Erzahlung, die modellhaft eine Flille 
von prinzipiell gleichgebauten Situationen analogieartig 
enthalt und sozusagen eine Ur-oder Elementarsituation 
reprasentiert, die in unzahligen Alltagssituationen 
mehr oder weniger aufleuchten kann, soll hier (im AnschluB 
an Jiilicher) parabolische Erzahlung oder Parabel genannt 
werden. Wichtig ist, daS das Detail nicht identifiziert 
werden darf. Weil die Parabel nur der geistigen Wirklich-
keit des Prpblems, bzw. des "Sinnes" verpflichtet ist und . 
von diesem ihre Realitat - aus zweiter Hand - bezieht, ist 
sie uneigentliche Darstellung, als solche der "Natur" 
nicht verpflichtet und eine nichtrealistische Erzahlform 
wie auch die Allegorie. Der bedeutendste und auch 
ausschlieBlichste Vertreter dieser Gattung in der Moderne 
ist Franz Kafka. 
(op .cit.: 46f.) 
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Later, he also speaks of the "Vieldeutigkei t und Allgerneinheit im 
Besonderen der dargestell ten Situation, die der Gattung Parabel 
eigen ist" (ibid.: 74) . 
Despite certain important refinements to Mahler's theory pro-
posed by Hillrnann (1964:163ff.), Sokel (1967), Flilleborn (1969) and 
especially Elm ( 1976), the actual substance of his definition has 
gained almost universal acceptance, as is witnessed not only by the 
currency his broad sense of the term has gained among the vast major-
ity of Kafka scholars, but also by the continuing flow of publications 
which directly or indirectly support his arguments, e.g. Eastman 
(1960), Wiese (1962), Auden (1963)~ Henel (1963), Deinert (1964), 
Brandstetter (1966), Brettschneider (1971), Lawson (1972), H. Kraft 
(1972), Wcische (1976) and Pascal (1974; 1977; 1980) . 5 At least one 
scholar, however, ultimately came to the realisation that, before 
Mahler's definition could be allowed to stand, it needed to be 
thoroughly tested against the findings of more recent Biblical 
scholarship, since it was, after all, on the conclusions of much 
earlier Biblical analysis that its validity so heavily depended. 
Consequently, Philippi ( 1969) undertook a review of relevant exegeti-
cal studies by contemporary German, evangelical theologians, espec-
ially Linnemann, Bultmann and Fuchs. And the principal outcome of 
his survey was a revised distinction between the terms Gle·ich:nis 
and Parabel 3 according to their structure, content and purpose: 
Das Gleichnis - bisher von uns in dem weiten Sinn 
gebraucht, der eine recht undifferenzierte Verwendung 
der Begriffe Gleichnis und Parabel erlauben konnte -
unterscheidet sich, gebraucht man den Begriff in einem 
engeren, spezifischeren Sinn,als wir es bisher mit der 
Tradition -getan haben, deutlich von der Parabel. Es bau t 
auf dem Vergleich auf, bei dem etwas flir ein anderes 
eintritt. Es erweitert ihn zum Satz, zur Erzahlung. 
Es schildert vor allem "einen typischen Zustand oder 
typischen bzw. regelmaEigen Vorgang". In jedem Fall 
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beruft es sich auf Allgemeingliltiges. Das Bild ist aus 
der alltaglichen, jedem zugnnglichen Wirklichkeit genommen; 
es besitzt die Autoritat des allgemein Bekannten (op.cit.:31lf). 
Die Parabel flihrt ein Verhalten, das die Situation 
erfordert, an einem entsprechenden, aber nicht deckungs-
gleichen vcr. Die Erzahlung notigt zur Wertung: Sie soll 
von ihrero Zentrum her auf eine andere Ebene, vom "Bild" 
auf die "Sache" libertragen werden. Ihre Anschaulichkeit 
fingiert Realitat. Die analogia, Entsprechung zur Sache 
verlangt, diese aufzufinden, zu ihr ilberzugehen. 
Dabei hat die Parabel nur einen zentralen Vergleichspunkt, 
ohne Vergleichspartikel zu benutzen. Die (erzahlte) 
Wirklichkeit wird van einem vorausliegenden her auf einen · 
van einer Argumentationsabsicht gesteuerten Ablauf 
reduziert, peitenkomplexe werden weitgehend ausgeschaltet. 
( ... )Die Parabel ist eine Form des Denkens so sehr wie 
eine des Erzahlens. Sie muB bewuBt gebraucht werden; 
sie hat ein Ziel, das sie erkennbar machen will. Sie 
lehrt aber nicht, sondern fordert zum Vollzug auf. 
(ibid .325f.) 
The first point that needs to'be made about this distinction 
is that it does not have the support of at least one of Philippivs 
main authorities, Fuchs (ibid.:314). The second and far more import-
ant point, however, is that, if one applies Philippi's criteria with 
any rigour to those passages designated as parables in the synoptic 
gospels ·of 1~e Jerusalem Bible (1966), then not just a few, but a 
clear majority of them fit into neither of his categories. For 
some, including the famous story of the good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37), 
a~e parabolisch in their content and lack of a Vergleichspartikel, 
but nevertheless quite openly teach (e.g. Mk 12:1-12; Lk 16:1-8, 
18:9-14, 19:11-17, 20:9-19), while others are parabolisch as regards 
Vergleichspartikel and explicit teaching, but are gleichnishaft in 
content (e.g. Mt 13:4-9; Mk 4:1-9; Lk 8:4-8). Similarly, some are 
gleichnishaft in containing a Vergleichspartikel and an overt 
lesson, but are more parabolisch in content (e.g. Mt 13:24-30, 
22:1-14, 25:1-13, 15:14-30), while others are gleichnishaft in 
content and teaching, but lack a Vergleichspartikel (e.g. Mt 21: 
28-32; Mk 4:21-23, 4:24-25; Lk 8: 16-18). Obviously, then, Philippi's 
proposed distinction is invalid and should be rejected, despite the 
I 
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accurate insights his article otherwise affords. However, if one 
combines certain of these insights with those of some contemporary, 
English-speaking exegetes (Navone, 1964; McDonald, 1966; Galloway, 
1967), there emerges a sufficiently clear image of the parable to 
finally demonstrate whether and to what extent Kafka's works may 
truly be described as exempliyfing this genre. 
In the joint, though not always unanimous view of these scholars, 
a parable is a brief, essentially narrative statement, sometimes no 
longer than a s~ngle sentence (e.g. Mt 13:33, 44-46), which serves to 
teach one quite specific point by means of self-evident analogy or 
"a developed comparison" (Galloway., 1967: 1954). Although this in-
dispensable analogical framework (cf. Philippi, 1969:314f .) need not 
tq,ke the direct form of an explicit simile ("The kingdom of heaven 
is like .•. "), it must neverthele,ss be unequivocally established by 
the innnediate context, if the parable is to achieve its overtly 
didactic purpose (cf. parables of the good Samaritan, the prodigal 
son, etc.). Furthermore, because each parable is intended to clarify 
only a single point, all its content is subordinated to that particu-
lar end. Consequently, ·any attempt to elaborate parallels between the 
details of the things compared is alien to its nature and results in 
allegoresis, at least one example of which is provided by the synoptic 
gospels, themselves 11 (Mt, 13:18-23; Mk 4:13-20; Lk 8: 11-15) and has been 
I 
explained by Galloway ( 1967) as "a later formulation by which the 
early church adapted the teaching of Christ to contemporary needs in 
a perennially valid way" (op.cit.: 1959; cf. McDonald, 1966:1823, 
1826; Navone, 1964:924). 
If one accepts this current definition (cf. Elm, 1976:492ff.), 
it will be obvious that to classify all or even most of Kafka's 
' I I 
works as parables 'or 'parabolische Erzi.ihlungen' is simply to 
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misunderstand the nature of the genre in question, a view towards 
which Binder (1966:197; 1979b:58ff.) also inclines. For, of the 
collected texts now published, only two satisfy a~l the criteria of 
the parable: Vor dem Gesetz in its original context of Der Froze~ 
(Pz 255f.) and Eine kaiserliche Botschaft in its original context of 
Beim Bauder chinesischen Mauer (BkI 77f.) . 6 Removed from their 
original contexts, however, as they are in the Landarzt collection, 
even these two works cease to be parables. 
In the face of these conclusions, it might easily be objected 
that a definition of the parable based on New Testament studies is 
irrelevant to Kafka, since he was not writing in the Christian tradi-
tion. Consequently, it needs to be pointed out that the above 
dqfinition is not based exclusively on the evidence of the gospels, 
but also encompasses the theory and practice of Hellenic, Old Testa-
ment and Rabbinical literature as surveyed by Galloway (s.a. Hesel-
haus, 1966). And since these traditions are the very sources of 
our term 'parable', they must be relevant to its definition at any 
time and with reference to any writer. 
Some scholars, however, maintain that Kafka and many other 
modern writers have radically modified this tradition by creating an 
"open parable" (Eastman, 1960; H.Kraft,1972:61). What is to be made 
of their claims? Again, the answer is quite straightforward. Such 
a modification is manifestly and completely irreconcilable with the 
nature of the genre at issue. For a parable which is not 'a develop-
ed comparison' , which lacks a self-evident and quite specific 
an(:llogical framework, is simply no parable at all. Consequently, 
this and similar theories about the so-called modern parable must be 
regarded not only as unproven, but also as unprovable. 
Finally, there remains the related matter of Kafka's piece 
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entitled Von den Gleichnissen (BkI 95), which was probably composed 
between the end of 1922 and the middle of 1923 (cf. Pasley/Wagenbach, 
1964:74; Binder, 1975:299). Apart from Politzer (1962; 1965), many 
scholars have provided commentaries on this text (s. Beicken, 1974: 
168ff.) and, like Politzer, they have all assumed that~in using the 
term Gleichnis~ Kafka intends 'parable' in the Biblical or some 
7 
allegedly modern sense. However, from the one example of Gleichnis 
given in the text, this assumption would appear to be unfounded. 
Viele beklagen sich, da2 die Worte der Weisen immer 
wieder nur Gleichnisse seien, aber unverwendbar im 
taglichen Leben, und nur dieses allein haben wir. Wenn 
der Weise sagt: "Gehe hinliber", someint er nicht, daB 
man auf die andere Seite hinlibergehen solle, ( ..• ) 
sondern er meint irgendein sagenhaftes Drliben, etwas, 
das wir nicht kennen, das auch von ihm nicht naher 
zu bezeichnen ist und das uns also gar nichts helfen 
kann. 
(BkI 95) 
Provided one does not approach these words with a preconceived 
notion about the meaning of Gleichnis~ it is clear that the expression 
"Gehe hinliber11 is intended as an example of the supposedly useless 
Gleichnisse of the wise, and that such an expression has as little 
in common with the traditional notion of the parable as do Goethe's 
lines from the conclusion to Faust II: "Alles Vergangliche/ist nur 
ein Gleichnis 11 (1. 12104f.). Furthermore, from the ensuing comment-
ary in the text, it becomes apparent that what the speaker has in 
mind is not, as Gaier (1969:294) believes, similes, but rather meta-
phors or, more generally, the figurative use of language. In other 
words, the meaning being attached to the term Gleichnis in this con-
text 1s very close to the following definition provided by one of 
Kafka's favourite references (cf. Br 169; Brod, 1954:130, 259; Wagen-
bach, 1958:90£,), namely, Grimm's Deutsches Worterbuch: '"Sinnbild', 
'Abbild' flir ein Verhaltnis tieferer Bedeutsamkeit besonders dort, 
. I 
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wo ein Sichtbares ein Unsichtbares, ein Greifbares ein Ungreifbares 
ausdrilckt, ein au~erer Gegenstand oder Vorgang bildhaft oder gestalt-
haft einen inneren verkorpert, reprasentiert". That this meaning of 
Gleichnis was current in Kafka's day is demonstrated by the sources 
quoted in Grim.~~ and its continuing currency is attested by Emrich 
( 1958) , who emphatically denies that Kafka' s works are Parabeln, 
but readily grants them "einen Gleiclmischarakter" (Qp.cit.:81). 
Viewed in this light, Von den Gleichnissen becomes a statement not 
about the nature of parables, but about the nature of language and, 
as such, it is anticipated by the diary entry of 6th December, 1921: 
"Die Metaphern sind eines in dem v,ielen, was mich am Schreiben 
verzweifeln laBt" (Tb 550), as well as the aphorism of 8th December, 
1917: "Die Sprache kann filr alles auBerhalb der sinnlichen Welt nur 
andeutungsweise, aber niemals auch nur annahernd vcrgleichsweise 
gebraucht werden, da sie, entsprechend der sinnlichen Welt, nur vom 
Besitz und seinen Beziehungen handelt" (Hv 45, 92) . 
. 
From the deliberations o.f this section, then, three main con-
clusions follow. First, the claim that Kafka 1 s works are inherently 
vieldeutig and that all interpretations are therefore equally valid 
or invalid is a self-defeating argument and iogi~ally impossible. 
Second, with the exception of Vor dem Gesetz and Eine kaiserliche 
B~tschaft in their original contexts, none of Kafka's works can be 
designated a parable without simultaneously contradicting the essent-
ial meaning of that term. Third, Kafka's use of the word Gleichnis 
bears no relation whatever to the traditional and still current under-
i' 
standing of the litera~y genre 'parable'. ~11 of the widely held 
views opposed to these conclusions are therefore in need of revision. 
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Einsinnigkeit 
Even before Kafka's works had been expounded as parabolic and 
inherently vieZdeutig, yet another alternative to their allegorisa-
t_ion had been conceived and enunciated. This time the aim was to 
achieve true philological rigo,ur, the scholars 1 overriding concern 
being not with speculative interpretation, but with the precise ana-
lysis and description of literary form. More specifically, the 
exponents of this critical method sought to provide a genuinely 
sound basis for the understanding of Kafka 1 s texts by defining the 
actual nature and implications of the author's narrative technique, 
above all his use of perspective or point of view. 
Initiating this approach, BeiBner (1952) made the following 
crucial assertion: "Kafka erzahlt, was anscheinend bisher nicht 
bemerkt warden ist, stets einsinnig, nicht nur in der Ich-Form, 
sondern auch in der dritten Person" (op .cit.: 28). What this means, 
in BeiBner's view, is that each of Kafka's workp is narrated exclus-
ively through its central character: "nichts wird ohne ihn oder gegen 
ihn, nichts in seiner Abwesenheit erztihlt, nur seine Gedanken ( ••. ) 
weiB der Erzahler mitzuteilen" (loc.cit.). Since "die innere Welt" 
is, therefore, the subject of Kafka's stories and the narrator does 
not adopt the stance of a dispassionate observer, "so bleibt ihm kein 
anderer Platz als in der Seele seiner Hauptgestalt:'er erzahlt sich 
selbst ( •.. )"(ibid.:29). As a consequence, none of Kafka's narrators, 
whether first-person or' third-person, ever seems to know more than 
his characters or the reader at any given moment in time: "Der 
Erzahler ( ... ) ist nirgends dem Erzahlten voraus, auch wenn er im 
I 
Praeteritum erzahlt. Das Geschehen erzahlt sich selber im Augenb:J_ick, 
in paradox praeteritaler Form ( ... )" (ibid.:32). Thus the narrator 
is "nicht nur mit der Hauptgestalt eines (und er ist es bei Kafka 
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auch dann, wenn er in der dritten Person erzahlt), sondern auch mit 
dem Erzahlten" (ibid.: 34). It is because Kafka' s narrators lack 
any ,distance from the figures and events of their narratives that one 
finds in the latter "keine Reflexion iiber die Gestalten und iiber 
deren Handlungen und Gedanken. Es gibt nur den sich selbst (paradox 
praeterital) erzahlenden Vorgang" (ibid.:35). Finally, owing to 
the identity between the narrator and the narrated in Kafka's works, 
the author transforms "nicht nur sich selbst, sondern auch den Leser 
in die Hauptgestalt. Er tritt keinen Augenblick aus dem auf das 
Innerseelische der Hauptgestalt gerichteten und um dieses Inner-
s0elische erweiterten Zusammenhang heraus und entlaBt auch den Leser 
nicht daraus, laBt ihn nicht los" (ibid.:36). 
Despite the quite remarkable nature of BeiBner's enterprise 
in his analysis of Kafka's oeuvre and the even more remarkable manner 
in which some of his conclusions are expressed, neither his first 
monograph nor its successor (BeiBner, 1958) attacted much critical 
attention. Indeed, apart-from Martini (1954:292ff.), Wiese (1956:_327f.) 
and Pascal ( 1956: 249), all of whom accepted his theory in varying 
degrees, no other major scholar was to take cognisance of it for at 
least a decade, so that even Politzer (1962) still made no reference 
to it or its sequel in Walser (1961). The most likely reason for 
this neglect was BeiBner's apparent failure to demonstrate the rele-
vance of his theories to the task of interpretation. Yet, from the 
very beginning, the link between the two had always been present, 
as Martini (1954) clearly perceived, when he construed Einsinnigkeit 
as placing the phenomena of Kafka' s world "in einen autonomen Raum 
der Existenz", inaccessible to human interpretation (op .ci t,: 307), 
and as thus accounting for the essential mysteriousness and Viel-
deutigkeit of the works (ibid.:303). For his part, however, BeiBner 
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originally drew the inference that, if his theory were correct, then 
the texts should be interpreted as studies in delusion. Thus Die 
Verwandlung presented "die traumhaft verzerrte Einsamkeit des er-
kranktenHelden, der sich in ein ungeheueres Ungeziefer verwandelt 
wahnt" (BeiBner, 1952:36), while in Der "Proze/3 it was, in this opinion, 
all too evident,- "daB alles, daB der gauze ProzeB ein innerseelisches 
Wahnbild eines in voUstandiger Erschopfung isolierten Geistes ise' 
(ibid.:39£.). But in his last two monographs, BeiBner (1963;1972) 
considerably modified this position. Drawing on various frequently 
quoted passages from Kafka's diaries (e.g.Tb 420) and notebooks (e.g. 
Hv 72), he now concluded that the ~arks were the representation of 
the author's "traumhaften,innernLebens"(l963:18f.), that their images 
were "Traumassoziationen" (ibid.:29), and that Kafka had created 
this "innere Welt", which can only be lived and not described (loc. 
cit .) , in opposition to "der gottverlassenen modernen Zeit" (ibid.: 
33), as a defence against the contemporary "auBere Welt der Trtimmer 
( •.. ); gegen sie stellt Kafka seine unzerstorbare, innere, erschrie-
bene Welt: sein traumhaftes, inneres Leben" (1972:11). Just how 
this made the works relevant to anyone but Kafka, except as a form 
of ultimately inexplicable, nightmarish escape (cf. BeiBner, 1963: 
29), BeiBner unfortunately did not indicate. 
Ironically, the work that finally gave currency to BeiBner's 
theories was one which considerably revised, even radicalised his 
ideas and had originally been submitted to him as a doctoral dissert-
ation ten years earlier, namely, Walser's study (1961) of the three 
novels. Agreeing with BeiBner that Kafka dispenses with the 
-
"erscheinenden Erzahler" (op.cit.:22) and places "den Gesichtspunkt 
der Perspektive seines Erzahlens in den Helden" (ibid.:23), so that 
the reader experiences everything "mi t ihm und <lurch ihn" (ibid.: 49) , 
' ' I 
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Walser nevertheless departs from BeiBner in preferring to describe 
the relationship between author and central character as one of 
I 
congruence rather than identity: "Wir vermeiden es, van Identitat 
zu sprechen, weil uns daran liegt, die Deckung van Autor und Held 
technologisch zu sehen. Kongruenz heiBt nicht, was Identitat heiBen 
konnte, daB der Held mit dem Autor meinungsidentisch ist. In der 
Kongruenz decken sich Autor und Held, wenn manes recht versteht, nur 
auBerlich, das heiBt: erzahlungstechnisch" (ibid.: 135). Regrettably, 
however, Walser never once explains the grounds for his distinction, 
that is, the criteria by which he has decided that the congruence 
between author and 'hero' is limit,ed merely to the perceptual; yet 
the point is cn1c i al to the remainder' of his arguments about the 
nature of Kafkars works. 
Similarly, although Walser agrees that everything constituting 
the three novels is filtered through the central character, he does 
not believe, like BeiBner, that this creates an 'interior world' 
representing the psyche of either the 'heroes' or the author. On 
the contrary, taking into account the nature of time, space and 
char<;cter in these works, Walser is convinced, "daB es sich nicht 
um eine abgebildete, die vorhandene Wirklichkeit adaquat reprasen-
tierende Welt handelt" (ibid.: 140) . Rather, Kafka' s novels embody 
"eine Welt, die dem BewuBtsein gegenliber, das sie erschuf, Unabhangig-
keit erlangt" (ibid.:I 14), an ontologically autonomous world that 
i~ 'intrasubjective' (loc .cit .) , even 'transcendental' (ibid.: 103), 
and distinguished "vorwiegend <lurch ihre Geschaffenheit" (ibid.: 49). 
Within such an autonomously "organisierten Welt" (ibid.:58), 
Walser maintains,everything is subordinated to "Funktionalismus" 
(;i.bid. :59). This applies not only to the whole "Gegenwelt" 
i' 
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e~countered by the 'hero' and the circumstances in which he encounters 
it (time and space), but also to the 'hero' himself. For while the 
former exists solely for the purpose of "Aufhebung" (ibid.: 79ff .) , 
the latter's overriding function is self-assertion: "Die Relation, in 
der die Ordnungen zueinander existieren, ist die Aufgehobenhe.i t. 
Diese ist prinzipiell vorhanden. Sie wird von den Helden immer wieder 
durch die Behauptung ihrer eigenen Existenz gekilndigt. Die K.s sind 
wesentlich auf nichts anderes als diese Behauptung h:l.n angelegt: . 
Behauptung ist ihr fundamentaler Existenzbeweis; der der Gegenordnung 
ist die Entfernung (als Vollzug)" (ibid.:86). Furthermore, "da die 
Gegenordnung unerschopflich an aufhebender Kraft ist" (loc .cit.), the 
struggle of Kafka's 'heroes' "gegen das Aufgehobenwerden" is "endlos" 
(loc.cit.). "Das heiBt also, als allgemeinste Aussage ilber Kafkas 
Romane, daB Tun seinen pragmatischen Sinn verliert; jedem Tun ist 
seine Aufhebung immanent, weil es bei Kafka nur Tun von einander 
fremden Ordnungen gibt, und diese heben ihnen seinsfremde Tatig-
keit eo ipso auf. Darum wird die Wiederholung zu einer Notwendigkeit" 
(ibid.: 87). The "Sinn" of Kafka' s novels is therefore "eigentlich 
Sinnlosigkeit11 (ibid.:117). Thus, in the same way that BeiBner (1952: 
6ff,) had begun by denouncing allegorical 'translators' of Kafka's 
works, but had ultimately arrived at a form of biographism, if not 
Freudianism, Walser, too, rejects all "dichtungsfremden Kommentare-" 
(op.cit.:11) on the very first page of his text, but eventually 
reaches exactly the same conclusion as Camus, who allegorises Kafka's 
oeuvre in terms of absurdist philosophy (Camus, 1948). And yet Walser 
steadfastly asserts that his analysis has in no way involved inter-
pretation (op.cit.:129) ! 
Immediateiy after the publication of Walser' s study, though not 
always in response to it, Einsinnigkeit became increasingly the 
I 
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subject of critical discussion. Some scholars simply accepted the 
notion, at least in its technical aspects, without demur (Rhein, 
1964:22; Jahn, 1965:6, 104; Pasley, 1966: 7ff.). Fietz and 
Schillemeit, on the other hand, attempted to show that Einsinnigkeit 
actually implied Undeutbai~keit, that Kafka' s works displayed "die 
Verabsolutierung des einsamen, subjektiven Erlebnisses", which is 
"in sich wertfrei, d. h. moralisch nicht mehr faBbar" (Fietz, 1963: 7 5) 
or that "die Wirklichkeit, um die es in Kafkas Dichtung geht, ist 
keine andere als sie, die Dichtung selbst" (Schillemeit, 1966:579). 
Evidently it did not occur to either of them that, in regarding some-
thing as undeutbar, one is simultaneously and necessarily engaging 
in Deuten, so that their underlying argument is self-defeating. 
By far the majority of scholars, however, sought to disprove 
the theories of BeiBner and Walser by establishing the presence of a 
concealed, authorial or omniscient narrator. Wiese (1962) detected 
"eine Dis tanz zum Erzahl ten" indicating the "Dichter Kafka" behind 
the narrative (op.cit.:326), while Allemann (1963) believed Kafka's \ 
use of perspective to be "im Grunde rein funktional bestimmt, durch 
die eigentlimliche Sehweise des verborgenen Erzahlers" (op.cit.:240). 
Re-interpreting the so-called Versehen or Verfehlungen mentioned by 
Walser (1961:32, 137) and linking them with Kafka's use of sunrrnary, 
Leopold (1963) and Kudszus (1964; 1970) endeavoured to demonstrate the 
existence of important, authorial breaks in the "single limited per-
spective" (Leopold, 1963:31), but BeiBner (1972) was inclined to 
dismiss such arguments as "torichte Beckmesserei" (op .cit.: 39). 
Philippi and Langguth concentrated their attention, instead, on such 
narrative elements as the account of physical actions and .the use of 
dialogue (cf. Sokel, 1964:396), from which they deduced that, although 
"the internal drama of the narrative ( ... ) is all seen through K.' s 
1, 
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eyes" (Langguth, 1968:52),, the events which constitute "das Geriist 
der erzahlten Welt" (Philippi, 1966:21) are nevertheless presented 
in a manner that is "perspektivisch vollig neutral" (loc .cit'; cf. 
Langguth, loc.cit.). Finally and for a variety of reasons, a' signi-
ficant number of other scholars arrived at the conclusion that, while 
works like Das Urteil, Die Ve!'Wandlung and the three novels provided 
unmistakable evidence of Einsinnigkeit, the remainder of Kafka's 
texts employed a more distanced, external perspective (Au/3ensicht) 
or a combination of the two. 8 
In all of this discussion about the nature of Kafka's narrative 
perspective, however, a few scholars also suggested or actually 
stated a principle which has been widely overlooked in reviews of 
their studies (cf. Beicken, 1971:58ff.; 1974:137ff.), but which wlll 
prove to be of considerable, even crucial importance in the final 
assessment of Einsinnigkeit. Sokel (1964), for example, when distin-
guishing between Kafka's allegedly dreamlike-expressionistic stories 
and his later works, had the following to say about the latter: 
"Zwischen den Leser und die Perspektive der Gestalt schiebt sich die 
bewuBte Ironie, die der traumhaften Wirkung entgegensteht" (op.cit.: 
21). Similarly, in his study of 1966, Sokel maintained that, even 
in works like Das Urteil, Die Verwandlung and Der Proze/3, the 11prota-
gonist' s perspective, to be sure, operates for the purpose of block-
ing access to and comprehension of the truth, but the truth emerges 
through the defeat of the protagonist's consciousness" (op.cit.: 12). 
In the same year, Binder (1966), commenting on the difficulties fac-
ing the interpreter of Kafka' s works, remarked: "Wie kann man solche 
Fehlinterpretationen vermeiden, wo einen Fixpunkt flir sachgemaBe 
Interpretation finden, wenn das Vorverstandnis des empirisch Gewohnten 
fehlt? Die Antwort lautet: Man muf3 die Funktion' der Mot1.:ve 
i' 
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innerhalb des Erzahlgefalles, und an der Erzahlstruktur die Meinu.ngen 
der Figuren messen" (op.cit.: 121). The following year, Henel (1967), 
who attempted to reinterpret Kafka's einsinnige works as the con-
frontation between a guilty man and his conscience projected as 
GegemJelt., nevertheless stated: "Aber trotz der einseitigen Perspek-
tive weiB der aufmerksame Leser Uber den Helden Bescheid, denn er 
sieht mit ihm auf die Welt, in der sich die innere Situation des 
Helden spiegelt. Als auBenstehender Beobachter kann er diese 
Rzflexionen objektiv interpretieren, wahrend der Held auf sie mit 
Arger reagiert ( ... ) 11 (op.cit. :259). Finally, in 1969, Fingerhut, 
discussing some of Kafka's animal stories, observed: '"Das Groteske 
• 
entwickelt sich in Kafkas Umformungen zu dem eigentlichen Pendant 
des Marchenhaften. Auf gebaut aus der gleichen Mischung von Realem 
und Phantastischem, erzahlt aus der gleichen Einsinnigkeit der Per-
spektive, bedient es sich der Harmonie jener Erzahlgattung, um den 
Leser aus der Illusion einer im Kunstwerk erstellten, heilen Welt zu 
reiBen ( ..• )" (op.cit.:168, s.a. 182). Common to all of these views 
is at least the implied notion that, even when Kafka employs the 
technique of so-called Einsin:nigkeit, he can still distance the reader 
from the work and convey his own authorial attitudes by means of 
indirect or implicit commentary (cf~ Booth, 1961:272ff.; Chatman, 
1978:228). 
For the time being, however, this very significant point was 
generally ignored, as a third phase in the affirmation of Einsinnig-
keit was established by another member of the Tilbingen school, Kobs 
(1970). Amplifying and refining the approach of Walser, who tried 
to show that the very language of Kafka's works validated his concepts 
of Einsinnigkeit and Aufhebung (Walser,, 1961: 92££.), Kobs actually 
begins his study with an essay in detailed linguistic examination. 
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Taki~g the brief, early piece, Die Bawne, and submitting it to what 
Glinz has dubbed "inhaltsbezogene Textanalyse" (Kobs, 1970:56ff.), 
Kobs reaches the conclusion that the work's ultimate effect is to 
create an impenetrable 'paradoxical circle' (op.cit. :7-19), resulting 
from an "tibermaB an scharf s inniger Argumentation" (ibid. : ) I) • In 
his view, the essential nature of the text is consequently to be des-
cribed as "objektive Hermetik" (ibid.:33,4p), a characteristic he 
attributes to all of Kafka's other brief, more aphovistic works as 
well (ibid.:33). 
Although this first major argument in Kobs' study explicitly 
excludes the question of narrative' perspective and will therefore not 
be critically assessed until later, in the consideration of Paradoxie~ 
it nevertheless remains extremely relevant to the present discussion, 
since it provides a correlative to Kobs' understanding of Einsinnigkeit, 
which he elaborates with particular reference to Amerika or Der 
VerschoUene. Disagreeing with Walser' s conception of time in Kafka' s 
novels and deducing from this that the congruence between narrator 
and 'narrating medium' or Perspektivgestalt is not a purely technical 
matter (ibid.:25£.), he then proceeds to construe Einsinnigkeit as 
meaning, "daB al1es, was erzahlt worden ist, in der ,Art, wie es 
erzahlt warden ist, nur in der Verrnittlung <lurch Karls BewuBtsein hat 
erzahlt werden konnen" (ibid.:32). What this implies, he believes, 
is that, in the novels, there are "keine absoluten Satze und keine 
unbezweifelbare Wirklichkeit. Nicht Fakten werden hier erzahlt, 
sondern Eindrlicke~' (ibid. :33). 
Developing this point further, Kobs then maintains that, since 
Karl RoBmann's account of 'facts' can be shown to be full of inconsis-
tencies and his evaluation of people and events is possibly even more 
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unreliable, the potential interpreter is left in an imp~ssible position, 
because the narrator, having been reduced "auf die Funktion eines nur 
registrierenden Organs" (ibid.:32), fails .to provide him with any un-
equivocal criterion by which to judge what constitutes truth in the 
narrative (loc.cit.). Thus the principle of Einsinnigkeit achieves 
"flir die gro.Beren Werke erzahlenden Inhalts dasselbe wie der paradoxe 
Zirkel filr die kleine Prosa van der Art des Stlickes Die Baume" (ibid.: 
33). Indeed, the only difference between the two lies in that 
11 zwischen der 'objektiven Hermetik' des paradoxen Zirkels und der 
'subjektiven' der einsinnigen Darstellung" (ibid.: 46). In both cases, 
however, "ist die Frage nach dem Sinn 'aufgehoben' in.der doppelten 
Bedeutung des Wortes" (ibid.: 19) . As a consequence, the would-be 
commentator on the shorter works must be content to show, "weshalb 
jedes Erklaren seinen Gegenstand verliert, weshalb das Streben nach 
positiven Bestimmungen in paradoxe Zirkel umschlagt, weshalb schlieB-
lich der Bereich jenseits des Zirkels sich der Formulierbarkeit ent-
zieht11 (lac .ci t.) , while the interpreter of the longer narratives 
remains the captive of an "einsinnig erzahlte(n) Welt" and "kann 
bestenfalls ihr Sosein als Funktion der Sehweise erklaren,. nicht aber 
aus ihr heraustreten, ohne auf inhaltliche Aussagen verzichten zu 
mlissen" (ibid. :53). 
Despite its obvious indebtedness to Bei.Bner and especially 
Walser, Kobs' study undeniably constitutes an original and ingenious 
contribution to Kafka scholarship. Yet, notwithstanding its obvious 
merits, one may seriously question its alleged superiority to. its 
predecessors. Certainly it avoids the type of allegoresis into which 
BeiBner eventually strays, as well as the implicitly absurdist position 
of Walser and the self-defeating theories about Undeutbarkeit suggest-
ed by Fietz and Schillemeit. However, in the final analysis, it 
'so. 
remains extremely doubtful whether its own underlying implications 
are any more valid, let alone illuminating, than those it has sought 
' ' 
to correct. For it should not be overlooked that Kobs' ultimate con-
clusions unmistakably indicate that, at least in the case of Kafka, 
the notion of literature and literary interpretation is to be radic-
ally revised. Indeed, if his views are accepted at all, there remains 
no logical alternative to the inference that, for Kafka, literature 
is nothing more than the art of connnunicating how not to communicate, 
while the interpretation of his work becomes a mere exercise in prov-
ing this to be the case. In other words, for all his attempted philo-
logical rigour and his utter rejection of allegoresi~ (ibid.: 20££ .) , 
Kobs, like BeiBner and Walser before him, actually ends up adopting 
a position identical with that of certain allegorical commentators, 
namely, those abovementioned, increasingly numerous scholars who, on 
largely biographical evidence, interpret Kafka's works as the author's 
writing about the author's writing. That Kobs can nevertheless regard 
hi.,; findings as being "ebenso trostlich wie trostlos" and as prevent-
ing "den Einbruch des Absurden" (ibid.:29) serves only to reveal the 
fundamental irrationality of his approach. 
Given the ultimate implications of Kobs 1 arguments, it is per-· 
ha::>S not surprising to find little direct support for them J.n more 
recent studies. What is surprising, however, is that most of those 
who do confirm his views make no mention whatever of his work. One 
such is Thorlby (1972), who maintains that Kafka 1 s oeuvre represents 
"the process of describing the world when no convention is available 
to tell us what it means, not even a convention that will enable us 
to distinguish what is there from what we think is there" (op .cit. :98). 
From this he then concludes, in terms strongly reminis~ent of Kobs' 
final position: "Kafka's writing is directed against the absurdity 
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not of the world, but of writing. It reflects its own activity, 
its own reality and utter artificiality" (loc .cit.). 
Rolleston (1974) also ignores Kobs' study, but nevertheless 
offers a closely related interpretation constructed on two main 
premisses: 11 the rigorous insistence on the hero's perspective" (loc. 
cit.:102), that is, BeiBner's Einsinnigkeit (ibid.:xiv), at least in 
the works predating 1915 (ibid.:17, 26,102),and a "theatrical meta-
phor" (ibid, :xv) or 11 theatrical analogy" (ibid.: 40) derived from Beck's 
a:rnlys is ( 1971) of the influence exerted on Kafka by a troupe of 
Yiddish actors during the last months of 1911 (cf. Tb 79ff.). Combin-
ing these two notions, Rolleston d'istinguishes between earlier works, 
in which "the Kafka hero tries to incorporate the world into his own 
mental theatre, to become the spectator of his own drama" (ibid.: 143), 
and later works, where the 'hero' attempts "to re-enter the world 
through the alignment of private role with public function" (loc .ci t.: 
s.a.202£.). In both cases, however, the outcome is essentially the 
same, for the texts are so structured that "each culminates in a 
parablelike clarity that serves only to generate questions without 
end" (ibid.: 6 7), as they describe "an inexorable circle back into 
the smallest details of the immediate events, opening a void beneath 
every thought or statement" (ibid.: 100), or else "the unmediated 
focussing on the 'facts' of a story results in a dialectical calling 
into question of both the narrator and his world, so that the reader 
comes to feel ( •.. ) that he has witnessed only an absence of reality, 
a narrative running into the sands of language without content" 
(ibid.: 103) • Thus, at the end of each work, "the attention of all 
participants is redirected to the stage, than which nothing more 1 real 1 
can be conceived after all" (ibid.:41) and "the metamorph~sis of the 
theatre, so indefatigably imagined, never takes place" (ibid.: 143). 
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However much Rolleston may appear to depart from these admittedly 
I 
arbitrary and fanciful theories in his subsequent essays (Rolleston, 
1976; 1976b; 1979)J' his firm link with Kobs still remains quite un-
mistakable in his continuing insistence on the essen~ially closed 
or hermetic quality of Kafka's works. As he says of Der Proze2: 
"The problem is simply that the text cannot be translated directly 
into, or even adequately evoked by, any other terminology" than that 
of the text itself (Rolleston, 1976:5). 
Another scholar who makes no reference to Kobs, but clearly 
agrees with him, is Krusche (1974). In his commentary, the method 
consists of a threefold transition l'von der Analyse der charakterist-
ischen Erzahlformen Kafkas zu den unter dem Begriff des 'reduktiven' 
zusammengefaBten Deutungen, van der Untersuchung der Motivgestaltung 
zu den unter dem Begriff des 'Spekulativen' gebilndelten Interpreta-
tionen und von der Erorterung der Sozialfunktion des Kilnstlers Kafka 
zur Analyse des Kunstbegriffs wie er in groBen Teilen der bisherigen 
Kafka-Literatur sich zeigt" (op.cit.:7). And, having completed 
these processes, he concludes: 11 (Kafka) begibt sich in die paradoxe 
Situation eines Menschen, der sich fortwahrend und in hochster 
Eindringlichkeit, Einpragsamkeit und formaler Verbindlichkeit - unter 
den Bedingungen natilrlich kilnstlerischer Gestaltung - mitteilt und 
all seiner Mitteilung die Funktion auferlegt, die Unmoglichkeit aller 
Mitteilung zu erweisen" (ibid.: 156). 
At least two advocates of Kobs' theses, however, do review his 
work and, in part, both dispute some of his findings. Steinmetz (1977), 
for example, maintains that Kobs' analysis of Die Biiu.me is excessively 
stringent and his use of the term 'paradox' inappropriate (op.cit.:86ff .), 
Nevertheless, after examining the nature of Kafka's literary reception 
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and what he regards as characteristic structural features of the 
author's texts, he, too, is led to the contention: '~ie Interpretation 
Kafkascher Texte kann nicht weiter vordringen als bis zur Deskription 
ihier inneren Struktur, in der alle gangigen Deutungskategorien 
annihiliert werden"(ibid.:81). Similarly, Corngold criticises Kobs' 
notion of 'the pure expression 1 (cf. Kobs, 1970:94ff., 4'llff.; s.a. 
Binder, 1976:209ff.), maintaining that it jeopardises the "absolute-
ness of congruence as a narrative principle" (Corngold, 1977:63) and 
logically requires "a narrator inscribed within the text", one who is 
"not identical with 'Kafka the writer', the author of the entire 
oeuvre" (loc.cit.), Despite this pbjection, however, he then proceeds 
to argue that "the felt presence of a narrator is no guarantee of the 
truth" (loc,cit.) and that the narrator of Der VerschoUene_, like Karl 
RoBmann, "is not wholly reliable" (loc.cit.). Consequently, his views 
eventually coincide with Kobs' when he deduces that "it is impossible 
to decide authoritatively whether at any given moment the language 
of Der VerschoUene is to be read literally, as accurately presenting 
I 
Karl's own erroneous grasp of the world; or figuratively, as profer-
ring Karl's experience as pure expression, as a gesture whose truth 
undoes the manipulative, 'ironically distancing' perspective of the 
narrator. This z~ne of indetermination in Kafka, which Kobs (if 
inadvertently) l~ads us to discover, appears to be the ult,imate field 
I 
of Kafka's paradox" (ibid.:64). 
Between those studies supportive of Kobs and those that clearly 
oppose him, there stands one detailed discussion of Einsinnigkeit 
which, even in the perplexing world of Kafka scholarship, is so 
conspicuous for its illogicality that it warrants special mention. 
The work in question is that by Szanto (1972). Totally disregarding 
the theories of Kobs and Walser, not to mention the various critical 
'I 
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responses to them, Szanto fully endorses BeiBner's notion of Ein-
sinnigkeit_, but relabels it "narrative consciousness" (op .ci t.: 6), 
since he believes that it is the protagonists' consciousness which 
"narrates the stories and controls their point of view" (ibid.:9). 
As a consequence, he maintains~ "each novel is essentially concerned 
with process rather than established fact. The novel becomes not 
' 
a product but a medium, not the writing about something, but the pro-
cess of something being transmitted; the process becomes the created 
object 11 (loc.cit.). Thus the actual text of Kafka's works "becomes 
the end in itself ( .•• ) • It leads backwards to the narrating conscious-
ness instead of forward to environment described. It is the written 
word with which the reader becomes involved, he need no longer look 
to the formulated message it transmits 11 (loc.cit.). 
None of these arguments is, of course, entirely new. On the 
contrary, all of them bear a close resemblance to views already pro-
pounded by Walser, Fietz, Schillerneit and Kobs, as becomes even 
more apparent when Szanto later asserts that a corollary of narrative 
consciousness is "the impossibility of a phrase·-by-phrase, analytic, 
interpretative explanation" (ibid. :42). Yet, in manifest contradiction 
of these theoretical pronouncements, the same commentator has no 
hesitation whatever in describing Kafka' s works as "stories of unsuc-
cessful, incompleted quests" (ibid.: 9) or in declaring Kafka 1 s anony-
mous country doctor and Georg Bendemann of Das Vrteil to be thoroughly 
"self-centred" characters (ibid.:50, 67). And the ostensible justifi-
cation for this obvious inconsistency is that, in Kafka's texts, 
"each word present has its purpose, each word can be explained without 
interpretation" (ibid.: l15) • However, by what ingenious process the 
words of a literary composition or their purpose can be 'explained' 
without being 'interpreted' regrettably remains an undivul~ed secret, 
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Nevertheless, from the so-called explanations just quoted, it would 
not seem unfair to assume that the stated distinction is just as 
arbitrary and irrational in its suppositions as the majority of 
Szanto 1 s study, and that the effect of both is less likely to be 
clarification than further, quite unnecessary confusion. 
Fortunately, the same cannot be said about those commentaries 
which unequivocally oppose Kobs' views, for even the most inadequate 
of them is still, for the greater part, logically consistent, Among 
such critiques, by far the most exhaustive is Beicken's doctoral 
dissertation (1971). , Recognising that Kobs' arguments depend prim-
arily on his interpretation of th~ relationship between narrator and 
Perspektivgestalt, Beicken first sets out to prove that the former 
has not been reduced to the level of a 'mere recorder' and that the 
question of congruence is more complex than is generally acknow-
ledged. Initially, therefore, he undertakes a lengthy review of 
literature about the nature of the narrator and,- preferring the 
functional theses of Hamburger (1957) to definitions in terms of 
person, he concludes that the narrator is to be construed as "eine 
Teilerscheinung des erzahlenden Autors" (Beicken, 1971:21f.), "eine 
funktionale und synthetische GroBe ( .•. ),die aus den Erzahlakten 
aufgeschliisselt werden muB" (op.cit.59), an "erzahlerische Instanz 
oder Intelligenz" (ibid.: 66) . As he later summarises: "Es ware 
verfehlt, aus dem funktionalisierten Erzahlvorgang, der <lurch deu 
subjektiven BewuBtseinsraum der Perspektivgestalt bestinnnt ist, 
auf einen unabhangigen und distanzierten Erzahler zu schlieBen. 
Kafka tritt 'als Erzahler nicht selbst auf', sond,ern der l>ichter 
hat sein erzahlerisches Wirken ganz in die dargestellte Welt hinein-
verweb t" (ibid.: JOO) . Throughout most of his study, therefore, Beicken 
follows the example of Hamburger (1957:46) in employing the obviously 
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active term rnarrating author' instead of 'narrator'. And since the 
former cannot, by definition, be identified with any one of his 
characters, the relationship b~tween 'narrator' and Perspektivgestalt 
cannot be one of virtual identity, as Kobs' notion of congruence 
implies. 
This form of argument is given added weight by Beicken 1 s early 
and very important distinction beaveen Perspektive and SehuJeise: 
"In dem allgerneineren Begriff der Erzahlperspektive kornmen zwei 
verschiedene Sachverhalte ungeschieden zusamrnen. Es handelt sich um 
den Standort im Sinne des wahrnehmungsrnaBigen Erfassens der darge-
s tell ten Welt, van dem der Standpunkt der Wertung ~nd Deutung getrennt 
werden miiBte. Beide Standpunkte begriinden zwei verschiedene Bezugs-
felder11 (ibid.::l) .· Perspektive he limits to the perceptual of these 
two viewpoints, and Sehweise to the evaluative. 
On the basis of this distinction, Beicken 1s then able to re-
fine the notion of Einsinnigkeit still further, maintaining that, 
although the 'narrating author' may restrict his Perspektive to that 
of his protagonist, it does not necessarily follow that he therefore 
also identifies with the latter's Sehweise. On the contrary, there 
is a whole range of indirect means by which he may clearly create 
his own Sehweise alongside and in opposition to that of his Pers-
pektivgestalt: 11Tonfall, Sprechhaltung, Wortwahl, Emphase oder Unter-
treibung sind Mittel _der erzahlerischen Redeweise und Rhetorik, die 
in der sprachlichen Gestaltung dem erzahlenden Autor Wege schaffen, 
sich gegeniiber seinen Figuren wertend, distanzierend und deutend zu 
verhalten. Dieses Verhalten ist ohne Zweifel auf den erzahlenden 
Autor, auf seine erzahlerischen Absichten und Wirkungen zurlickzu-
flihren" (ibid.: 7) . 
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What Beicken is discussing here. is, of course, that extremely 
important narrative technique noted in a few earlier studies, namely, 
the use of indirect or implicit conunentary. And towards the end of his 
analysis, substituting 'das erzfihlende Subjekt' for 1 the narrating 
author' , he provides a considerably more comprehensive list of the 
elements by which such conunentary may be created: "Es handel t sich beim 
erzahlenden Subjekt um eine synthetische GroBe, die 1n der Gesamtheit 
der Erzahlakte greifbar wird, also im Erzahlaufbau, 1n den Eigenarten 
der Erzahlkomposition und in der sprachlichen Gestaltung, die in den 
Wertbestimmungen der Darstellung einen besonderen Wirkungsbereich filr 
das erzahlende Subjekt schafft. Die Darstellung der erzahlten Welt 
. 
umfaBt innner eine Auswahl und Zusammenstellung von Wirklichkeitsmomenten. 
In diesem GestaltungsprozeB macht sich das urteilende Sehvermogen des 
Autors~ seine besondere Sehweise geltend" (ibid. :496f.). In his more 
recent statements, Beicken (1977; 1978; 1979) ~ssociates this form of 
rhetoric with Kafka' s term "Tat-Beobachtung" (Tb 563) 'and contrasts it 
with the notions "Berechnung" and "Kunstaufwand" (Tb 448f .) , which he 
uses to denote Kafka's opposite technique of trying to make the 
reader identify with the protagonist. 
Having thus established the possibility of covert authorial 
commentary in Kafka's works, Beicken is also in a position to reinter-
pret the final main concern of Kobs' deliberations, that is, the 
protagonist's factual inconsistencies and his degree of reliability. 
Kobs, it will be recalled, had attributed the former to the prota-
gonist's flawed consciousness, projected on to the 'external world' 
,(cf. Kobs, 1970:33, 349f.), and had regarded them as both incontro-
vertible and unverifiable. Beicken, on the other hand, agrees with 
Sekel (1964; 1965; 1976; l976b; 1980) and Henel (1967) in maintaining 
that their source is not simply perceptual or cognitive, but rather 
: I 
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psychic: "Wenn die AuBenwelt als BewuBtseinsphanomen zu begreifen 
ist, dann nimmt diese Projektion des Innern auch die Probleme der 
Psyche auf ( •.. ). Die Prinzipien der Unstinunigkeit und Widersprilch-
lichkeit lassen sich nur dann schllissig erklaren, wenn psychische 
Momente als Storfaktoren des subjektiven BewuBtseins auftreten und 
die 1fowuBtseinstatigkeit steuern" (ibid.: 141). Furthermore, since 
it is possible to assess the protagonist 1 s Sehuleise by comparison 
with the author-narrator's, it is also possible to isolate and define 
each work 1 s 11Wirklichkeitsmomente in ihrer lib er form ten Gestalt" 
(ibid.: 142), even if this does not yield "ein objektives Bild der 
AuBenwelt im Sinne einer wahren Refllitat" (loc.cit.). 
Although H. Kraft (1972) would tend to agree with Beicken about 
this last point, arguing that the world confronting the protagonist 
is "me is t nur s trukturell vorhanden: als Negierung des Reali tat 
ermangelnden Wirklichen, als Zerstorung der Illusion; sie hat selber 
noch keinen positiven Inhalt" (op.cit.:42), he nevertheless rejects 
the idea that it is merely the protagonist's mental projection, 
whether psychic or otherwise: "Bedeutung (filr den Leser) gewinnt 
diese Dichtung, weil die dargestellte Innerlichkeit nicht subjektive 
(individuelle) Innerlichkeit (des Autors) abbildet, sondern weil sie 
allgemeine Wirklichkeit deutet .. ( ... ) Der 1 Solipsismus' ist 'nur 
scheinbar; denn die intensive Gegenwelt entspricht einer extensiven, 
einer gegebenen, gefilrchteten, in satirischer Aggression, in Deutungs-
wut und Selbstdemlitigung anerkannten Wirklichkeit'" (ibid.:22f.; cf. 
Fischer, 1962:548). For the rest, however, Kraft strongly supports 
Beicken's opposition to Kobs, devoting the major part of his study 
to. a detailed consideration of the specific means Kafka employs in 
order to distance the reader, question the protagonist's view of 
things and implicitly establish a Sehweise superior to that of the 
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Perspektivgestalt. Among the more important factors he discusses 
are the clash between style and content (ibid.:21), discrepancies 
between the reader's general empirical knowledge and the central 
character's version of it(ibid.:30ff.), comic effects (ibid.:33ff.), 
the juxtaposition of levels of reality (ibid.:39ff.), animals as 
characters or narrator-agents (ibid.:62f.), and irony (ibid.:67). 
Thus, while affirming BeiBner's notion of Einsinnigkeit, Kraft, like 
Beicken, is still not prepared to accept Kobs' belief that this 
technique necessarily implies works which are 'subjectively hermetic'. 
Nor does he subscribe to the view that Einsinnigkeit characterises 
all of Kafka's works (ibid.:45,58),, In this last respect, he echoes 
the opinion not only of Kobs (1970:25) and Beicken (1971:473f., 477), 
but also of virtually every major commentator on the subject since 
Hillmann (1964) and Sokel (1964), including Binder, whose more recent 
studies either mention narrative perspective only in passing (Binder, 
1976) or merely repeat his arguments of 1966 (Binder, 1979b:62ff.). 
Two of the small, but very significant minority who find no 
need to distinguish between works by Kafka which do or do not give 
evidence of Einsinnigkeit are Beutner (1973) and $heppard (1973; 
1977). And their reason for omitting such distinctions is, quite 
simply, that they consider BeiBner's theory and its subsequent elabora-
tions to be deficient. In particular, they disagree with the assert-
ion that, in Kafka's novels, there is no perceptible narrator above 
or beyond the consciousness of the 'hero'. Beutner, for example, 
maintains that such a narrator is always evident, especially in the 
narrative's account of the central character's gestures, feelings 
and motives (op.cit.:24). Indeed, for her, the existence of a per-
spective superior to that of the protagonist is a fundamental element 
of Kafka's technique in all three of his novels: "Zwar konstituiert nur 
I , 
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das von der Figur Wahrgenommene die Erscheinungsweise der erzahlten 
Welt, zum anderen aber wird das Wahrgenornmene wiederum zu einer 
Wiederspiegelung der inneren Gestiinmtheit des Wahrnehmenden. Der 
Wahrnehmende und das Wahrgenommene stehen bei Kafka in_unlosbarer 
Wechselbeziehung, bestinnnt von einer libergeordneten, nicht an den 
Wahrnehrnenden gebundenen Perspektive" (lac .cit.) . Furthermore, this 
superior perspective is to be attributed to an intellectually advant-
aged narrator: "eine liber K. hinausgehende Perspektive ( ... ) findet 
I ' 
sich in allen drei Romanen.auch dann, wenn Gedanken und Uberlegungen 
der Helden ohne besondere Kennzeichnung unmittelbar genannt werden. 
Es ist also kein Erzahler da, der ,uns dergleichen referiert, sondern 
ein Erzahler, der alles das einfach weiB" (ibid.: 26). 
In a similar fashion, Sheppard (1973), after referring to certain 
br'eaks in perspective already noted by Leopold and Kuds zus, as well 
as " a small number of episodes which are reported 'above K.' s head'" 
(op.cit::.: 26), soon reaches the conclusion that "just because the 
_narrator of Das SchloI3 does not intervene directly 'interpreting, 
teaching, .reflecting', it does not follow that he is necessarily a 
Deus Absconditus" (ibid.: 29). Rather, he is more accurately t:o be 
cons trued as i;a captive of the world which he has created. At key 
points he reveals 'himself as directly as he dare, but more typically 
he exists within that world as a unifying substance or nameless, shap-
ing presence who provides the reader with a subliminal sense that K., 
appearances to the contrary, is himself under judgement" (loc .ci t .) . 
Moreover, if a narrator, "though not obvious, is nevertheless present" 
in Das Schlo!3, in Der Proze/3 he is "more tangibly" so (Sheppard, 
1977: 398) . 
Consistent with his understanding of the narrator, Sheppard 
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also recognises the important principle of indirect connnentary and, 
through his excellent analysis of Das SchloB (Sheppard, 1973)~ provides 
the most comprehensive account so far of the means Kafka employs to 
this end. Howe\rer, because "the patterns generated" within the novel 
"have the effect"· -:1f distancing the reader from K.' s assessment of any 
given situation, of drawing attention to other possibilities of inter-
pretation and of arousing the suspicion that the world external to K. 
has a secret life of its own" (op.cit.:34), Sheppard describes these 
means as "alienation-devices" (loc.cit.) and divides them into eight 
broad types: "parallelism~,discrepancies, leitmotivs, changes of 
register, reflection, indirect narrational connnent, direct connnent on 
K. by others and breaks in narrative perspective" (ibid. :35). The one 
aspect of this argument that needs to be questioned here is what 
Sheppard calls 'indirect narrational comment', for if one examines the 
passages he quotes to substantiate this classification (ibid.:117f.), 
it becomes evident that, far from being indirect, they actually consti-
tute unmistakably direct, albeit unobtrusive commentary, as the use of 
1 undankbar' in the following sentence demonstrates: "K. aber, undankbar, 
machte· sich von Olga los und nahm den Wirt beisei te" (ibid.: 117) • The 
only person who can possibly be thinking and uttering the word 
'undankbar' in this context is the impersonalised narrator, and since 
he utters it quite directly, unmediated by another, there can be no 
justification for regarding it as anything but direct, evaluative 
commentary, however skilfully it !\lay be concealed in the text (s .a. 
Sh_eppard, 19 79) • 
By comparison with other studies opposed to Kobs' view on 
Einsinnigkeit~ the last two corrrrnentaries that need to be mentioned in 
this survey are not only less original, but also much less convincing. 
Nevertheless, they do have the merit of serving to illustrate the 
I' 
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extremes towards which scholars have been attracted in their attempt 
to break the vicious interpretative circles postulated by Walser, 
Fietz, Schil1emeit and Kobs. In essence, Walther's contribution 
(1977)to this debate is to reaffirm BeiBner's later version of 
Einsinnigkeit by deducing from the narrative point of view that the 
contents of Das SchZo/3, for example, are to be explained in terms 
of dreams: "Wir fahren deshalb am besten, wenn wir alles, was im 
Roman passiert, als traumhafte Imagination Kafkas auffassen" (op. 
c it.: 10); "Alle der Hauptperson begegnenden Geschehnis se s ind, wie 
das auch in Traumen der Fall ist, funktional auf diese bezogen" 
(ibid.:11). Unlike BeiBner, however, he grants the reader a certain 
superiority to the protagonist's viewpoint: "Wir sehen also alles 
mit K.s Augen. konnen aber Widerspriichlichkeiten, die er nicht 
reflektiert, in unsere Beurteilung des Geschehens einbeziehen und 
sind insofern der Perspektivgestalt_ ilberlegen" (1.oc .cit.). Further-
more, following the example of Sokel, Henel and Beicken, he construes 
the confrontation between K. and the allegedly oneiric world of t,he 
castle as a form of "Ich-Spal tung, in der Weise, daB ein bewuBterer ~ 
mehr an der Oberflache liegender Teil, eben K., wie er im Roman als 
handelnde Person auftritt, mit einem bisher weitgehend unbewuBt geblie-
benen Teil, verkorpert in d~r Dorf- und SchloBwelt, konfrontiert 
wird" (ibid.:20). Finally, he, too, feels it necessary to distin-
guish between 'dreamlike' works, which are characterised by Einsinnig-
keit, and others that display an 'objective' form of presentation, 
"sei es in realistischer oder Fabelmanier" (loc.cit.). 
In stark contrast to Walther's eclectic reassertion of Ein-
1 
sinnigkeit as consistent with interpretation, Steffan ( 1979) will 
have no truck with the notion in any of its formulations, orthodox, 
radical or revised: "Die 'Einsinn,igkeit' erweist sich weder in 
i. 
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totaler Ausweitung noch in eingeschrankter Form als richtig. Sie 
ist nicht das Prinzip, das die Eigenart des Kafkaschen Erzahlens 
erklarenwiirde11 (op.cit.:29). Going still further, he also repudi-
ates, in its entirety, the narrative theory on which he considers 
BeiBner, his supporters, modifiers and opponents have all based their 
arguments, namely, the assumption of the "Mittelbarkei t der Darstellung 
im Roman" (Stanzel, 1955:4). For, according to Steffan, mediacy of 
this kind "bedeutet die Anwesenheit eines personlichen Erzahlers im 
Roman, der die darges tellte Welt vermittelt" (op .ci t.: 30) ', and this 
he regards as impossible, "denn wie kann die fiktionale Welt von 
etwas vermittelt werden, das selbst in den Bereich der Fiktion gehort. 
• 
Der Erzahler bzw. der entsprechende Personalindikator konnnt ja in 
Satzen\vor, die den Text mitkonstituieren" (loc.cit.). 
One very obvious difficulty raised by such statements is, of 
course, the t~sK of reconciling them with the enormous number pf 
frequently highly personalised narrators to be encountered in virtu-
' 
ally every period of literary history. Well aware of this difficulty, 
' 
Steffan returns to the source of his radical pronouncements and, in 
ostensible refutation of conventional wisdom, quotes the following 
\ 
passage from Leistner (1975): 
Diese and ere Beziehung des 1 ich 1 zu Ich, die sich aus 
der Moglichkeit sprachlich handelnder Menschen ergibt, 
sich zum Erzahle.n wessen inuner aUer in der jeweiligen 
Sprache vorkommenden Nominatoren, z.B. des 'ich' 
bedienen zu diirfen, hat nun flir die, die mit ihm 
erzahlen, zur Falge, daB sie mit dem je erziihl ten 'ich' 
alles, bis auf die einzige Ausnahme, den zum 'ich' -
Sagen existentiell befahigten und benotigten Menschen, 
personalindizieren konnen, wenn sie es eben wollen, wie 
fur die, die icherzahlte Texte verstehen, daraus folgt, 
daB sie mit den Marken 'ich' alles, nur eben nicht Menschen, 
darum also auch weder sich selbst, noch den Verfasser des 
icherzahlten Textes personalindiziert sehen/verstehen 
konnen. 
(op.cit.:399) 
'' 
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For all their opacity, however, these elusive assertions prove 
nothing of any substance about the nature of human communication or 
of literary narration. On the contrary, if what Leistner asserts 
were correct, then no-one employing the pronoun 1 1 1 could ever give 
an account, spoken or wr~tten, of something he had done, even an 
hour beforehand, and still unequivocally indicate himself when using 
the term 'I'. In other;words, if Leistner's remarks were valid, then 
the universally accepted pronoun of self-identification would be 
summarily transformed into some alter-referential or purely fictional 
indicator, and one of the most fundamental assumptions of all human 
communication, including legal evipence, would be arbitrarily and 
totally discarded, with inevitably chaotic results. As a consequence, 
w~en Steffan, basing himself on such absurd propositions, draws the 
inference that 11Konstruktionen eines Ich-, Er- oder auktorialen 
Erzahlers" are both superfluous and inadmissible, because the author 
is "der einzige Erzahler" (op .cit.: 32), his argument is deserving 
of no more credence than that of his acknowledged source. 9 
Since BeiBner first published his theory, then, thirty years 
have now elapsed and, as the foregoing review will have indicated, 
during that time the debate about Einsinnigkeit has been virtually 
constant and undeniably extensive. Yet, to judge by the results 
achieved so far, it is clear that, despite its professed aim of philo-
logical rigour, this approach to Kafl<a's work has proven to be 
scarcely any more fruitful than the admittedly arb~trary, interpre-
tative methods it sought to displace. Indeed, in some very important 
instances, its conclusions have been practically identical w}th those 
of its rivals and, .Ln a few others, they have been even more extreme. 
This is not to deny, of course, that certain individual scholars have 
done a great de~l to clarify the matter of Kafka's rhetoric and its 
I I . 
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implications for interpretation. Beicken, H. Kraft and Sheppard 
are three obvious cases in point. However, i£ one were pressed to 
define the consensus of opinion among the many who have now written 
about Kafka 1s narrative technique, it is doubtful whether one could 
go beyond the two vague statements that some of the author's works 
exhibit Einsinnigkeit while others do not, and that the relationship 
oftechnique to meaning in his works remains uncertain. 
Given the self-evident validity of the principle that fiction, 
like all art, should be analysed and interpreted by methods appropri-
ate to its intrinsic nature, it might well be asked how so much debate 
about the rhetoric of Kafka's oeuvre could possibly have produced 
such meagre results. And to find the most likely answer, one need 
look no farther than to the pioneering statements of BeiBner. For 
there one discovers that the narrator is variously characterised as 
bring distinct from the author (1952:35; 1958:12,15), yet identical 
with him (1952:28,36) and with the' central character (1952:29,34; 
1958: 12) as well as the narrative (1952:34), whil'e at the same time 
not existent at all, because the action narrates itself (1952:32,35). 
From such utter confusion, the inference is inescapable that, before 
the theory of Einsinnigkeit can be properly assessed, there exists a 
fundamental need to define precisely what a narrator is or is not. 
Con~equently, an attempt will now be made to satisfy this need. 
With the exception of Bei.Bner (1952:32,35) and Walser (1961:22), 
i 
whose views defy all reason, narrative theorists are unanimous in 
affirming the axiom that every act of narration logically presupposes 
a narrator or,. in the words of Kayser (1948: 351), that the narrator is 
the 11condi tio sine qua non aller epischen Literatur". The most basic 
matter at issue about this entity or agent is, therefore, ,rn;>t whether 
.i~ may or may not exist, but rather whether, in literature, it should 
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be construed as fictional. And, according to the vast n~jority of 
scholars, the answer ,to this question is totally beyond doubt, so 
that from Friedemann (1910:26) and Petsch (1934:111) to Chatman (1978: 
248) and Genette (1980:123) one finds repeated acceptance of the 
principle that the narrator is "immer eine gedichtete, eine fiktive 
Gestalt" (Kayser, 1954: 17), Yet, for a very small number of scholars, 
such a principle is completely mistaken. Apart from Leistner and 
Steffan, this group also includes Hamburger (1953:347ff .; 1957:76ff.) 
and Beicken (1971:17). However, since Hamburger's theories have al-
ready been conclusively refuted by Stanzel (1.959) and the demonstrably 
fallacious reasoning of Leistner and Steffan has been analysed 
I 
earlier in this discussion, the only argument that remains to be 
c~nsidered is that of Beicken. 
Referring to Kayser's definition of the narrator as an invented, 
fictional figure, "eine Rolle, die der Autor erfindet und einnimmt" 
(Kayser, 1957:451), Beicken (loc.cit.) maintains that there is an 
insuperable difficulty in this notion: "Die Schwierigkeit liegt darin, 
daB man fragen muB, wie der Erzahler sowohl fingiert und gleichzeitig 
dem Fiktiven liberlegen und iibergeordnet sein kann". In posing such 
a question, however, he is suggesting difficulties where none exists. 
For the principal, though not always the only sense in which a narra-
tor may be said to be "dem Fiktiven liberlegen und libergeordnet" re-
i 
I ' 
sides in the fact that he alone tells the whole 9f a story. To con-
strue the narrator as being intrinsically non-fictional is, therefore, 
to assume not only that fictional characters do not have the ability 
to narrate, but also that they do not have the power of human speech, 
~ecause to possess the latter is necessarily to_h~ve the potenti~i 
for the former. And since it is manifestly obvious that fictional 
characters may be and generally are endowed with the power of human 
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speech, it must logically follow that they are also capable of narrat-
ing, without in any way jeopardising, let alone forfeiting their 
fictional status. On the contrary, insofar as the narrator of a 
1 iterary work ;:ict.ually performs his special function, he s imul tan-
eously confirms his fictionality, for the simple reas1on that, as voice 
or transmitter, he constitutes the immediate precondition of the 
narrative's existence, so that he and it are ontologically interdepen-
dent. And because the narrative, as literary creation,is fictional, 
its narrator must be as well (cf. Stanzel, 1955:4£., 24f., 38; 
Kayser, 1956:230; Seidler, 1959:461,473; Booth, 1961:149ff.). 
Since all narrators ipso fac,to possess the power of human 
speech, together with at least all the faculties which that gift 
implies, it must also be logically inferred that they are personal 
as well. Yet, although this notion, too, is accepted by the vast 
10 
majority of scholars, it is just as firmly rejected by a significant 
few, and not merely the four dissenters already mentioned, but also 
by Tillotson (1959), who calls the narrator 11a method rather than a 
person" (op.cit.:22), and by Langguth (1968), who describes Kafkavs 
narrators as "merely a neutral grammatical source" (op.cit.:55). 
In denying that narrators are, inherently personal, however, all of 
these scholars, except Langguth, plainly contradict themselves, in 
that each of them repeatedly identifies the narrator with the author, 
and if he is not to be understood as personal~it is difficult to 
imagine who is. Langguth's error, on the other hand, consists in 
the quite untenable assumption that something other than a person 
can narrate. For no matter what form of creature an author may choose 
to ~dopt as his narr~tor, he must always endow it with the cap~citr 
for human thought and speech before it can tell a story at all, and 
as soon as he does that, he transforms it into a person. Consequently, 
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no· narrator can be a 'neutral grammatical source'. Rather, as 
Moffet/McElheny (1966:568) have explained: "Every story is first-
person, whether the person identifies himself or not". and their point 
is strongly supported by Genette (1980) when he refers to "the element 
of the narrative situation that is in fact invariant - to wit, the 
presence (explicit or implicit) of the 'person' of the narrator. 
This presence is invariant because the narrator can be in his narra-
tive (like every subject of an enunciating in his enunciated state-
ment) only in the 'first person'" (op.cit.:243f.). Similarly, 
"insofar as the narrator can at any instant intervene as such in the 
narrative, every narrating is, by definition, to all intents and 
' 
purposes presented in the first person" (ibid.:244). 
Applied to the theory of Einsinnigkeit~ the implications of 
these statements are extremely far~reaching. To begin with, they 
invalidate all of the following. specific propositions about Kafka's 
rhetoric which were encountered in the preceding survey: that the 
narrator is always to be identified with his central character 
(BeiBner; Szanto) or with what is narrated (BeiBner); that the world 
of the narrative is independent of the narrator (Walser); that parts 
of a narrative can be totally neutral in perspective (Philippi; 
Langguth); and that the narrator can be reduced to the function of 
a mere recording instrument (Kobs), a notion also necessarily assum-
ed by those who interpret the_ world confronting Kafka's protagonists 
as the implied creation of the latter's oneiric, cognitively flawed 
or neurotic self-projections (BeiBner; Kobs; Henel; Sokel; Beicken; 
Rolleston; Walther; s.a. Greenberg, 1965:10; Neumann, 1968:722; Elm, 
1976:486). More generally, however, the views of Moffet/McElheny and 
Genette tend to make the term Eins-innigkeit quite useless as a defin-
ing characteristic of any fiction, whether Kafka's or not. For, if 
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all narrators are first-person, then so is all narration, so that 
every narrative whatever becomes einsinnig, at least in the sense that, 
ultimately, the whole of each has been filtered through and trans-
mitted by the consciousness of only one person, namely, the narrator. 
To accept that, logical1y speaking, every narrator roust be 
construed as first-person is, therefore, to acknowledge the need not 
only for a more precise concept than Einsinnigkeit, but also for a 
valid alternative to the traditional distinction between first-person 
and third-person narration. Approaching the second of these matters 
by way of the long-standing debate about telling and showing., scene 
and summary, Booth (l961:151ff.) aavocates the adoption of the terms 
'dramatised' and 'undramatised'. However, because of their inevitable 
and inappropriate theatrical associations, as well as a certain, 
I 
inherent ambiguity later admitted by Booth (op.cit.:161ff.) and, 
above all, their failure to indicate d~rectly the crucial notion of 
person, these terms are really not sufficiently exact to be of use. 
A more adequate solution to the problem is sugges.ted, instead, 
by another of the issues raised by Beicken (1971). Noting that Kayser 
(1954:29) defines the technique of Mada.me Bovary as impersonalised 
narration, but still insists that a personal narrator is present in 
the novel, Beicken is moved to enquire: "Wie kann ein Erzfihlen, das 
<lurch den bewuBt angestrebten Erzahlerschwund gekennzeichnet ist, 
unter dem Begriff der fiktiven Erzahlergestalt subsumiert werden ( ••. )?" 
(op.cit.:17). The answer to this question lies, of course, in the now 
commonplace distinction between person and personality. For it is to 
the latter that the word 'impersonal' refers and not the former, as 
may be gleaned from any comprehensive dictionary of current English, 
German, French or Italian, and probably a large number of other living 
languages as well. Tlnis ,to describe a person, his manner or his mode 
70. 
of expression as impersonal is to denote that he or it is lacking in 
personality or personal reference; it is not, under any circumstances, 
to signify that he or it has disappeared or ceased to exist. Conse-
quently, there is no contradiction whatever in Kayser's statements. 
On the contrary, they so accurately delineate two of the narrator's 
most basic features that, combined with the category 'personalised', 
they provide a thoroughly convincing, alternative framework within 
which all further discussion of the narrator in this study can 
securely proceed. In other words, from this point onwards, it will 
be taken for granted not only that all narrators are alike in being 
the necessary, inunediate precondition of a narrative and, therefore, 
fictional as well as logically first-person, but also that they may 
differ fundamentally in the extent to which they are personalised or 
impersonalised, the absolutely minimum requirement for the former 
quality normally being that the narrator should actually identify 
himself with the pronoun 'I' or 'we'. 11 
Since it has already been established that literary narrators 
are inherently fictional, it may seem unnecessary to conclude this 
analysis of their essential nature by seriously discussing those fre-
quently encountered claims or tacit assumptions that they are never-
theless to be identified with their authors. After all, authors can 
never be fictional. Unfortunately, however, the matter is not quite 
so simple, as the following remarks by Brod (1954) clearly suggest: 
"Ich habe es immer wieder erlebt, daB Verehrer Kafkas, di~ ihn nur 
aus seinen Blichern kennen, ein ganz falsches Bild van ihm haben. Sie 
glauben, er mlisse auch im Umgang traurig, ja verzweifelt gewirkt 
haben. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. Es wurde ·einem wohl in seiner 
Nahe" (op .ci t. :44). 
I 
Al though Brod' s use of the term ''false' in this passage should 
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certainly be disputed, particularly when one considers his own inter-
preted image of Kafka, the point that he is ~mking is nevertheless 
of considerable importance, because it corresponds to a distinction 
which literary theorists have been drawing for more than a century. 1 
According to Tillotson (1959:22), a certain Dowden felt the need to 
contrast George Eliot' s "historical self" with "that second self who 
writes her books, and lives and speaks through them" as early as 1877. 
And since that time it has by no means been uncommon to find others 
differentiating in the same manner between the historical person and 
the "poetica personalita" (Croce, 1936, in Kayser, 1948:176), "the 
whole man" and "the writing self" ,(Liddell, 1947:53), "die menschliche 
Personlichkeit''~ and "die schaffende, klinstlerische Personlichkeit" 
(Kayser, 1948:288), "the novelist" and "the official scribe" (West, 
1957, in Booth, 1961:71), "the real man" and "the implied author" 
(Booth, 1961: 151), "die blirgerlich·-biographische Pers onl ichkei t' 1 and 
"die dichterische Personlichkeit" (Walser, 196l:11), "the empirical 
personality" and "the literary personality" (Corngold, 1977:68), or 
I 
"the real author" and "the implied author" (Chatman, 1978: 148). 
Exactly what is meant by these distinctions .has been explained in 
most detail by Booth ( 1961): "Even the novel in which. no narrator is 
dramatised creates an implicit picture of an author who stands 
behind the scenes, whether as stage manager, as puppeteer, or as an 
indifferent God, silently paring his fingernails. This implied author 
is always dis.tinct from the 'real man' - whatever we may take him to 
b.e - who creates a superior version of himself, 1 a second self', as 
he creates his work 11 (op.cit.: 151). Earlier in his study, he also 
makes the comment: "Our sense of the implied author includes.not only 
the extractable meanings but also the moral and emotional content of 
each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters. It 
i 
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includes, in short, the intuitive apprehension of a completed 
artistic whole; the chief value to which ·this implied author is 
c?mmitted, regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real 
life, is that which is expressed by the total form" (ibid.:73f.). 
In recognising and attempting.to remove so much basic confusion 
about the implications of the term 'author', Booth and other like-
minded scholars have unquestionably made a major contribution to 
critical theory, and it is strongly to be regretted that the many 
biographical allegoretes of ·Kafka's works remain apparently unaware 
of the fact. Nevertheless, to acknowledge the validity of Booth's 
and related distinctions is not necessarily to accept the need for 
the term 'implied author' or any of the other proposed alternatives. 
On the contrary, at least three major objections can be raised to the 
in~roduction of such concepts. In the first place, if critics are 
to talk about implied authors, then logically they will also have 
to talk about implied poets, implied dramatists, implied painters, 
etc., and it is extremely difficult, indeed, to imagine such cumber-
some expressions becoming accepted usage in any language. Further-
more, because, strictly speaking, the term 'author' has validity only 
in reference to something actually created, the epithet 'implied' is 
superfluous. In other words, the notion of author is primarily and 
necessarily an inference from the existence of a particular example 
or body of art, so that the addition of 'implied' to the ~otion is 
actually tautologous. Finally, unless it is to be assumed that all 
artists are ·total schizophrenics (and even Freud did not go that far), 
' there can never be a complete' disjuncture between 'the real man' 
a-nd 'the implied ·author', so that to· ins·ist on the· rigorous separation 
of the two is artificial. The really crucial point, then, about the 
meaning and use of the term 'author' is not that its biographical 
: ' 
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dimension should be excluded, but that critical discussion should 
always and emphatically proceed from the principle that the person in 
question' is first and foremost the image one gains of him from his 
work, for without a clear, sensitive and comprehensive awareness of 
that ~mage, the evidence of biographical research can very easily 
become what Liddell (1947:53) has aptly called "irrelevant gossip". 
Provided this fundamental principle is strictly observed, there will 
be no need to invent or apply terms like 'the implied author'. 
Nor, it must now be conceded, will it be possible to distinguish 
between author and narrator simply on the basis of fictionality, 
since the author "as an ideal, literary, created version of the real 
man" (Booth, 1961:75) is, himself, fictional. This is not to say, 
however, that author and narrator are or ever can be totally identi-
cal. For, even apart from the author's additional~empirically actual 
dimension, he still remains 11 the principle that invented th~ narrator, 
along with everything else in the narrative" (Chatman, 1978: 148), and 
"the narrating situation of a fictional account is never reduced to 
its situation of writing" (Genette, 1980:214). Nevertheless, there 
will be occasions when the differences between the two, at least in 
terms of literary image and values, will be minimal, if not non-
exist'ent, and the determinant of these occasions will be the extent or 
degree to which the narrator is impersonalised. As Booth ( 1961) 
overstates the matter: "In so far as a novel does not refer directly 
to this (implied) author, there will be no distinction between him 
and the implied, undrarnatised narrator( ... )" (op.cit.:151). 
In summary, then, the narrator of a literary work is always to 
be construed as fictional; as first-person, but with the potential to-
vary considerably in his degree of personalisation or impersonalisation; 
and as distinct from the author in lacking any empiric.ally actual 
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dimension and in directly transmitting or being the voice of the 
entire work. Although it has been mentioned several times before, 
the one idea in this definition which may need to be elaborated 
further is the last, namely, that a narrator transmits the whole of 
his narrative or, in other words, that every complete narrative has 
but one narrator. Many will, of course, dispute this notion, pas-
sibly pointing.out, for example, that in Storm's Der Schimrnelreiter 
there are obviously three narrators (the anonymous magazine-reader 
of the first paragraph, the traveller and the schoolmaster) or that in 
Uwe Johnson' s fvlut;ma13ungen iiber Jakob there are four (the impersonal-
ised 1 editor 1 , Rohlfs, Jonas and Gesine). In doing so, however, 
they will all miss the point. For while it is true that each of these 
figures narrates, in the sense of relating one or more series of 
events, only one of them transmits the whole of Der Schimmelreiter, 
namely, the anonymous magazine-reade~, and only one of them transmits 
the whole of the Mutma2ungen~ namely, the impersonalised 'editor'. 
Without these avo figures, neither of the'works in question would ever 
have come into existence in its present form, since it is these two 
figures and they alone who are the immediate precondition of the other 
charactersv fictional existence, including those few that also narrate. 
Whether one designates these other narrating characters 'sub-narrators' 
or chooses an entirely different term, the decisive point remains 
that there can be but one narrator of a whole work, namely, the 
narrator. .To abandon this principle is inevitably to cause confusion, 
if not chaos, as is evident from some of the unfortunate statements 
by Booth (1961), who would turn not only "third-person centres of 
consciousness, through whom authors have filte1red their narratives" 
' 
(op.cit.:153) into narrators, but also "every speech, every gesture", 
for "most works contain disguised narrators who are used to tell the 
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audience what it needs to know, while seeming merely to act out their 
roles" (ibid. : 15_2) . It is sma 11 wonder that such misleading usage 
should have attracted the strictures of Genette (1980:188). 
Besides creating the need for a thorough review and redefinition 
of the notion 'narrator', BeiBner's theory of Einsinnigkeit has also 
and necessarily raised the vexed question of narrative perspective 
or point of view, a concept "whose pluuisignification must give pause 
to anyone who wishes to use it in precise discussion 11 (Chatman, 1978: 
151). According to Lubbock (1921:151), point of view is concerned 
with "the relation in which the narrator stands to the story", but 
Kayser (1948:204) extends it to mefln 11das Verhaltnis des Erzahlers 
zum Publikum und zum Geschehen", whereas Booth (1961: 15~) evidently 
regards it as pertaining to "an implied dialogue among author, 
narrator, the other characters, and the reader". Similarly, some 
·scholars would limit the concept essentially to the issue of percept-
ual perspective, 'focus', 'vision', or 'focalisation' (Brooks/Warren, 
1943:589; Pouillon, 1946:72ff.; Binder, 1966:188ff.; 1979b:62ff.; 
Genette, 1980: 186), while others would place more emphasis on the 
narrator's degree of orrmiscience and personalisation (Lubbock, 1921; 
Stanzel, 1955), and yet a third group would insist upon an evaluative 
dimension as well (Friedmann, 1955:123ff.; Booth, 1961:155ff,; 
Beicken, 1971:1; Chatman, 1978:151£.). 
The basic fault with almost all of these theories and their 
various typologies, however, is not that they fail to distinguish 
"between 'point of view' and narrative voice" (Chatman, 1978: 153) or 
between "the focal character" as an element of "mood" and "the narra-
tor" as "voice" (Gene tte, I 980: I 88), but -rather that they are too 
restricted in their understanding of the term 'point of view' and, 
tl1erefore, in their choice of distinguishing criteria. One need 
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only reflect for a while on non-fictional communication to realise 
that! one person's expression of his point of view and another person's 
assessment of it are determined by far more than matters of optical 
range, cognitive limits, personal or impersonal style and intellectual 
values. Both may also be strongly influenced, for example, by differ-
ences in physique (e.g. deformity, colour of skin), in temperament, 
in kinds and levels of taste, in vocabulary or linguistic register, 
and so on. And since this is the case in actual human communication, 
it is bound to be so in narrative fiction as well. For, no matter how 
'non-representational' or 'objective' the latter may become, insofar 
as it comrnunicates at all, it will employ human speech and, therefore, 
an essentially human, first-person narrator, from whom point of view, 
in the sense just explained, is inseparable, however carefully it may 
be disguised. 
Assuming, then, as all narrative theory does, that in consider-
ing fictional point of view, one is basically concerned with the man-
ner in which a work is transmitted from author to reader, there are 
always four factors involved: the author, the narrator, the narrative 
and the reader. However, as the immediate determinant of what is trans-
mitted, the most important of these is obviously the narrator, whose 
nature may comprise any number of properties, from the human to the 
quasi-human (e.g. narrating animals) and the extra-human (e.g. imrned-
iate knowledge of other people's thoughts; clairaudience, etc. in 
Grass's narrating dwarf), every one of which will in some way affect 
the manner and therefore the content of his narrative. Consequently, 
as already indicated, discussion of point of view cannot be limited 
simply to the -analysis of such issues as the narrator's visual, cogni-
tive or evaluative perspective, however significant each of these may 
be. Rather, it must endeavour to define all or_ at least the most 
' ' ' 
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important of the narrator's characteristics that condition the neces-: 
sarily interrelated method and message of his narration, thus estab-
lishing his rela~ionship to the author, the narrative and the reader. 
In other words, confirming the implications of Booth's typology, but 
modifying some of its terminology (Booth, J961:149ff.), statements 
about point of view should more properly be concerned with the extent 
to which the narrator is personalised or impersonalised, advantaged 
or d . d d 12 . 1 d d" d 13 • • isa vantage , invo ve or istance , connnentative or reticent, 
self-aware or unself-aware, 14 and reliable or unreliable. 15 Because 
these categories, as qualitative polarities,are naturally capable of 
gradation ('slightly personalised', 'highly personalised', etc.) and, 
unlike Booth's associated concepts, may refer to any fundamental 
dimension of human nature, be it physical, emotional, intellectual, 
moral, aesthetic, spiritual or social, they not only allow more ade-
qu<ltely for the virtually infinite variety of narrators and points of 
view; they also conform more closely to what must surely be the sole, 
valid purpose in examining point of view, namely, the attempt to relate 
narrative means to narrative effects (cf. ibid.:158). Furthermore, 
since any of the possible combinations and permutations of these 
qualities will inevitably regulate the type of voice the reader hears 
at any given moment in a narrative, including the amount and kind of 
scene or summary (ibid.: 154f., chaps. 1,2), those scholars who insist 
on distinguishing between point of view and narrative voice are 
misguided. 
Integral to the theory of Einsinnigkeit, however, are not only 
erroneous notions about the nature of the narrator and, by implication, 
point of view. From the beginning, BeiBner also propounded a demon-
strably false view of narrative commentary. Thus, in 1952, he asserted: 
"Kafka laBt dem Erzahler keinen Raum neben oder Uber den Gestalten, 
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keinen Abstand van dem Vorgang. Es gibt darum bei ihm keine Reflexion 
ilber die Gestalten und ilber deren Handlungen und Gedanken" (op.cit.: 
35) • And in all of his subsequent monographs on Kafka, he never once 
attempted to modify or abandon this claim (BeiBnei:, 1958:13,25; 1963:7; 
19?2:34,35). Yet, of the fourteen texts comprising the Land.arzt 
collection, no fewer than twelve contain direct commentary of the type 
he describes, while three of them (Ein Besuch im Bergwerk; Die Sorge 
des Hausvaters; Elf Sohne) consist, to a large extent, of nothing else. 
Indeed, the only pieces that actually lack such commentary are 
those where everything, apart from a very brief and factual, introduct-· 
ory phase, is either stated by a non-narrating character (Das nachste 
Dorf) or mediated through his subconscious (Ein Traum). 
To recognise the fallacy of BeiBner's statement, which numerous 
other scholars have uncritically repeated, one need only examine the 
two longest and most personalised narratives of the collection: Ei'.n 
Landarzt and Ein Bericht fil.r eine Akademie. In the former, the totally 
involved narrator nevertheless comments directly and evaluatively on 
at least all of the following subjects: the gods (Se 125), his patient's 
family, himself, connnunicating with people (Se 126), the neighing of 
his horses, his patient's condition, the people in his district (Se 
127), his patient's wound and the human estate, his successor, his 
era, his patients' nature, their treatment of him, and the answering 
of the nightbell (Se 128). Similarly, in his autobiographical report, 
the more distanced, human-simian narrator of the second work provides 
both his fictional listeners and the actual reader with his explicit 
views on a whole range of topics: his progress and attainments (Se 147) , 
the nature of all earthly creatures, his theatrical standing, his name, 
newspaper reporters (Se 148), truth and the high-minded (Se 149), his 
own narration (Se l49f.), freedom (Se 150), the ship's crew (Se 150, 152), 
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promises and their fulfilment (Se 151f.), his fate, imitating human 
beings (Se 153), learning, his educative progress, the notion of 
Ausweg, his development, his chimpanzee mate (Se 154), his present 
level of achievement (Se 154£.) and other people's opinion of it (Se 
155). By comparison with these two stories and the trio of works 
already mentioned, the remaining personalised texts containing direct 
commentary (Der neue Advokat; Ein altes Blatt; Schakale und Araber) 
differ only in the extent and topical range of their explicit judgements, 
the most reticent narrator being the traveller in Schakale und Araber3 
who limits himself to a tentative assessment of the conflict between 
the story's two opposed groups (Se 133), a brief remark about the 
innate reserve of Arabs (Se 135), and a highly emotive description of 
the jackals as they consume a dead camel (Se 135). 
Among the impersonalised works, on the other hand, direct com-
mentary is, as one might expect, usually less common and far less 
obtrusive. Nevertheless, in Auf der Galer.ie,, for example, it is still 
clearly present in every evaluative statement the disembodied speaker 
utters about each of the participants, especially the actual ringmaster 
and his attitude towards the equestrienne, in the second paragraph: 
"der Direktor, hingebungsvoll ihre Augen suchend, in Tierhaltung ihr 
entgegenatmet; vorsorglich sie auf den Apfelschimmel hebt, a.ls ware 
sie eine liber alles geliebte Enkelin ( .•• );die Sprlinge der Reiterin 
scharfen Blickes verfolgt; ihre Kunstfertigkeit kaum begreifen kann" 
and, at the end of her performance, "keine Huldigung des Publikums 
flir genligend erachtet" (Se 129). Exactly the same kind of technique is 
also to be encountered in Eine kaiserliche Botschaft:J where the imper-
sonalised narrator is even more overtly commentative. For not only does 
he open his account with a reference to the imperial subject as "de~ 
jiirnmerlichen Untertanen, dem winzig vor der kaiserlichen Sonne in die 
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fen1ste Ferne gefliichteten Schatten" (8e 138), he also breaks another 
of BeiBner's ostensible and widely accepted rules (s. BeiBner, 1952: 
32) by frequently anticipating the outcome of the action (Se 138f.), 
a ~haracteristic shared, to a lesser extent, by those other direct 
commentators: the country doctor, the cobbler of Ein altes Blatt and 
the worried family man, all of whom end their utterances with obser-
vations about the future and, like the narrator of the imperial message, 
always in negative, even desolate terms. 
The last two pieces that need to be considered in this context 
present such a sharp contrast that, in almost every respect, they 
constitute the virtual extremes of.Kafka's impersonalised narrative 
practice in the Landarzt collection, and their use of direct commentary 
is no exception. The works in question are, of course, Vor dem Gesetz 
and Ein BPUdermord, the one a model of subtlety in its control of 
narrative techniques and effects, the other a striking example of self-
indulgence and confusion. Thus, although the highly impersonalised 
and intellectually advantaged or 'omniscient' narrators of both works 
employ direct commentary of the kind already mentioned, in the former 
it is restricted to a description of th~ doorkeeper's enquiries as 
"teilnahmslose Fragen, wie sie groBe Herren stellen" (Se 132) and a 
remark so matter-of-fact that it has generally gone unnoticed as corn·-
mentary at all, namely, that "das Tor zum Gesetz offensteht wie immer" 
(Se 131). The crucial words here are, of course, the last two, since 
they contradict the doorkeeper's final, bellowed declaration that he 
is going to shut the door. Thus they assume enormous importance in a' 
complete interpretation of the work. So, too, do the direct comments 
of the narrator in Ein Bru~ermorp, -~he glaring d~ffere?ce being that, 
in this case, they are cheaply emotive and ultimately contradictory. 
When the murderer, for example, notices the flash of his dagger in 
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the moonlight, the narrator remarks: "nicht genug flir Schmar" (Se 144), 
and continues to paint a picture of a totally antipathetic, blood-
thirsty killer, He also does his utmost to make the reader disapprove 
of an eye-witness to the murder: "Warum duldete das alles der Private 
Pallas, der in der Nahe aus seinem Fenster im zweiten Stockwerk alles 
beobach tete? Ergrlinde die Menschennatur ! " (Se 144) . The approaching, 
unsuspecting victim, on the other hand, is portrayed with almost 
excessive pathos, so that when he gazes up at the dark-blue and gold 
of the night sky, the narrator observes: "Unwissend blickt er es an, 
unwissend streicht er das Haar unter dem gellipften Hut; nichts rlickt 
dart oben zusammen, um ihm die allernachste Zukunft anzuzeigen; alles 
bleibt an seinem unsinnigen, unerforschlichen Platz" (Se 145). Yet, 
after this innocent, diligent, law-abiding citizen and husband has 
just been stabbed twice in the throat and once in the stomach by a 
friend, the very same narrator callously remarks: "Wasserratten, auf-
geschlitzt, geben einen ahnlichen Laut van sich wie Wese" (Se 145). 
As a later, detailed analysis o·f the whole story will confirm, this is 
the rhetoric of turbid sensationalism. 
If the views of BeiBner and many other Kafka scholars are 
deficient in their failure to recognise direct narrative commentary, 
they are even more so in their apparent ignorance of the numerous in-
direct forms such commentary may assume. However, since the latter 
have been considered at some length in the earlier sections of this 
discussion (s.a. Lubbock, 1921:67f.; Petsch, 1934:113f.; Kayser, 1954: 
28), further elaboration becomes superfluous. Consequently, the point 
has now been reached where all the notions central to the theory of 
Einsinnigkeit have been closely examined and, when necessary, revised, 
so that an attsmpt can finally be made to define more precisely the 
real nature of the technique which BeiBner and so many others have 
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debated for so long. And because Das Urteil (Sept. 1912), apart from 
being relatively brief, is also generally acknowledged as the first 
work in which Kafka actually employed this technique, it will be 
taken as a typical example. 
In terms of the categories already proposed, the fundamental 
and most obvious characteristic of this story's narrator is his high 
degree of impersonalisation, the fact that he is known to the reader 
almost exclusively by implication, as an anonymous voice relating a 
certain set of circumstances and events in a particular manner. Con-
sistent with this attitude, he is also totally unself-aware, never 
once drawing attention to or discussing himself in any of his dimensions, 
least of all his role as narrator. Furthermore, he is extremely advan-
taged, being endowed with the power of direct access to another's 
thoughts and emotions or what Booth (1961: 163) calls "inside views". 
Because he is constituted of these three basic qualities, the differ-
ences between him and the image the reader gains of the workvs author 
will be minimal, so that he must also be construed as highly reliable, 
that is, as conforming most closely to the author's implied norms in 
the text (cf. Booth, 1961:158ff., chaps. 7,8; Chatman, 1978:149). 
Despite his capacity for inside views, however, this narrator's 
advantage is strictly limited, being applied solely to the mind of the 
story's central character, Georg Bendemann, alLhough it must be conceded 
that, in the following passage, the phrase 11wie er erwartet hatte", 
lacking any such adverb as 'offenbar' or 'vermutlich', could be inter-
preted as the narra~or's direct insight into the father's mind as well: 
"Der Vater beugte sich vor, fie1 aber nicht. Da Georg sich nicht 
naherte, wie er erwartet hatte, erhob er sich wieder" (Se 31). Besides 
being rigorously concentrated in this way, the narrator 1 s psychological 
advantage is also not continuously exploited, so that parts of the 
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story are not transmitted through the immediate, personal consciousness 
of the 'hero' at all, In the opening paragraph, for example, the 
narrator is clearly at a distance from his central character, setting 
the scene and portraying .Georg from without, as is evident from his 
use of the phrase "in spielerischer Langsamkeit" (Se 23), an expression 
which cannot possibly be interpreted as haying passed through Georg's 
mind at the time he was sealing the letter. Similar instances of dis-
tanced narration are provided by the summary beginning "Im Laufe 
dieser drei Jahre" (Se 24), the dramatically presented flashback to a 
conversation between Georg and his fiancee (Se 25) , the bridging pas-
sage from "Mi t <liesem Brief in der Hand" to "das Zimmer seines Vaters, 
in dem er schon seit Monaten nicht gewesen war" (Se 26), another flash-
back, about his dec'ision never to be taken by surprise (Se 30), the 
depiction of.the maid's reaction after Georg has rushed past her (Se 
32), and the very last sentence with its reference to pheno~ena of 
which Georg can s~arcely any longer be aware (Se 32) . 
Nevertheless, for the greater part, the narrator of Das Urteil 
transmits his story through or from the standpoint of his central 
character's consciousness, relating only what that figure could be 
construed as actually perceiving, thinking or feeling at any given 
moment in the fiction. Necessarily, therefore, he shows a high degree 
of intellectual and emotional involvement in what he is narrating, a 
fact he sometimes emphasises (Se 23,26,29) by employing erlebte Rede 
or 'narrated monologue 1 • 16 , And the combined effect of these inter-
related, narrative features is to make the reader identify with Georg 
as well, even to the extent of uncritically accepting his whole evalu-
ation of the work's contents and thus of condemning all that his father 
represents, an attitude unmistakably implicit in the many Oedipal 
and similar interpretations of the text (cf. Beicken; 1974:2ldff.). 
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Yet, quite apart from the distanced passages just mentioned, the 
narrator, in league with the author, also adopts other subtle means 
of counteracting this unquestioning empathy. One is to make the con-
frontation between Georg and his father considerably longer than the 
opening section of the work and to present it in a generally scenic 
manner, so that inside views of the protagonist become increasingly 
fewer and briefer, while direct speech, of which the father has the 
lion's share, becomes the dominant method of narrative communication, 
thus lending added weight to an outlook opposed to Georg's. 
Another means of creating distance between the reader and the 
central character is the narrator's use of unobtrusive, direct commen-
tary, most of which is directed against Georg, at least in the sense of 
undermining the initial impression he creates of complete self-
confidence and moral certainty. Thus, very soon after his father has 
opened their conversation, he begins to lose tra~k of things, speaking 
"wie im Nachhang zu dem Fri..iheren"(Se 27) and following his father's 
movements "ganz verloren" (Se 27) , A short while later, he is des-
cribed as "verlegen" (Se 28) and, before long, feels impelled to make 
a decision "kurz mit aller Bestimmtheit" (Se 29), al though the narrator 
clearly doubts the efficacy of his decision: "Es schien ja fast, wenn 
man genauer zusah, daB die.Pflege, die dart dem Vater bereitet werden 
sollte, zu spat kommen ki:innte" (Se 29) •17 As his self-assurance 
continues to wane, he tries to jog his father's memory by childishly 
nodding at him "aufmunternd" (Se 29), he rushes about "fast zerstreut11 
(Se 30), and remembers. a personal resolve, only to forget it immediately, 
"wie man einen kurzen Faden <lurch ein Nadelohr zieht" (Se 30). From 
then on, thougnts- simply whizz throu-gh his mind' -"denn iTIIDlerfort 
vergaB er alles" (Se 31), and the process of psychological disintegration 
gathers such pace that finally he implicitly admits his alleged guilt, 
\ 
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is condenmed to death by drowning, and straightway hurtles from the 
room to carry out the sentence. It is only at this point that the 
direct commentary becomes positive: "Schon hielt er das Gelander fest, 
wie ein Hungriger die Nahrung. Er schwang sich Uber, als der aus-
gezeichnete Turner, der er in seinen Jugendjahren zum Stolz seiner 
Elte~ gewesen war" (Se 32). But it is too late, for what had pre-
viously been positive now serves only to confirm the negative. 
The final, most important method by which narrator and author 
conspire to distance themselves and the reader from Georg consists in 
that indirect commentary deriving from the work's very structure. Here, 
as in Die Verwandlung, Der Verschollene, Der _ProzeE.and Das SchloE, this 
effect is produced essentially by so shaping the course of events that 
they profoundly challenge. the protagonist's version. ,oJ.i reality and 
should cause the reader to do the same. In other words, like Milena 
Jesenska-Polak when Kafka promised to send her his now famous letter 
to his father (Hv 162-223), through the total form of Das Urteil the 
reader, too, is tacitly warned: "Und verstehe beim Lesen alle 
advokatorischen Kniffe" (Em 80), 18 that skill at which so many of 
I 
Kafka's eminently plausible, non-narrating 'heroes' are so extremely 
adept. Among the scores of commentators on this story (cf. Beicken, 
1974:241ff.; A. Flores, 197£:168ff.; A. Flores, 1976a), the only one 
to explicitly recognise this principle is Stern (1976a), who refers 
to "the extraordinary narrative triumph that is achieved here, where 
the words on the page are assembled ostensibly to assert proposition A 
but in reality - and I do not mean any obscure, hidden reality, but 
the narrative reality conveyed through the text - but in reality assert 
non A" (op.cit.:124). Since Stern's outstanding interpretation and 
evaluation then provide a detailed account of this subtle technique 
and its implications for the entire work, it will be illustrated here 
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by only one example, a case he actually does not mention. 
Before Georg's father condemns him to death, one of the accusa-
tions he levels against him is that he has "unserer Mutter Andenken 
geschandet" (Se 30). Yet, at a very early stage in the text, the 
narrator, employing an inside view and disc us sing Ge or g' s friend in 
Russia, creates the very opposite impression when he relates: "Von 
dem Todesfall von Georgs Mutter, der vor etwa zwei Jahren erfolgt war 
und seit welchem. Georg mit seinem alten Vater ·in gemeinsamer Wirtschaft 
' 
lebte, hatte der Jreund wohl noch erfahren und sein Beileid in einem 
Brief mit einer Trockenheit ausgedrilckt, die ihren Grund nur darin 
haben konnte, daB die Trauer Uber ein soches Ereignis in der Fremde 
ganz unvorstellbar wird" (Se 24). Obviously there is a clash here 
between two opposed assessments of the same reality. Shortly afterwards, 
however, the reader is told that, since his friend's return to Russia, 
more than three years earlier, Georg has been at pains to keep from 
him any news that might disturb the image he retains of his hometown 
(Se 24f.). Consequently, .he has limited himself to writing letters 
about "bedeutungslose Vorfiille" (Se 25). But since Georg' s secretive-
ness is futile unless it presupposes that he, alone, has remained his 
friend's correspondent at home, it becomes evident that, despite the 
hedging "wohl noch" of the text, the friend must actually have heard 
from Georg, himself, about his mother's death. And because the latter 
occurred only about two years previously, it, too, must be included 
among those incidents that Georg explicitly regards as "bedeutungslos", 
so that his implied claims of profound grief at his mother's death are, 
in reality, a sham. In this indirect way, the text repeatedly estab-
-lishes the central character's unreliability beneath_ his_fa9ade of 
amiable plausibility, though whether this justifies the father's 
sentence of death is quite another matter. 
I 
'I 
87. 
Briefly, then, the narrative method inadequately defined as 
Einsinnigkeit consists in the highly impersonalised, unself-aware, 
yet reliable narration of a story, in which the narrator's extremely 
advantaged inside views are generally very detailed, but remain limited 
to the mind of his central character, who may be and, in Kafka's case, 
always is emotionally, intellectually and morally unreliable. Contrary 
to the assumptions of most scholars, however, this does not imply that 
stories told in such a manner may consist only of what the protagon-
ist could be regarded as having actually perceived, thought or felt, 
~ 
consciously and subconsciously, at any particular moment in the narra-
tive. Rather, as the analysis of Das UrteiZ should have demonstrated, 
the method in question is considerably more flexible, affording the 
narrator a whole range of means by which he may distance himself, to 
varying degrees, from the immediate awareness of his central character. 
Apart from indirect.commentary through structure, context within a 
collection, recurring motifs, symbols and the like, these may include 
summary, flashbacks, previews (cf. opening of Der ProzeB), the mention 
of phenomena clearly beyond the range of the central characterv s mind 
(cf. ending of Die VeY'WandZung), unobtrusive direct commentary and, 
in some instances, even brief remarks by the narrator in his own person, 
a practice to be observed not only in the novels of Henry James, "the 
old intruder" (cf.Booth, 1961 :58£.), but also in the last few pages 
of Uwe Johnson's Eine Reise wegr»ohin, 1960. As Kudszus (1964:193) has 
quite rightly observed, the use of this narrative method also seems 
invariably to entail a degree of ambiguity, in the sense.that the 
thoughts of· figures other than the protagonist may be directly presented 
as well, but without being unequivocally attributable either to the 
knowledge of the impersonalised, advantaged narrator or to the unsig-
nalled inference or supposition of the central character. In addition 
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to the example already quoted from Das UrteiZ, a considerable number . 
of others have been noted in all three of Kafka's novels, though they 
have generally been misinterpreted as breaks in perspective (e.g. 
Leopold, 19 63; Sheppard, 1973), Versehen and VerfehZungen (e.g. Walser, 
1961:32), or they have simply been assigned, usually somewhat arbitr-
arily, to the protagonist (e.g. BeiBner; Kobs). That such ambiguity 
is not to be resolved in these ways, that it is evidently intrinsic 
to the method under discussion and far from being peculiar to Kafka, 
may be illustrated by a short extract from Henry James' What Maisie 
Knew (1897) .• At the very beginning of Chapter 3, Maisie is loudly told 
by her mother· that .. she must learn to keep her thoughts to herself. 
The text then continues: "This was exactly what Maisie had already 
learned, and the accomplishment·was just the source of her mother's 
irritation. It was of a horrid little critical system, a tendency in 
her silence, to judge her elders, that this lady suspected her, liking 
as she did, for her own part, a child to be simple and confiding". 
From every stylistic feature of this passage, it is obvious that the 
voice uttering these words cannot possibly belong to six-year-old Maisie. 
What is not clear, however, ancl what cannot be immediately clarified 
is whether this voice is expressing its own direct insight into ·· 
Ida Farange 1 s mind or Maisie's implied version of it, since every idea 
in the extract could be paraphrased into the language of a very percep-
tive and sensitive child like Maisie. As a consequence, for want of 
evidence to the contrary, the reader is left with no valid alternative 
to the assumption that both interpretations must apply (cf. Kudszus, 
1964:205) •19 Had this fact been more widely acknowledged by Kafka 
I 
scholars, most of the debate about Einsinnigkeit would never have arisen. 
Indeed, as a description of narrative perspective, the term might 
'never have been coined. 
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Nor need it have been. For the technique at issue had been 
consistently and more accurately described by Henry James in his 
critical prefaces, the first of which appeared in 1907 (cf. Blackmur, 
1934), and since that time his terms (third-person) 'centre of 
consciousness' or 'reflector' have become so firmly established in the 
vocabulary of narrative theory that they will be used in the remainder 
of this study as well, although the term 'reflector' will be preferred, 
since it does not exclude the element of the subconscious or uncon-
scious, so important, for example, in Ein Traum and Auf der Galerie. 
Moreover, before Kafka had composed a single extant work, James had 
already brought this technique to a level o.f extreme refinement in a 
long series of short stories and novels, while other writers to follow 
his example include James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Graham Greene, 
Fran~ois Mauriac, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Robert Musil, Thomas 
Mann and Uwe Johnson. To call such a technique "Kafkas einzigartige 
und neue Errungenschaft" (Beick~n, 1971 :498) or to claim that "Kafka 
was the first to succeed with the possibilities of narrative conscious-
ness" (Szanto, 1972:7) and that "his narrative technique was unique" 
(ibid.:42) is therefore, at the very least, to be mistaken. 
Before this discussion of Einsinnigkeit can be concluded, however, 
there is one further, extremely basic issue that needs to be examined, 
namely, the almost universal assumption that Kafka's fiction is to be 
regarded 2s invariably narrative. Among the vast majority of scholars, 
including virtually everyone who has att~mpted to analyse the rhetoric 
of his works, this matter has simply been taken for granted. But a 
significant few have thought otherwise. Rohner (1950), for example, 
maintains of Ktffka, "daB er zum groBen Teil uberhaupt nicht erzahlt, 
sondern die Problematik seiner Gegenstande erortert" (op.cit.:54); 
! 
Filrst (1956) is convinced: "Kafka erzahlt nicht Geschichten, irnmer 
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macht er Forschungen" (op.cit.:50); Wiese (1962) refers to Die 
VerwandZung as "mehr Analyse als Erzahlung" (op.cit.:325); Krusche 
(1974) remarks about the novels: "nicht das, was geschieht, steht im 
Vordergrund des Erzahlinteresses, sondern die verschiedenen Deutungen, 
die das Geschehen durch die Personen der Hand lung erfiihrt" (op ,ci t.: 
53); and similar views are to be found in studies by Martini (1954:319£.). 
Leopold (1959:59ff.), Hasselblatt (1964:59), Flach (1967:129ff.), 
M. Greenberg (1968:146), Fingerhut (1969:117) and Kobs (1970:25,33) •20 
Implicit in all of these diss~nting statements and the supposi-
tion they are opposing is, of course, a theory about the nature of 
' 
narration. Yet, apart from Flach, who esoterically construes as non-
narrative any text which "keinen intentionalitatsbestimmenden Satz 
enthalt" (Flach, 1967: 129ff.), no other scholar broaches the subject 
at all, despite its self-evident and crucial relevance. Before the 
issue can be pursued 'any further, therefore, an attempt must obviously 
be made to provide what so many others have omitted. Surrnnaris ing the 
arguments of Milller ('1947: 10; 1950: 5) and Larrnnert ( 1955: 20f .) , ' Seidler 
(1959) defines the essence of narration thus:· "Die Ursituation des 
Erzahlens besteht im Berichten. ( ••• ) Eine Welt von Bcgebenheiten ist 
gleichsam die Energiequelle, sie wird im Sprechen aufgebaut und zu 
einer Handlung zusammengezogen·. Die Grundform lautet - so hat schon 
Herder erkannt - 'es ward'. Aber sofortmuB man diesem 'Es ward' noch 
hinzufligen: 'und dann'. Damit ist das ideale Grundgerilst alles 
Erzahlens festgelegt" (op.cit.:456; s.a. Petsch, 1934:61; Kayser, 1948: 
349ff.). 
If one accepts these well-~ounded, eminently_ reasonabl!=! disdn-
guishing criteria and applies them to the forty-four works Kafka pub-
lished in his own lifetime, the astonishing fact to emerge is that 
approximately two-thirds of his output consists of texts which are 
91. 
clearly non-narrative. The dividing-line is, admittedly, not always 
easy to draw. Nevertheless, of the fourteen pieces constituting the 
Landarzt collection, six can certainly be classified as non-narrative 
(Der neue Adv~kat; Auf der Galerie; Ein altes Blatt; Das nachste Dorf; 
Die Sorge des Hausvaters; Elf Bohne), while two others (Ein. Besuch im 
Bergwerk; Ein Bericht filr eine Akademie) may be regarded as borderline 
cases, for although itheir basic structure derives from an inter-
connected series of events, this is so overlaid with description and 
co~entary that one can scarcely regard incidents as providing their 
primary 11Energiequelle". 
The significance underlying this preponderance of non-narratives 
is suggested by Wellek/Warren's observation that narrative fiction "or, 
better, a term like 'story', calls our attention to time, and a sequence 
in time" (Wellek/Warren, 1942:222). In other words, Kafka' s unmis-tak-
able preference for non-narrative composition is a corollary of his 
attitude to time. Many scholars have connnented on this latter aspect 
of his oeuvre, stressing its constantly present, static or iterative 
1 . 21 qua ity. However, Martini (1954) and Leopold (1959) are alone in 
directly relating it to the matter of narratfve essence, though even 
they are still not prepared to infer that some of Kafka's fiction is 
actually non-narrative. Furthermore, because so relatively few scholars 
have concerned themselves with the present collection, there has also 
been a general failure to recognise that Kafka does have a temporal 
perspective; an awareness of the present in terms of the past and the 
future, but that the past is always presented as an irrevocably lost 
positive, while the future becomes simply an extension of the present's 
fundamental negativity, culminating inevitably in utter failure, ruin, 
death or total oblivion (cf. Josefine die Sangerin). Thus the distinctive 
characteristic of time in Kafka's total literary world-view is not so 
I I' 
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much "stehender St~rmlauf" (Tb 169) or "inunerwahrender Augenblick11 
(Ranun, 1971:47ff.; cf. Hv 39f.), but rather its radically disjunctive 
or inorganic quality, and this, as later discussion of Das naohste 
Dorf will attempt to show, has crucial implications for the notion of 
identity a's well (cf. Martini, 1954:319£.). Moreover, questions of 
11 SchaffensprozeB" apart (Binder, 1971; 1976a; Hillmann, 1979), it may 
also serve to explain why twenty-seven of the forty-four works Kafka, 
himself, had published do not extend beyond two printed pages, while 
only nine exceed five pages, a surely not insignificant fact, but one 
which has been totally ignored in favour of empty speculation about 
intrinsic fragmentariness (cf. Binder, 1979b:67ff.). 
Assuming, then, that much of Kafka's fiction is not narrative, 
one is immediately faced with a problem of nomenclature,, since the 
terms 'non-narrative' and 'non-narrator' are both too imprecise and 
too negative to be at all adequate, As possible alternatives, Leopold 
(1959:59f.) has proposed 'report' and Krusche (1974:21) 'Reflexionen' 
or 'Betrachtungen'. However, since the former does not exclude the 
concept of narration and both the latter imply an attitude of composure 
generally quite foreign to the works concerned, a more satisfying 
solution is to be derived from the following remarks by Larrnnert ( 1955): 
"Die Formel 'es war einmal' drlickt noch keinerlei Geschehens-Intention 
aus; sie kann deshalb nur als das Urscherna erzahlerischer ·i;position 
gelten, als das EinlaBtor in die fiktive Welt, die erst dann erz~ihlerisch 
gestaltet wird, wenn aus dem zustandlichen 'es war' ein 'es ward' oder 
'es geschah 1 sich entbindet" (op.cit.:21). What Lammert is describing 
here as 'exposition' corresponds precisely to the type of enunciation 
in all of Kafka's non-narrative fiction. Consequently, although it 
logically requires the less than euphonious term 'expositor', both 
will be employed as alternatives to 'narrative' and 'narrator', 
'i 
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respectively, in the remainder of this study, while later analysis of 
point of view will naturally refer to expositors as well, since they 
are just as subject to the qualitative polarities already mentioned 
as are narrators. Einsinnigkeit, on the other hand, and all the 
erroneous notions associated with it, will now be taken as dispro~en 
and, therefore~ of no further use. 
Pamdoxie 
The last concept to be examined in this survey also gained cur-
rency during the 1950 1 s, since which time it has become as prominent 
among Kafka studies as the word 'parable'. Like the latter, it, too, 
owes its widespread adoption to the commentaries of Politzer who, in 
one of' the earliest reviews of Kafka research (s.a. Ackermann, 1950), 
finnly asserted: rr"Das charakteristische Stilmerkmal von Franz Kafkas 
Werk is t das Paradox. ( ••. ) Wo imrner und van welchem Standpunkt auch 
man Kafkas Werk anrlihrt, man wird immer einem Paradox begegnen" 
(Politzer, 1950:214). And although, in his later, far more comprehensive 
analyses, Politzer (1962; 1965; 1973a) broadened his views considerably, 
he has never ceased to regard the paradox as being of central import-
ance to Kafka's fiction and its interpretation. 
Through his popularisation of this notion, however, Politzer 
has created extensive confusion as well, because his own use of the 
term is so loose that numerous others have been led to follow bis 
example. As Kobs ( 1970) has rightly observed: "Filr Poli tzer gil.t jede 
befremdende Wendung, jede Unstimmigkeit, jeder Widerspruch schon als 
ein Paradox; filr paradox halt er es zum Beispiel, wenn ein Schutzmanh 
statt einer Auskunft eine abweisende Antwort gibt, paradox erscheint 
ihm sogar die Redeweise van einer 'gesteigerten Erlosung' ~ wie sie 
sich am Ende der Erzahlung Josefine, die Sangerin finclet 11 (op.cit.: 12). 
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In common parlance, it is true, vparadox' may be and often is employed 
in this imprecise manner. But, from the Stoics onwards, its exact 
meaning has always been, in essence, 'a seeming contradiction', a 
fact which has recently been confirmed by such Kafka scholars as Sand-
bank (1967), Neumann (1968:704,730), Fingerhut (1969:299) and Steinmetz 
(1977:87£.). Neumann, for example, after reviewing acknowledged stand-
ard works on the subject by Heiss, Schilder, Friedrich and Schroer, 
reaches the conclusion, "daB von der Antike bis zu Kierkegaards 
'schlechthinnigem Paradox' in den 'Philosophischen Bracken' (Dlisseldorf-
Koln ,' 1960, S. 34ff.) das Paradox als scheinbar Widersinniges:,i als 
'ganz Unwahrscheinliches' (a.a.O.S.49), als eine der allgemeinen Meinung 
widersprechende Aussage betrachtet wird, die sich bei genauerem Nach-
denken als entweder richtig, oder <loch filr einen bestimmten Zusammen-
hang (etwa die in sich widersprilchliche Tatsache der Erbstinde) als 
sinnvoll erweist" (op .cit.: 704). 
Yet, despite their recognition of this current, traditional 
meaning and their repudiation of the very frequent, inaccurate usage 
encouraged, if not initiated by Politzer, two very influential scholars 
have argued that Kafka has produced a new, individual form of paradox 
which constitutes the basic feature of all his works. The first of 
these is Neumann (1968), who claims that Kafka's mode of thinking and 
writing defies the conventional laws of logic and rhetoric in that it 
creates a "gleitendes Paradox". What he means by this term, he first 
illustrates by analysing the following two aphoristic statements from 
Kafka's notebooks: "Wer sucht, findet nicht, aber wer nicht sucht, wird 
gefunden" (Hv 94), and "Ein Kafig ging einen Vogel suchen" (Hv 41,82). 
Then he provides this general explanation: 
Kafkas Paradoxa leben nicht aus einer Verkehrung des 
Normalen, sie basieren selbst schon auf einem Widerspruch. 
Sie lenken nicht auf eine Synthese des Widersprilchlichen hin, 
,I 
wie das traditionelle Paradox, sondern vonjeder 
erwarteten Stimmigkeit ab; jede Auflosung ist bloB eine 
Reduktion auf neuerlich und viel ursprlinglicher 
Unbegreifliches. Dadurch wird jedoch die Beziehung 
zwischen Vogel und Kafig, zwischen Suchen und Finden 
nicht aufgehoben; sie bleibt bloB unbestimmt, ist weder 
auf einen glatten Widerspruch, noch auf vorschnelle 
Harmonisierung und Ausgleichung festzulegen. Kafkas 
11Umkehrung 11 ist also nicht die des "klassischen" 
Paradoxes; sie erscheint vielmehr stets verbunden mit 
einer "Ablenkung" van konventionellen Denkbahnen und 
erzielt dabei zwei entscheidende Wirkungen: Einerseits 
treten <lurch sie zwei Pole - im vorliegenden Beispiel 
Suchen und Finden, Vogel und Kafig - in einen ebenso 
entschiedenen wie befremdlichen Bezug; und gerade auf 
diesen Bezug scheint es Kafka anzukornrnen. Andererseits 
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laBt sich dieser Bezug auf keine der ilblichen Denkverknlipfungen 
reduzierert. 
(op.cit.:706) 
Although there are many objections which might be raised to 
Neumann's definition and its subsequent elaboration, the most obvious 
and basic point 1 to be made is that, if the phenomena he is discussing 
are to be described as paradoxical in any sense, then they must neces-
sarily partake of the essence of the paradox, that is, they must con-
sist of a contradiction which is later resolved and thus proves to 
have been only apparent, as is the case in the following line from 
Paul Fleming's Gedanken uber der Zeit: 
"Ach daB <loch jene Zeit, die ohne Zeit ist, kame ( ... )." 
However, since in Neumann's own explanation it is openly conceded that 
the stylistic features he is discussing do not, in his opinion, conform 
to these criteria, there is no justification for regarding any of 
them as a paradox, 'gleitend' or otherwise. Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine how a paradox could ever be aptly described as 'gleitend 1 
and still remain true to its essential nature. 
To reject Neumann's term, however, is not to deny that much of 
Kafka Is prose exhibits some- o:( the chara-cteri sties he mentions 0 No-one -
would seriously question, for example, that the author deliberately 
aims to challenge conventional ways of thinking or that, to this end, 
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he :may employ "semantische Verschiebung" (ibid.: 72ff .) , ~'Zitatent­
stellung" (ibid.:726ff.), "entfrerndete Metaphern" (ibid.:728ff.) 
and even banal pictures which still manage to assume enormous signifi-
cance,like that 0t the fur-clad woman in Die Verwandlung. On the other 
hand, one would certainly have to dispute the assertion that "Stil-
gesetze der kafkaschen Pros a ilberhaupt" (ibid.: 733) can be derived, 
very largely, from a selection of the author's most enigmatic aphorisms 
and that the "beliebige Reproduzierbarkeit" of a picture therefore 
renders it "trivial" (ibid.:736). Nevertheless, what remains of para-
mount importance is that the devices analysed by Neumann in no way 
exhaust the range of Kafka's rhetoric, and that they do not constitute 
paradoxes of a radically novel kind. On the contrary, they do not 
necessarily constitute paradoxes at all. To insist on this point is 
all the more essential because, as Henel (1964:247) has already indi-
cated and the later interpretations of this study will confirm, Kafka's 
literary world-view is undoubtedly and fundamentally paradoxical, not 
as the expression of some drifting antinomies, but in the very precise 
sense accepted since the Stoics. Had Neumann, like Kafka (cf. Br 20; 
Pasley, 1966; Walther, 1977), been more familiar with the writings of 
neo-Platonist, Christian mystics, he, too, might have recognised this 
fact. For one of the statements he quotes, namely, "Wer sucht, findet 
nicht, aber wer nicht sucht, wird gefunden" is either an empirical 
hyperbole or a close paraphrase of Angelus Silesius' paradoxical 
couplet entitled: "Gott findet man mit nicht-suchen" in Der 
cherubinische Wandersmann I, 171 (s .a. Hv 124). 
Towards the end of his article, Neumann explains that the aim 
of his "Arbeit" has been to show, "wie man nicht denken darf, wenn 
man Kafkas Texte nicht verfehlen will; und sie versucht, in die 
Kafkasche Denkbewegung - die im Grunde eher eine Schreibbewegung ist -
I' 
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einzufiihren; sie kann nicht Resultate formulieren, sondern nur den 
Nachvollzug kafkascher Denkbewegungen erleichtern" (op .cit.: 732). 
Thus, two years before the appearance of Kobs' study (1970), he anti-
cipated not only the ultimate conclusion of the latter's commentary, 
but also one of its central concepts. For, as noted in the discussion 
of Einsinnigkeit, Kobs, too, believes that the interpretation of 
Kafka's work cannot proceed beyond formal description, and that this 
is due to the creation of a special kind of paradox: 
Drei Momente sind es, die ein Paradox von dieser Art 
bestinnnen. Die Teile mtissen in einem streng logischen 
Zusannnenhang stehen, mtissen ftir sich und in ihrem 
Verhaltnis rational iiberpriifbar sein. Sie mlissen am 
Ende tiberraschend umschlagen: die Argumentationskette 
muB zu ihrem Ausgangspunkt zurlickkehren und sich so zu 
einem Zirkel verschlieBen. Dieser Zirkel ist das 
wesentliche Strukturmoment des Paradoxes. ( .•. ) 
Als drittes aber gehort zu einem Kafkaischen Paradox der 
Zwang, sich immer wieder auf diesen Zirkel einzulassen, 
ihn stets neu zu durchdenken; denn das BewuEtsein kann 
sich nicht damit zufriedengeben, daE eine Folge von 
logisch aufeinander bezogenen Einzels~ltzen insgesamt 
keinen positiven Sinn ergeben will. 
(Kobs , 19 70: l 2f.) 
According to Steinmetz (1977:87f,), Kobs' notion of a paradox 
is based on Kierkegaard' s original understanding of the term as '' eines 
als radikal erfahrenen Widerspruchs" (op.cit.:87), an idea he later 
abandoned because he wanted "<lurch das Paradox 'Platz schaffen, daB 
Gott kommen kann'( ... )" (loc.cit.). Whether this is true or not, the 
obvious fact remains that the phenomenon Kobs is describing does not 
conform to the essential criteria of the paradox in its traditional, 
exact and still generally accepted definition. Rather, it would seem 
to correspond more closely to a vicious circle, in the same way that 
most of the allegedly 'gleitenden Paradoxa' mentioned by Neumann are 
actually what others would more aptly regard as. -riddles or enigmas. 
In any case, despite their justified criticism of Politzer, neither of 
these two scholars can be said to have ,employed the term with much 
!: 
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more precisi~n than their predecessor or to have elucidated its crucial 
significance in Kafka' s literary world-view. What they have achieved, 
however, is to assist in establishing that increasingly popular dogma 
' 
which asserts that Kafaka's works are ultimately and intrinsically 
resistant to interpretation, that they may be structurally described, 
even 'explained' (Szanto), but never explicated. Already it has been 
shown that, in respect of nar.rative perspective or point of view, such 
an argument is simply not valid. Now an attempt will have to be made 
to assess the same contention on the level of verbal logic as well. And 
since Kobs' analysis of the brief exposition Die Baume has come to be 
regarded as definitive· proof of this claim, it will be examined as a 
test-case.· 
·Although first written probably late 22 in 1904 as part of Kafka's 
incomplete work, Beschreibung eines Kampfes (s. BkII 122,123), the text 
now known as Die Baume was later removed from its original context, 
stylistically revised, and initially published by Kafka in a collection 
of eight pieces called Betrachtung (1908), then as one of five pieces 
designated Betrachtungen (1910), and finally in its present form, 
reproduced below, as the second last of eighteen pieces collectively 
entitled Betrachtung (Dec. 1912; cf. Bfl75; Binder, 1975:56,ll6ff.; 
A.Flores, 1976:3£.). 
Die Baume 
Denn wir sind wie Baumstamme im Schnee. Scheinbar 
liegen sie glatt auf, und mit kleinem AnstoE sollte 
man sie wegschieben konnen. Nein, das kann man nicht, 
denn sie sind fest mit dem Boden verbunden. Aber sieh, 
sogar das ist nur scheinbar. 
(Se 19) 
In order of priority, the first issue -raised by Kohs is the 
meaning 0£ 'scheinbar' in the second sentence. As he understands it, 
this adverb must be construed in the same sense as the 'nur scheinbar' 
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I: 
i! 
.I ,, 
' I 
! ' 
99. 
of the last sentence (Kobs, 1970:9). Steinmetz (1977), on the oither 
hand, regards such a proposition as "unnotig stringene' and suggests 
that the word should be taken "in der neutraleren Bedeutung van 1 es 
sieht so aus', 'es hat den Anschein', 'es scheint' ( ..• )" (op.cit.: 
~9). However, from Kafka's usage elsewhere, it is evident that he 
employs the term 1 scheinbar' very carefully, in its strict sense, as 
the following extract from Forschungen eines Hundes should serve to 
demonstrate: 11den anderen (Hunden) scheint im Schweigen wohl zu sein, 
zwar hat es nur diesen Anschein, so wie bei den Musikhunden, die 
scheinbar ruhig musizierten, in Wirklichkei t aber sehr aufgeregt war en 
( ••• )" (Se 339). Kobs' interpretation of 'scheinbar' is, therefore, 
to be affirmed. 
Concerning the same sentence, Kobs then maintains that 'schein-
bar' can only apply to the first half, because the modal construction 
'man sollte .•. konnen' does not permit "die zusatzliche Modalbestimmung 
<lurch das Adverb 'scheinbar', sondern nur die durch das Wart 'eigent-
lich'" (op.cit. :9). But Fingerhut (1972) disagrees, contending: "so 
transformiert er ein riichtausformuliertes 'scheinbar' in ein 'eigent-
lich' ( •.. )" (op.cit.:393). Once again, however, Kobs' explanation is 
to be preferred, since the subjunctive 1 sollte konnen' already expresses 
the implied unreality of 'scheinbar' and thus makes the combination 
of the two, if not impossible, at least extremely unlikely (cf. 
Ramm, 1 9 7 1 : 20) • 
Assuming that the sense of 'scheinbar' can be rendered by 'in 
Wirklichkeit nicht', Kobs' next step is to paraphrase the second sentence 
as "In Wirklichkeit liegen sie nicht glatt auf und eigentlich sollte 
man sie mit kleinemAnstoB wegschieben-konnen" (ibid.:8f.). From this 
he then reaches the hardly surprising conclusion, "dal3 hier tatsachlich 
eine Unstinunigkeit besteht ( •. ,). Ohwohl es schon als sicher gilt, daB 
I 
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hier von nur Scheinbarem, nicht Wirklichem die Rede ist, geraten in 
der zweiten Halfte des Satzes die Bereiche des Scheinbaren und Wirk_: 
lichen durcheinander. Der bloBe Schein strebt nach der Wirklichkeit 
des 'Eigentlichen' ( •.. )" (op. ci t. :9) , There are, however, two very 
basic errors in this argument. The first pertains to the meaning of 
the term 'sche·inbar' • When used with precision, this adverb or 
adjective always d~notes an opposition between the outward impression 
created by a phenomenon and its actual reality. Absolutely essen.tial 
to the notion, therefore, is· the implicit contrast between misleading 
appearance and real fact. Consequently, its meaning cannot be reduced 
to 'in Wirklichkeit nicht 1 , since such an expression omits the funda-
mental aspect of misleading appearance (Schein) , so that its only exact 
equivalent is 'dem Schein(e) nach 1 • Kobs' second cardinal mistake is 
to equate 'eigentlich' with 'wirklich', when the two are plainly 
distii:ict, the latter simply asserting or even emphasising that something 
is actually or in reality so, while the former denotes that, despite 
factors which may create a different impression, something is actually 
or really so. It is because of this important difference that clauses 
containing the adverb 'eigentlich' are frequently preceded or followed 
by an adversative (e.g. 'aber') or a concessive (e.g. '·obwohl'). Once 
these necessary distinctions have been drawn, it becomes obvious that 
there is no logical confusion whatever in the sentence at issue. But 
the point becomes even clearer when it .1..s also recognised that the two 
halves at the sentence are actually causally related, the second half 
constituting a logical inference from the first, so that the whole 
could, in fact, be accurately paraphrased as 'Da sie scheinbar (dem 
Scheinenach) glatt aufliegen, sollte man sie (eigentlich) mit kleinem 
AnstoB wegschieben konnen'. And since Kobs' theory of a linguistically 
embedded, "'paradoxical' circle depends entirely on his misconstruction 
of this second sentence, it totally collapses once the rational 
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validity of that sentence has been demonstrated. 
Before Die Baume can be reinterpreted, however, there are two 
further issues that need to be clarified. The first is the matter of 
the opening phrase ("Denn wir") which, in Kobs' opinion, "an einen 
anderen Sachverhalt anzuknlipfen scheint, damit aber ins Leere greift, 
denn es gibt keinen solchen Anknilpfungspunkt" (op.cit.:8), a view 
that is shared, with some modifications, by Rannn (1971:21) and Stein-
metz (1977:90) as well. Yet, to construe the work in this way is to 
overlook the crucial factor of context. For, in all of its forms, 
whether published or unpublished, Die Baume never once occurs in iso-
lation. Within the first version of Beschreibu:ng eines Kampfes, for 
example~ it is prefaced by the following remarks from the prayerful 
man: 
Wir bauen eigentlich unbrauchbare Kriegsmaschinen, 
Thlirme, Mauern, Vorhange aus Seide und wir konnten 
uns viel darliber wundern, wenn wir Zeit dazu hatten. 
Und erhalten uns in Schwebe; wir fallen nicht, wir 
flattern, wenn wir auch haBlicher sind als Fledermause. 
Und schon'kann uns kaum jemand an einem schonen Tage 
hindern zu sagen: "Ach Gott heute ist ein schoner Tag". 
Denn schon sind wir auf unserer Erde eingerichtet und 
leben auf Grund unseres Einverstandnisses. 
(BkII 120, I 22) 
Despite some minor alterations and additions, the same framework is 
also provided in the second unpublished version (BkII 121,123), while 
in the final version of Betrach-tung it is preceded by the following, 
equally brief exposition called Wunsch, Indianer zu werden. 
Wem1 man doch ein Indianer ware, gleich bereit und auf 
dem rennenden Pferde, schief in der Luft, innner wieder 
kurz erzitterte ilber dem zitternden Boden, bis man die 
Sporen lieB, denn es gab keine Sporen, bis man die Zligel 
wegwarf, denn es gab keine Zligel, und kaum das Land vor 
sich als glatt gemahte Heide sah, schon ohne Pferdehals 
und Pferdekopf. (Se 1 a.f .) 
Although the differences between these two types of framework 
are undeniably great, they nevertheless have one ·concern in connnon, 
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namely, the relationship between man and the earth. In the first 
unpublished version, this is made quite explicit by the last sentence, 
the burden of the whole passage being that man's sense of security 
and the objects he fabricates in order to express or reinforce it are 
actually deceptive, since they are based solely on a tacit human agree-
, 
ment to regard the world in a particular, comforting manner rather than 
face the possible anguish or terror of viewing it otherwise. Wunsch, 
Indianer zu UJerden, on the other hand, creates the image of a fervently 
desired, even ideal human condition, characterised by total self-
integration and certainty. Ins~antly decisive and alert, the Red Indian 
is so completely at one with himself and the world,as he races through 
the countryside on his horse, that he becomes increasingly oblivious 
of everything except the sheer motion in which he is utterly involved. 
Spurs, reins, the nature of the terrain, even the horse's head and 
neck: all gradually fall away, recede from his consciousness, as he 
attains the supreme freedom and happiness of a completely untroubled, 
unself-aware vision in action. Both in its original and in its 
definitive form· , therefore, the context of Die Ba,wne clearly reveals 
that it is intended as a statement about the underlying nature of the 
human condition, the "Denn wir" of the final version serving explicitly 
to generalise the work's ideas and to relate them, as cause, to the 
preceding wish, as effect (cf. Binder, 1975:119). 
The other matter that needs to be settled before this interpre-
tation can be completed is the construction to be placed on the expres-
sion 'Baumstamme im Schnee'. According to H. Richter (1962:76) and 
Kobs, these objects are to be understood as felled logs, "des 
! 
Blatterschmucks der Krone entkleidet, nicht mehr im Boden·wurzelnd, 
die liegengeblieben sind, weil man sie nicht rechtzeitig abtransportiert 
hat" (Kobs, 1970:13). Flach (1967:131) and Ramm (1971:19ff.), on the 
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:1 other hand, evidently see them as standing in the snow, while Steinmetz 
(1977:90) maintains that both views are possible and that, in any 
case, each leads to the same outcome. However, the question cannot 
be dismissed so lightly, for it makes a great deal of difference 
whether, as H. Richter and Kobs imply, man is being compared to something 
already dead, something alrea~y severed from the earth, or to something 
living and rooted in the earth. Furthermore, if the tree-trunks are 
taken to mean felled logs, it makes nonsense of the notion that they 
could even apparently be '£est mit dem Boden verbunden'. Steinmetz 
(loc.cit.) tries to-overcome this difficulty by allowing for "festge-
frorene liegende Baumstfunme", but in doing so makes equal nonsense of 
the idea that one might even apparently push them aside 'mit kleinem 
AnstoB'. Despite the verb 'aufliegen', therefore, the tree-trunks must 
be interpreted as belonging tb living, standing trees, unless one is 
predetermined to make nonsense of the work. 
Viewed in the light of the preceding connnents, Die Baume assumes 
enormous importance in the understanding of Kafka's oeuvre, since it 
establishes one of the most fundamental characteristics of all his 
thought and writing, namely, the recognition of a reality superior to 
and masked by the empirical (cf. Hv 121). For, through its developed 
analogy, Die Bawne actually presents three degres du savoir3 to use 
Maritain's term. The first is that of innnediate perception, which can 
be misleading. It is on this level that men, like tree-trunks deep 
in snow, may seem to resemble insecure, easily removed theatrical props, 
with no firm tie to the earth. But this illusion is corrected by the 
second degree of knowledge, the empirical, according to which men, 
like stands of trees, are known to be physically rooted in the earth, 
whatever the appearances to the contrary. However, in Kafka's judge-
ment, one must also acknowledge that empirical knowledge, it~elf, is 
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ultimately an illusion, that physical reality, far from providing man 
with certainty and security, actually deceives him by making him 
blind to the metaphysical and preternatural, which may at any moment 
irrupt into his life (cf. Die VerwandZung, Der Proze~ and many similar 
works), by deflecting his attention from or blocking his access to the 
truth, which therefore remains ultimately uncertain and unfathomable, 
and by encouraging him to find comfort in various types of falsehood 
(cf. Hv 39££., aphorisms on su_nde, Luge, Betrug, Bose) • As Kafka was 
much later (probably in spring, 1923) to remark to Janouch: "Wir leben 
in einer Zeit des Bosen. Das ist schon daran ersichtlich, da3 nichts 
mehr seinen richtigen Namen tragt. ( ... ) Die Begriffe werden wie 
entke~nte, leere NuBschalen hin - t.md hergeschoben. So spricht man 
zum Beispiel van der Heimat jetzt, in diesem Augenblick, da die 
Wurzeln des Menschen schon langst aus dem Boden gerissen sind 11 (Gk Slf .) • 
Despite his empirically demonstrable, 'firm ties with the earth, then, 
man can, like t'ree-trunks, be totally uprooted, and Kafka firmly 
believed that, in his own: era, man had been so for a long time. This 
i. s the third degree of knowledge, the resolution of the apparent contra-
diction in the last sentence of Die Ba:wne. For this brief work is 
truly a paradox, in the precise, traditional and only meaningful 
sense of the term. 
Apart from demonstrating the actual nature of the paradox, how-
ever, Die Bawne also helps to clarify the vexed question of reality in 
Kafka's fiction. According to Fingerhut (1969), almost all scholars 
are agreed in regarding "Kafkas Pros a" as being characterised by the 
fact, "daf;\ in ihr Reales und Irreales unmittelbar nebeneinandersteht" 
(op.cit.), and his claim is supported by the more recent study of H. 
Kraft (1972:39ff.). Kobs (1970), on the other hand, maintains that, 
because the reader is bound to the vision of characters who accept 
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themselves and their co-existents as empirically real, he, too, must 
"die einsinnig dargestellte Welt als empirische Realitat hinnehmen" 
(op.cit.:53)~ a proposition which, if valid, would turn all fables, 
fairytales and science fiction into documentaries. At the opposite 
extreme, Walser (1961:49,140) denies the reality of the novels any 
empirical reference at all, and Henel (1967) agrees with him, asserting 
that Kafka' s world is neither "Darstellung einer transzendenten Welt" 
nor the "Abbild oder Persiflage einer empirischen Wirklichkei t" (op. 
cit.: 254). Consequently, to her mind, even "die Menschen in dieser 
Welt sind nicht der empirischen Welt entnommen" (loc.cit.), although 
in the remainder of her article she does not hesitate to attribute 
human awareness to Kafka's 'heroes' or to interpret their 'Gegenwelt' 
as the projection of their own repressed guilt, as if awareness, psychic 
projections and guilt bore no relationship whatever to empirical 
reality. 
That most of Kafka's fiction contains elements which are clearly 
non-empirical,which belong to the third degree of knowledge, is unden-
iable. But to interpret al 1 of his literary phenomena in this way is 
to distort the meaning of the term 'empirical'. Even if one ignores 
the ambiguity in all of Walser's criteria (op.cit.:49), it is not true 
that fictional characters, for example, must be "psychologisch wahr" 
or "anthropologisch menschlich" or "biologisch nattirlich" (Henel, 19 67: 
254) to be empirically representative. On the contrary, if a fictional 
phenomenon, whether personal or otherwise, is to be classified as 
empirically representative, the only requirement it must meet is that 
nothing about it may transgress the accepted limits of the
1 
empirically 
possible. Consequently, despite the fact that many of Kafka's characters 
never question the actual existence of obviously non-empirical pheno-
mena about them, this does not jeopardise their empirically representative 
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status, for if it did, then one would be logically obliged to conclude 
that, not only every member of the Flat Earth Society, but also every 
believer'in a god ipso facto forfeited his empirical sta~ding, a 
proposition which is manifestly absurd. To ignore or deny this prin-
ciple is to miss the whole point of Kafka's purpose in most of his 
works, that purpose being, as Die Baume so well illustrates, to 
challenge the empirically representative or second degree of knowledge 
by constantly confronting it with the third or trans-empirical degree 
of knowledge. It is for this reason that the traditional and genuine 
paradox plays such an important part in his fiction. 
Reviewing Kafka scholarship in 1967, Kurz made the following 
observation: "Um und nach 1950 ist in der Kafka-Forschung eine Zasur 
zu verzeichnen. Die weltanschaulichen Aspekte, die meist im publi-
zistischen und vermeintlich logischen Direktgang Kafkas Werk abgezwungen 
wurden, traten, wenigstens in ihrer unmethodischen Isolierung, zurilck. 
Die asthetischen Fragen traten als Gegenreaktion und Zeichen des 
kri tischeren WerkbewuBtseins in den Vordergrund" (Kurz, 1967: 66) • 
If the deliberations of this chapter and their ensuing conclusions 
·have any validity at all, then clearly they demonstrate the accuracy 
of Kurz's assessment. At the same time, however~ they also confirm 
the obvious fact that to be in the foreground is not necessarily to 
be in focus. For, contrary to the opinion of Gaier (1969) and the 
I 
many other advocates of Vieldeutigkeit, it is not the intrinsic 
nature of Kafka' s works which has led to such a bewildering divergence 
of opinions or 'chorus of lies' about their meaning, but rather the 
sheer inadequacy of the critical theories with which they have been 
approached. Now 'that those shortcomings have been revealed and, it 
is to be hoped, suitably remedied, an attempt can finally be made to 
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provide a sound basis for the interpretation of what is, after all, 
the overriding concern of this study: Kafka's Landarzt collection. 
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3. TOWARDS A RHETORIC OF THE COLLECTION 
At the beginning of the preface to his monumental study, Booth 
(1961) explains: 11 In writing about the rhetoric of fiction, I am not 
primarily interested in didactic fiction, fiction used for propaganda 
or instruction. My subject is the technique of non-didactic fiction, 
viewed as the art of corrnnunicating with readers - the rhetorical 
resources available to the writer of epic, novel~ or short story as 
he tries, consciously or unconsciously, to impose his fictional world 
upon the reader." Among Kafka scholars since BeiBner (1952), however, 
these resources, as revealed by the preceding chapter, have been taken 
to mean principally, if not exclusively, the author's use bf narrative 
perspective, Furthermore, in adopting this very restricted view of 
fictional rhetoric, such scholars have the unequivocal support of 
authority. Lubbock (1921), for example, argues that the "whole intri-
cate question of method in the craft of fiction" is ''governed by the 
q-uestion of point of view" (op.cit.:251), and Kayser (1948) agrees 
with him, when he maintains of the Erziihlhaltung: "Ihre rechte 
Erfassung ist flir das Verstarn;l.nis eines Werkes von groBter Bedeutung" 
(op.cit.:204; s.a. Kayser, 1956:231). 
Yet, without 1n any way underestimating the significance of 
point of view, examination of Einsinnigkeit and fictional perspective 
in general has disclosed that it 1s not of primary importance, that 
narrators, expositors and reflectors may be quite demonstrably unreli-
able, that their point of view may be undermined or overruled by a 
whole range of unobtrusive and covert devices at the author's disposal. 
Consequently, any consideration of fictional rhetoric which attempts 
I 
to adequately represent the actual nature of its subject matter must 
give precedence to these other, more subtle elements of the 
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fictional enterprise, since they are the factors which collectively 
I 
provide the author's indirect commentary and ultimately establish the 
implicit norms of his work. Regrettably, within the limits of the 
l 
present study, it will not be possible to treat all of these elements 
in detail. Neverthel,ess, some have already been discussed, others will 
inevitably be mentioned in the later, extensive analysis of the texts, 
' and a few will simply have to be adumbrated as possible corollaries of 
others. All that the following observations aim to achieve is an 
accurate and reasonably objective description of the principal means 
employed by Kafka in the Landarzt collection as he attempts to create 
and vimpose his fictional world.upon the reader'. Furthermore, in 
I pursuing this objective, they lay no claim to exclusive validity. Nor 
do they pretend to be totally unengaged in interpretation, since that 
' is impossible in an account of any author's rhetoric. Nonetheless, 
their primary concern is to describe, to explain the main premisses 
on which the subsequent, lengthy interpretations are based, and to 
allow the reader to judge them for himself, in advance and as a separ-
ate issue. 
Structure 
In literary commentary, it is not uncommon to find the term 
'structure' construed in an architectural sense, as the set of building-
blocks with which some fixed edifice is erected and left to stand, 
statically, on its own. Stanzel (1955), however, rightly opposes this 
notion, insisting that the structure of a novel should be understood as 
I 
I 
"das Zusammenwirken, die Abhangigkeit voneinander und die Einheit aller 
am Roman beteiligten Aufbauelemente" (op.cit. :7). More refently, 
Moffat/McElheny (1966) have reasserted this interpretation of the 
concept_, with an even more active emphasis: "The best means to keen 
' understanding is what learning psychologist Jerome Bruner has called 
I 
i 
I, I 'I 
110. 
'structure' and what Alfred Whitehead long ago called 'seeing the 
woods by means of the trees'. That is, any field of knowledge one 
might care to name is a field because of certain basic relations that 
/ 
operate throughout it, lines of force that magnetise it. This set of 
relations shifts; it is dynamic" (op.cit.:578). 
Viewed from this more dynamic standpoint, and in the light of 
the remarks made earlier about the nature of reality in Ka~ka's works, 
all the pieces of the Landarzt collection exhibit a common· structure, 
in that each of them creates a set of relations in which one or more 
representatives of historically conditioned,empirical reality are con-
fronted with a phenomenon which constitutes such a disturbing, radical 
departure from customary norms and valves, interpretations and assump-
tions, that it induces the various representatives of empirical reality, 
and the reader with them, to attempt to come to·terms with it. In 
'Das nachste Dorf,- it is true, the element of Auseinandersetzung on the 
part of the empirically representative, only slightly personalised 
expositor would seem to be entirely lacking. However, from the fact 
that he obviously considers his .grandfather's repeated saying worthy 
of public record, but fails, himself, to indicate whether or to what 
extent he agrees with it, one can reasonably infer that, in some way, 
he, too, is still trying to come to terms with it, and that he expects 
the reader to·do the same. Consequently, at least by implication, 
this very brief work may also be regarded as conforming to the defined, 
basic structure. Similar allowances must also be made in the case of 
Ein Bericht filr eine Akademie where, apart from Rotpeter's reference 
to a journalist's comment about his self-exposure in public (Se 148f.), 
there is no explicit attempt at Auseinandersetzung by his empirically 
representative, learned listeners, although it is clearly implied by 
the academy's actual invitation to Rotpeter and the topic on which 
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they ask him to address them. Another somewhat anomalous piece is 
Ein BY'Udermord,where the entir e action and all the main characters, 
with their highly typifying names, are so radically stylised that the 
work seems to contain no acceptable representative of empirical r eality 
at all. In this instance, however, that role is assumed by the narra-
tor who, though scarcely personalised , nevertheless speaks directly to 
the reader on two occasions, both times pass ing corrnnent on the unfath-
omable nature of the real ity he is presenting. Furthermore, although 
it may seem from his narrative that he defies t he limits of empirical 
reality by displaying omniscience,it must not be overlooked that he is 
merely providing his own version of what is allegedly proven fact. As 
his opening sentence states: "Es ist erwiesen, daB der Mord auf 
fo l gende Weise erfolgte : ( ..• ) " (Se 144) . Essentially, therefore , this 
work, too, confirms the uniform structural principle und erlying each 
piece of the col lec tion. 
Within this uniformity, however, there is clear and very signi-
ficant diversity, the basic structure taking shape in one of four 
different ways,according to the specific nature of the radically dis-
turbing phenomenon encountered. Perhaps the most obvious of t hese 
variations is constituted by those works in which empirically represent-
ative reality is confronted with the physically actual, yet empiri c-
ally inexplicable agents of a transcendent, moral authority. At its 
most palpable, this structure is exemplifed by Vor dem Gesetz, where 
the forbidding, elusive doorkeeper not only confounds al 1 the country-
rnan' s assumptions about the Law, but is also characterised as its 
direct, albeit distant servant and, unlike the countryman, defies the 
limits of the empirically possible by not aging . Despite all appear-
ances to the contrary, the same set of relations a lso under lies Ein 
Landarzt and Ein altes Blatt . That these works portray phenomena 
112. 
which 1 are to be accepted'as physically actual, yet empirically 
inexplicable, few will dispute, since the evidence of the fiction is 
unequivocal: two mysterious horses and a groom that suddenly appear 
from a small, dilapidated, long disused pigsty; a boy's hideous, yet 
beautiful and incurable wound, crawling with worms of no 'known phylum; 
and nomads of no recorded human type accompanied by carnivoro'us 
horses. Many, however, will need to be convinced that, like the door-
keeper before the Law, these phenomena, too, are to be construed as 
the agents of a transcendent, moral authority. Yet, within the texts, 
themselves, support for such an interpretation is unmistakable. Quite 
apart from the fictional fact of their trans-empirical or preter-
natural nature, the horses and groom, for example, are directly attri-
buted by the doctor to the intervention of the gods (Se 125), and the 
later neighing of the horses is taken to be "hohern Orts angeordnet" 
(Se 127). Similarly, the boy's wound is related by the doctor to a 
loss of faith among his patients and their abuse of him "zu heiligen 
Zwecken" (Se 127), the boy, himself, says that he was born with it 
and that it is his "gauze Ausstattung" (Se 128), while the doctor later 
explains it in terms of a fatal, existential weakness common to many 
'I 
men (Se 128). Finally, in the case of the nomads and their horses, 
although the cobbler states that the way of life and institutions of 
the empire they have invaded are incomprehensible and a matter of utter 
indifference to t:hem (Se 130), he nevertheless also maintains that the 
reason for their presence, the focus of their attraction9 is the seat 
of the emperor, the earthly representative of the Law: "Der kaiserliche 
Palast hat die Nomaden angelockt, versteht es aber nicht, sie wieder 
zu vertreiben" (Se 131). When one further considers that, despite 
their apparently irresistible force, the nomads never:once attack the 
I 
palace, it becomes evident that their primary function is to reveal, 
I 
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s·imp ly by the effect of their presence, some hidden truth about the 
nature of the relationship between the Law, its earthly representative 
and his subjects. Thus here, as in Ein Landarzt, there are distinct, 
if not conclusive indications that these other physically actual, yet 
empirically inexplicable phenomena are also to be interpreted as the 
agents of a transcendent, moral authority, however unlikely it may at 
first appear. As more detailed analysis will show, these indications 
are strengthened by the total context of the collection. 
Kafka's second variation on the fundamentally' uniform structure 
of the Landarzt pieces is to confront empirically representative reality 
with a partially,but essentially humanised animal or thing. Examples 
of this particular structure are, provided by Der neue Advokat, in which 
Alexander the Great's battle-charger, Bucephalus~is resurrected and 
made a fully qualified member of the modern legal fraternity; SchakaZe 
und Araber, where a traveller "aus dem hohen Norden" (Se 133), journey-
ing with Arabs through the desert, suddenly finds himself face to face 
with an extremely eloquent jackal; Die Sorge des Hausvaters, which 
deals with a somewhat reticent, utterly elusive, childlike creature, 
composed of an odd assortment of bits and pieces and bearing the 
enigmatic name Odradek; and, finally, Ein Bericht fUr eine Akademie, 
the attempted autobiographical report to the members of a learned 
academy by an educated, talking ape, an established star "auf allen 
, groBen Varietebiihnen der zivilisierten Welt 11 (Se 148). Each of these 
characters, too, is physically actual, yet empirically inexplicable. 
Hoyever, to have grouped them with those already mentioned would have 
been to ignore certain very crucial differences between the two. 
First, there is nothing violent or sinister, forbidding or punitive 
about these beings, On the contrary, they co-exist at ease with man, 
and each of the works in which they appear has a strong element of 
:I 
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almost lighthearted irony about it. Second, and more important, 
instead of opposing or threatening, misleading or abusing man, they 
'seem to reveal, in an admittedly extreme form, an actual affinity with 
him, bringing into high relief an important aspect of his modern 
existence. And, in two of the works concerned, this kinship is quite 
openly stated. At the end of Der neue Advokat (Se 124), for example, 
the empirically representative expositor takes the human-equine 
Bucephalus' reaction to his forlorn, contemporary situation as a 
possibly valid example for all humans to follow. Similarly, early in 
his report and despite his acknowledged human-simian nature, Rotpeter 
explicitly generalises the si~nificance of his condition, applying it 
to all earthly creatures: "Ihr Affentum, mei.ne Herren, sofern Sie 
etwas Derartiges hinter sich haben, kann Ihnen nicht ferner sein als 
mir das meine. An der Ferse aber kitzelt es jeden, der bier auf Erden 
geht: den kleinen Schimpansen wie den groBen Achilles" (Se 148). 
It will be the task of interpretation to show that the jackals and 
Odradek possess a similar relevance for modern man, and that both also 
provide him with the opportunity.of gaining insight into his own 
desolate condition, as Kafka saw it. 
In a third group of pieces, Kafka varies his basic structure 
again, this time by confronting the empirically representative with a 
hypothetical reality: a vision, a legend or a dream. This is the case 
in Auf der Galerie, Eine kaiserliche Botschaft and Ein Traum: Further-
more, in each of these works, the attempt of the empirically representa-
tive character to come to terms with the phenomenon confronting him is 
expressed in one brief sentence at the end. Of the actual circusgoer 
in the gallery, for example, the reader is simply told: "da dies so 
ist, legt der Galeriebesucher das Gesicht auf die Brilstung und, im 
SchluBmarsch wie in einem schweren Traum versinkend, weint er, ohne 
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'es zu wissen" (Se 129) . Similarly, knowing the emperor's message wi~l 
never arrive, the lowliest subject still goes on sitting and dream-
ing: 11Du aber sitzt an Deinem Fenster und ertraumst sie Dir, wenn der 
Abend kommt 11 (Se 139). Finally, and even more briefly, Josef K.'s 
dream of his own suicide by self-burial concludes with the lapidary 
phrase: 11Entzlickt von diesem Anblick erwachte er" (Se 147). 
The fourth and last variation on Kafka's basic structure in the 
Landarzt pieces is more difficult to define, since the phenomenon 
confronting the empirically representative neither defies the limits 
of the empirically possible nor consists in anything explicitly hypo-
thetical or unreal. Rather, it is a question here of commonplace 
empirical reality trying to come to terms with a radicalised and dis-
tanced form of itself. Illustrative of this category is the attempt 
of the miners in Ein Besueh im Bergwerk to grasp the nature of the 
mine's ten, young chief engineers and their haughty attendant, all of 
whom appear "als etwas Unverstandliches" (Se 138) in their esteem. 
Then there is the already mentioned case of the grandfather's repeated, 
radical view of time as an uncontrollable, terrifyingly rapid process 
of inorganic change in Das nachste Dorf'. A further example is pro-
vided by Elf Sohne,where the radicalisation consists in the highly 
improbable number of sons (especially given the lack of any reference 
to a mother or daughters), the fact that the father only ever adverts 
to· his allegedly beloved children by number rather than name, and the 
one characteristic which the father regards as common to them all, 
namely, their incapacity to fulfil what he considers to be their 
I 
potential, a surely extreme case among so many siblings. Finally, as 
indicated earlier, Ein Brudermord also belongs to this category, the 
radicalised nature of the phenomena confronting narrator and reader 
being heightened by the fact that the expectations associated with the 
il I ii I ' 
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title are confounded by the details of the story, the work's classical 
allusions are tot:alJy at odds with the actual content, and the murder 
is given no apparent motivation whatever. 
In one of four different ways, then, each of the Landarzt pieces 
displays a structure in which, to use the terminology of earlier ana-
lysis, the second or empirically representative degree of krtowledge 
-
is always confronted with one or more phenomena belonging to the third 
or trans-empirical degree of knowledge, entities which c~nstitute a 
radical departure from or denial of the farmer's norms and values, 
. . d . 1 interpretations an assumptions. Either explicitly or implicitly, 
: ' 
therefore, each of these works challenges the validity of the empirical-
ly representative, and from his advantaged position, outside the 
fiction, the reader is invited, if not provoked to undertake the same 
task here as in the case of Die Biiume3 that is, to resolve the evident 
contradictions by fully exploring the implications of the trans-
empirical phenomena so deliberately placed before him. For among the 
present texts, as in so much, if not all of Kafka's fiction, his 
essential literary struc'ture is that of the rhetorical figure so prom-
inent in the writings of some of his favourite thinkers, from Plato 
(Bf 693; Bo 108; Tb 673; Gk 190) to Meister Eckhart (Br• 20; cf. Pasley, 
1966) and Kierkegaard (Er esp. 224ff.; Bo 108; Tb esp. Sllff.; Gk 117, 
215), namely, the paradox, as traditionally understood. 
Owing to the nature of their underlying structure, the pieces 
comprising the Landarzt collection are also likely to convey ironies 
of various kinds. Needless to say, many scholars have already drawn 
attention, at least in passing, to this conspicuous aspect of Kafka's 
fiction, but no-one has yet anaJysed the subject on the basis of a 
comprehensive theory, such as that elaborated by Muecke (1969; 1970) 
I I 
I 
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or Booth (1974). Sokel (1964), for example, discusses the question 
primarily in terms of Sophoclean tragedy, while Glicksberg (1969) and 
H. Kraft (1972) are more concerned with Kierkegaard's definition, 
that is, with what Muecke (1970:66ff.) calls "general irony" and Booth 
( 1974: 2Lf0ff .) "unstable irony". Unfortunately, limitations on length 
prevent further consideration of the matter here. Nevertheless, where 
appropriate, instances of irony will certainly be noted in the follow-
ing interpretation of the collection. Whenever the concept is used in 
that context, however, it is to be construed in the sense expounded by 
Muecke (1970:24ff.), which may be surrnnarised as the quality resulting 
from the detached presentation (source) and reconstruction (recipient) 
of a discrepancy between appearance and reality, expressed as a con-
fident unawareness (feigned by the ironist, actual in the victim) of 
this discrepancy, and thus producing a comic effect of some kind, from 
black humour to belly-laughter. 
Another obvious corollary of the fundamental structure employed 
in the Landarzt texts is the potential for grotesqueness, a further 
matter that can be dealt with only very briefly in the present discus-
sion. Kassel (1969) has already devoted an entire volume to this 
feature of Kafka's work. However, his analysis is seriously flawed 
by its thoroughly inadequate definition, which asserts as the essential 
characteristic of the grotesque the "unvermittelte Zusammenfligung von 
Unvereinbarem" resulting in "die asthetische Moglichmachung des 
ontologisch Unrnoglichen" (op.cit.:26). But if this were true, it 
would mean that, in the field of religious art, for example,not only 
every devil, but also every angel would have to be classified as 
grotesque, a proposition whi eh, itself, is worthy of ,the epithet. 
Meanwhile, one of the most grotesque works in the whole of Kafka's 
oeuvre, Ein Bru.dennord~ would go totally unnoticed, as it is by Kassel. 
---- -·---- ~- ---~~- -
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Consequently, when used in this study, the term 'grotesque' is intend-
ed, not as Kassel understands it, but in the sense elaborated by 
Thomson (1972:20ff .) , namely, that which alienates by presenting an 
unresolvable clash of incompatible, concrete phenomena and arousing 
an unresolvable clash of emotions, the latter tending simultaneously 
towards some form of aversion (dislike, revulsion, horror) and 
amusement (laughter, mirth, ridicule). 
Finally, in this examination of structure, it needs to be empha-
sised that, so far, the notion has been considered only in regard to 
each of the Landarzt pieces as an individual entity. Within the 
collection itself, however, the concept assumes an additional dimension, 
for there it also refers to the dynamic set of relations underlying 
the actual sequence of the texts, the quite specific order in which, 
Kafka insisted, they should be published. What the principal elements 
of the author's structure in that sense might be, only an interpre-
tation of the collection as a whole will reveal. 
Point of View 
If, as already argued, the structure of a work of fiction is 
to be understood as a set of dynamic relations, it should be evident 
that, although point of view, in the sense defined earlier, may be 
opposed or overruled by structure, the two can never be entirely sep-
arated. On the contrary, in any successful work of fiction, the one 
is closely attuned to the other. Consequently, it should come as no 
surprise to find that, with very few exceptions, Kafka's choices in the 
matter of point of view, at least arrong the Land.arzt pieces, are govern-
ed by the general principle that it should provide the most effective 
and economical means to the desired end of challenging the validity of 
the empirically representative. Thus, no matter what particular point 
I' 
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of view he may employ in any of these works, his fundamental practice 
remains almost: invariably the same, and constitutes a synthesis of 
four main technical elements. 
The first of these consists in binding the reader as closely as 
possible to the mind of the figure who is the principal or sole repre-
sentative of empirical reality in a given narrative or exposition. 
Most conunonly, therefore, Kafka simply relays his works directly through 
these figures, having them communicate with the reader in the first 
person, singular or plural. Eight of the Landarzt pieces exemplify 
this procedure: Der neue Advokat, Ein Landarzt, Ein aZtes Blatt, 
SchakaZe und Araber, Ein.Besuch im Bergwerk, Das niichste Dorf, Die 
Sorge des Hausvaters and EZf Bohne. A sqmewhat deviant and ultimately 
unsuccessful form of the same technique is to be found in Ein Bruder-
mo7d, where the empirically representative narrator does not actually 
use the first person, but twice directly addresses the reader, clearly 
establishing his own personal presence as a cynical and sensational 
crime reporter. On some occasions, however, this method of personalised 
narration or exposition proves unsuitable for the communication of the 
particular material in question. Obvious cases in point are the three 
pieces that deal with a hypothetical reality. In these instances, 
Kafka adopts his much less frequent, alternative technique of having 
the work transmitted by a highly impersonalised, psychologically advan-
I • taged expositor or narrator, but limiting unequivocal inside views of 
characters to the figure representing empirical reality, so that the 
reader is again ~ound very largely to the latter's mind and perspective, 
although all the other devices associated with the reflector technique 
remain at the disposal of these narrators and expositors as well, so 
I 
that the resultant works are by no means uniform in nature. 2 Apart 
from Auf der GaZerie, Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft and Ein Traum, Vor 'dem 
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Gesetz is also relayed in this manner. 
The one~ very obvious exception to this and most of the other 
basic elements 1n Kafka's use of point of view among the Landarzt 
pieces is the last work of the collection, Ein Bericht fUr eine 
Akademie. Here the deviation consists in the fact that the story's 
personalised narrator, far from representing empirical reality, takes 
the form of an essentially. humanised ape. The ostensible reason for 
such a complete reversal of Kafka's normal procedure is, of course, 
the academy's request for Rotpeter's report. However, the real justi-
fication lies in the author's motives behind the work. For, as later, 
detailed analysis will attempt to show, in this, the culmination of the 
collection, it was Kafka's intention to bring the existential quest 
implicit in the preceding works to a positive, albeit paradoxical 
conclusion. And since that conclusion was to entail a startling 
revaluation of empirical reality, there was an obvious logic in having 
it communicated by a representative of trans-empirical reality, wh{le 
at the same time inducing the reader to identify with him as closely 
as possible, both emotionally and intellectually. It was evidently 
with considerations such as these in mind that Kafka chose to give 
Rotpeter a hybrid human-simian nature, while personalising him to ~ far 
greater extent than any other of the collection's narrators or exposi-
tors and having him explicitly equate his manifestly quite exceptional 
condition with that of all creatures, including man (Se 148). For 
apparently the same reason, he also endowed him with qualities which 
arouse considerable sympathy and trust, not the least being his frank-
ness in frequently and openly drawing attention to the narrative act, 
warning the reader about possible distortions and misunderstandings. 
This characteristic places him in a c.;itegory unique among the Landarzt 
narrators and expositors, in that it makes him aesthetically self-aware. 
I· 
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The second main element in Kafka's normal choice and use of 
fictional perspective in the Landa:r:>2t collection may be seen as a re-
inforcement of the first. For, instead of providing the reader with 
anything approaching a detailed portrayal of his empirically representa-
tive figures, be they narrators, expositors or reflectors, he consistent-
ly 'avoids the sense of difference or otherness such a· procedure would 
almost inevitably create, and deliberately reduces them, for the greater 
part, to the level of an anonymous medium of sensory perception, emo-
tional reaction and intellectual speculation, a technique which might 
also be expected to facilitate the reader's identification with them. 
Thus, apart from a brief reference to the stiffening, shrivelled body 
of the dying ~ountryman at the end of Vor dem Geset2 (Se 132), no inform-
ation whatever is given about the external appearance of the thirteen 
figures now being considered, and only one of them, Josef K. of Ein 
Ti>awn ,' is actually known to the reader by name, the remainder being 
identified purely functionally, in terms either of their so~ial status 
(a probable member of the legal community, a country doctor, a cobbler, 
a man from the country, a miner, the lowliest imperial subject, a crime 
reporter), or of their familial position (a grandson, a family man, a 
father of eleven sons), or of their present activity (a circusgoer in 
the gallery, a Eu!:opean traveller in the desert) • 
To draw attention to these shared features of Kafka Is empirical-
ly representative figures, however, is not to suggest that they are all 
alike in their degree of personalisation. On the contrary, one need 
only compare the circusgoer in the gallery with the man from the country 
or the grandson with the country doctor to be aware that a sense of 
personality is conveyed by far more than names, appearance, social 
I 
standing and current pursuits. Other factors of particular significance 
are actions, attitudes, types and degrees of emotion, and:the ~xtent 
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of intellectual insight. Taking these into account, one can recognise 
that the most personalised of these representative figures is clearly 
the country doctor and by far the least is the grandson, while all the 
others occupy positions somewhere in between. Yet, despite these unmis-
takable differences, it is also obvious that the range of variation is 
not great, and that the majority of these figures bear less resemblance 
to the country doctor than to the insubstantial imperial subject of Eine 
kaiserliche Botschaft~ that "winzig vor der kaiserlichen Sonne in die 
fernste Ferne gefllichteten Schatten" (Se 138). Consequently, the diver-
gence in degrees of personalisation does not_ invalidate the already 
stated~ general principle that, in the Landarzt collection, Kafka's 
marked tendency is to minimise the distinguishing personal qualities of 
his empirically representative figures, even when they assume the role 
of narrator or expositor, and that their general lack of detailed, 
individual traits facilitates the reader's identification with their 
mentality. 
If it is true that the first two principal constituents of 
Kafka's point of view in the Landarzt collection are calculated to 
reduce the distance between the reader and the minds of the figures re-
presenting empirical reality, then it is equally true that the remain-
ing two tend to work in the opposite direction. And the reason for this 
counter-effectiveness is that they both concern the relationship between 
th~ representative figures and the disconcerting, even baffling pheno-
mena confronting them, a matter which, in turn, significantly affects 
the relationship between the reader and the figures to whose mentality 
he is so closely bound. Thus the third main element consists in the 
relatively stringent limitations Kafka places on his empirical represent-
! 
atives' ability to actively participate in, to influence and even to 
understand the situations and events with which they are faced. 
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Of the reflectors, for example, only two play an active role 
in the events of their stories: the man from the country and Josef 
K •• ,The former initiates the action by his arrival and request for 
admittance to the Law, but soon submits to the mysterious and frighten-
ing doorkeeper's will by deciding to wait. Thereafter his partici-
pation is limited almost exclusively to verbal acts: importunity, 
cursing, grumbling, questions and answers; and none of them has the 
slightest influence on the doorkeeper's attitude or the story's out-
come: the protagonist's death without gaining admittance. For the 
greater part of Ein Traum, Josef K. is even more passive than the 
countryman, as he is transported to a festive burial scene and then 
simply observes. It is only towards the end of the dream, when he 
finally recognises the burial as his own, that he actively participates 
by digging his way into the grave and taking up his expected position. 
Thus his·only influence on the events is temporarily to retard their 
irresistible flow and the ultimate fulfilment of his implied death-
wish. Nevertheless, by his act of self-burial, Josef K. shows more 
direct and clear understanding of his situation than do any of his 
fellow reflectors. The imperial subject is allowed merely to indulge 
in idle dreams, the countryman's assumptions all prove to be false 
and his questions futile, while the man in the gallery is not even 
granted the awareness that he is actually weeping. 
Among the nine empirically representative narrators and exposi-
tors, the extent of active involvement is still more limited, with 
only three playing a direct, physical role in the works they communi-
cate: the country doctor, the cobbler and the traveller in the desert. 
Of these, the cobbler participates the least, ever more rarely running 
out of his shop to clear away the worst of the nomads'.·mess and co-
operating with his business colleagues in financially supporting the 
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tormented butcher, but otherwise keeping as far out of harm's way as 
possible and preferring simply to observe. Although no more willing 
an active participant than the cobbler, the traveller in the desert 
is forced into considerably more physical involvement, as he is 
surrounded and pinned down by a pack of jackals, with whose leader 
he then engages in a rather lengthy conversation. At the end of the 
story, he is also prompted to further action, when he restrains the 
Arab leader from continuing to lash the jackals with his whip. However, 
by far the most physically involved of all three is the country doctor, 
who stands at the very centre of his story's action, briefly direct-
ing it at the beginning, then becoming increasingly its sufferer, as 
brutish agents of the preternatural take control and ultimately 
transport him, naked, through wastes of snow to his inevitable ruin. 
Thus, like the cobbler and the traveller, he influences the course 
of events only minimally and has no effect whatever on the nature of 
the phenomena or the situation confronting him. 
Unlike almost all the other empirically representative narrators 
and expositors; however, the country doctor does give evidence of an 
unusual degree of intellectual insight. Indeed, apart from the exposi-
tor of Der neue Advokat~ he is the only one to display a broad and 
penetrating understanding of his era, its difference from previous 
times, and its relation to the alien phenomena with which he is sud-
denly faced. Together these two figures therefore come closest to 
grasping the true significance of the trans-empirical element in their 
particular situations. Nevertheless, the tentative conclusion of the 
one and the final self-pitying despair of the other clearly indicate 
the limits of their comprehension. As for the remainder of the empiri-
cal representatives, although the extent of their insight into reality 
varies significantly, from the family man, the father and the traveller 
i : 
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to the miner, the cobbler, the crime reporter and, finally, the 
grandson, they are generally even more at a loss to understand the 
disturbing phenomena confronti.ng them, and most of them openly admit 
it. 
By placing such relatively severe restrictions on the partici-
pation, influence and understanding of his empirical representatives, 
Kafka tends to maximise the distance between them and the various 
troubling phenomena with which, explicitly or implicitly, they attempt 
to come to terms. At the same time, however, he also sets up a 
tension in the relationship between the reader and these representa-
tives. For although the former may be closely bound to the minds of 
the latter, he is not necessarily subject to their intellectual limi-
tations and may, therefore, not be content to accept their interpre-
tations or their degrees of bafflement. 
It is as if to increase this tension, to provoke the reader into 
transcending the understanding and reactions of his empirical represent-
atives, that Kafka adds a fourth basic element to the point of view 
employed in all -of the first thirteen Landarzt pieces. This consists 
in the technique of devoting the greater part and, in some cases, 
virtually the whole of each work to a detailed account of its particu-
lar, disconcerting phenomenon, so that the latter assumes a strongly 
tangible quality and cannot pe lightly dismissed, while at the same 
time it is made as elusive as possible. To achieve this last end, 
Kafka not only invents the mysterious types of beings already des-
c:.ibed, he generally also imposes severe restrictions on the extent 
to which they may directly present or reveal themselves. The only 
major exceptions to this practice are Vor dem Gesetz, Schakale und 
Araber and Das '11iiehste Dorf, where such considerations as immediacy 
evidently outweigh the desire for maximum distance and puzzlement. 
126. ' 
In those works containing empirically inexplicable figures, Kafka 
further reinforces the enigmatic quality of these entities by simply 
having the fact of their existence taken for granted. Not one of his 
empirical representatives, not even the most intellectually aware, 
ever questions the fact that such creatures could exist. Instead, 
they are made to concentrate on the possible significance of the fact 
that they do exist, and the reader is clearly expected to do the same. 
/ 
In sunnnary~ then, Kafka's use of point of view in all but the 
last of the Landarzt pieces constitutes a synthesis of four techniques. 
First, he binds the reader as closely as possible to the mind of the 
principal or sole figure representing empirical reality in the work. 
Second, he facilitates the reader's identification with the mind of 
that figure by reducing the latter very largely to an anonymous medium 
of sensory perception, emotional reaction and intellectual specula-
tion. Third, he places relatively stringent restrictions on the 
extent of the representative figure's participation, influence and 
understanding, so that a tension is established between him and the 
reader, who is not necessarily subject to the same limitations, at 
least on the emotional and intellectual levels, and may therefore 
not be content to identify completely with the representative's re-
actions and interpretations. Finally, he heightens this tension between 
reader and representative by devoting the greater part, if not almost 
the entirety-of each work to an account of its particular, disturbing 
phenomenon, thus rendering the latter strongly tangible in quality, 
but simultaneously making it as elusive as possible, not only by giving 
it an empirically impossible, hypothetical or radicalised form, but 
on most occasions also by limiting to an extreme degree the extent 
of its direct self-presentation or self-revelation and, in the case 
I 
of the non-empirical entities, never once allowing the fact of their 
i 
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existence to be doubted. 
As indicated earlier, because Kafka's choice of fictional 
perspective throughout most of the Landarzt collection is determined 
by the need or desire to include all of these four elements, one of 
its major effects, like that of the basic structure inherent in each 
of the texts, is t~ provoke a radical questioning of empirical reality, 
encouraging the reader, to go beyond 'the intellectual limits of each 
empirically representative figure and to arrive at a more penetrating, 
cohesive and dispassionate understanding of the situations and events 
presented. At ~he same time, however, because the point of view 
generally also works to establish at least a strong and continuing 
emotional tie between reader and representative, it frequently has 
the further effect of creating a lasting ambivalence towards the 
latter, an effect which has all too oftenbeenignored by those who, 
in the interests of unequivocal interpretations, feel obliged to like 
or dislike, approve or disapprove without qualification. Finally, 
because the information presented in these works is subject to the 
various types 'and degrees of limitation already mentioned, similar 
restrictions will also and inevitably be imposed on the reader's 
ability to unriddle, explain and interpret, so that a residual element 
of mystery and uncertainty is to be neither regretted nor denied, but 
simply accepted as an integral part of Kafka's literary purpose and 
its implicit world-view. 
To complete this examination of point of view in the Landarzt 
collection, there are two further, very significant aspects of the 
topic that need to be considered, and both are relevant to all fourteen 
of the works at issue. The first is the matter of mental: or psycho-
logical advantage, what Booth ( 1961: 160) calls "privilege", by which 
he means knowledge that the narrator or expositor connnunicates as 
~ ' I 
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fact, although he cannot possibly have learned it "by strictly 
natural means" (loc.cit.) such as perception, formal learning, experi-
ence or reasonable inference. ·"Complete privilege", Booth further 
explains, "is what we usually call omniscience", while the "most 
important single privilege is that of obtaining an inside view of 
another character" (loc.cit.). 
From what has already been said, it will be evident that, in the 
present collection, the only extensive use of advantaged knowledge 
is to be found among the impersonalised narrators and expositors, 
all of whom regularly provide a relatively detailed inside view of 
one of their characters (the circusgoer, the countryman, the imperial 
subject, Josef K.) and one or more ambiguously direct glimpses into 
the mind of another figure as well (the ringmaster, the doorkeeper, 
the dying emperor, the headstone engraver) •3 However, since this 
technique, its purpose and effects have been discussed at some length 
in earlier sections of this study, further elaboration is unnecessary 
here. Instead, attention will be concentrated on four statements 
which differ substantially from inside views, but which constitute 
the only remaining examples of advantaged knowledge in the Landarzt 
collection. Three of them occur in personalised works, and all of 
them are of considerable moment for the would-be interpreter. 
The first and most obvious instance is encountered in the last 
paragraph of the collection's title-story. There the country doctor 
laments: "Niemals komme ich so nach Hause; meine blilhende Praxis ist 
verloren; ein Na~hfolger bestiehlt mich, aber ohne Nutzen, denn er 
kann mich nicht ersetzen; in meinem Hause wiltet der ekle Pferdeknecht; 
Rosa ist sein Opfer; ich will es nicht ausdenken" (Se 128). Taking 
into account the uncanny nature of preceding events and the qoctor's 
horses, most of the phrases in this rather staccato sentence can be 
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attributed to reasonable inference. However, the apparently contra-
dictory claims about an alleged successor simply cannot. Why Kafka 
felt it necessary to have his deeply involved narrator make these 
advantaged assertions will become clearer only from a thorough 
analysis of the whole work. For the moment, suffice it to say 
that they eliminate a possible misunderstanding of the ending and 
reinforce the underlying significance of the story's events. 
Because this first example of advantaged knowledge derives from 
one of Kafka's most intellectually perceptive narrators and in a 
context where levels of reality are increasingly confused, it is more 
readily accepted than the second, which is uttered by the cobbler of 
Ein altes Blatt. In the fourth paragraph of this piece, the reader 
is told in some detail about the total inability of the expositor 
and his countryman, even by the use of sign language, to communicate, 
with the nomadic invaders. In the same paragraph, the reader is also 
informed that the institutions of the cobbler's country are a matter 
of complete indifference to the nomads. Yet, in the last paragraph, 
the expositor is rather clumsily allowed the totally advantaged 
remark: "Der kaiserliche Palast hat die Nomaden angelockt" (Se 131). 
Given the contents of the preceding statements, there is no possible, 
natural means by which the cobbler could either know or infer the 
substance of this claim. Furthermore, like the doctor's advantaged 
allegations, it contains an apparent contradiction. For, if the 
institutions of the cobbler's country are a matter of complete indif-
ference to the nomads, how can one of the most important of these 
institutions have attracted them? Again it will be the task of 
interpretation to resolve this apparent contradiction, which 1s 
obviously crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the nomads 
and their horses and, thus, of the work as a whole. 
,, 
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The next example of advantaged knowledge is the phrase: "Da 
das Tor zum G~setz offensteht wie imm~r" (Se 131) in Vor dem Gesetz ,, 
However, since that remark and its implications have already been 
considered in the preceding analysis of unobtrusive, direct connnentary, 
there is no need to re-examine it here. Instead, one can move on ~o 
the last instance of this phenomenon in the collection, a piece of 
advantaged knowledge which, though equally as crucial as the others, 
is probably the most skilfully concealed of all, but is nevertheless 
to be found in Elf Sohne. Discussing his second son's hidden, but 
deep-seated flaw, the father describes it as "irgendeine Unfa])igkeit, 
die mir allein sichtbare Anlage seines Lebens rund zu vollenden" 
(Se 141). The nature of the advantage here resides not so much in 
a form of knowledge which could not be gained by strictly natural 
means as in the assertion that it is accessible to only one person. 
After all, if the son's potential is capable of being perceived by 
the father, there is no valid reason whatever for assuming that it 
cannot also be discerned by others, including the son himself. That 
the father nonetheless makes this claim to exclusiveness reveals 
that the alleged knowledge is actually nothing more than an arbitrary, 
E,ubjective judgement,' Furthermore, since he quite explicitly extends 
the significance of the supposed failing in his son, maintaining that 
it is "gleichze;itig der Fehler unserer ganzen Familie" (Se 141), 
himself included, it also becomes evident that the real source of his 
extremely critical attitude towards his children is, in fact, the 
personal conviction that his own shortcomings have simply been 
perpetuated in them. Through his assertion of advantaged knowledge, 
therefore, the father implicitly turns his whole commentary against 
I 
himself, as well as the notion of paternity as a possible means of, 
self-transcendence or vicarious self-fulfilment. 
I ' 
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In general, then, it can be said that, although the extent of 
I 
advantaged knowledge in the Landarzt pieces is by no means great, it 
is nevertheless of considerable importance whenever it does occur. 
For, in the form of inside views, it plays an extremely influential 
role in establishing Kafka's desired degree of identification, tension, 
ambivalence and uncertainty between reader and reflector, while in 
its other form it is decisive in focussing the complex intellectual 
and moral issues raised by the works concerned. Thus it constitutes 
a crucial element of Kafka's fictipnal point of view and cannot be 
ignored in any interpretation with pretensions to thoroughness. 
The final aspect of point of view that needs to be examined 
in this context is ultimately of more relevance than any other to the 
task of interpretation and judgement. Yet it is also the most diffi-
cult to define and assess. Booth (1961) explains the matter thus: 
"If the reason for discussing point of view is to find how it relates 
to literary effects, then surely the moral and intellectual qualities 
of the narrator are more important to our judgement than whether he 
is referred to as 'I' or 'he', or whether he is privileged or limited. 
If he is discovered to be untrustworthy, then the total effect of 
the'work he relays to us is.transformed" (op.cit.:158). He then 
continues: "Our terminology for this. kind of distance in narrators 
is almost hopelessly inadequate. For lack of better terms, I have 
I 
called a 'narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance 
with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author's 
norms), unreliable when he does not" (ibid,: 158f .) • Furthermore, as 
already pointed out, somewhat earlier in his study Booth also makes 
the following, overstated, but related generalisation: "In so far as 
a novel does not directly refer to this (inJplied) author, there will 
be no distinction between him and the implied, undramatised 
,j 
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narrator" (ibid.: 151). · 
Adapted to the concepts of the present study, reliability refers 
primarily to the emotional, intellectual and moral dimensions of the 
relationships constituting fictional point of view, and the critic's 
task in attempting to assess it is twofold. First, he must try to 
establish what values inform the attitudes and actions of a particular 
) 
narrator or expositor, as reflected _in the content and manner of his 
communication. Then, by comparing those values with the total struc-
ture of the work in question, he must endeavour to indicate the 
extent to which the author implicitly affirms or negates them, for 
reliability is always a matter of degree, especially in such-elusive 
I 
works as Kafka's. 
Because this task requires nothing less than a detailed analysis 
of each specific work in the collection, it will not be undertaken 
here. However, as the following chapter will reveal, several general 
principles concerning reliability do emerge from the·Landarzt pieces, 
and they may usefully be formulated at this point. First, since all 
of Kafka's impersonalised narrators are generally so to a high 
degree, and also display considerable mental or psychological advant-
age, the differences between them and the author, at least in terms 
of literary image and values, may be taken as minimal, so that they 
are to be construed as reliable. Second, although Kafka's imperson-
alised narrators or expositors comnlunicate much of their works through 
the minds of reflectors, there is always an implied or stated gap of 
awareness bet:"ween the two, so_ that none of the reflectors can be
1 
assumed to be entirely reliable. Third, the more dispassionate, well-
1 
informed and intellectually perceptive a personalised narrator or 
expositor happens to be, the more reliable he is likely to be. And, 
finally, self-pity in a narrator, expositor or reflector is an 
' I 
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infallible sign of unreliability. 
Symbol 
Although a close examination of structure and point of view 
does much to provide a sound basis for an interpretation of the 
Landarzt pieces, it still leaves certain fundamental questions 
unanswered. At its most obvious, this is to be noted in the case of 
recurring motifs. How is one to construe, for example, Kafka's 
deliberate choice of the number eleven in the composition of Elf 
Sohne and Ein Besuch im Bergwerk? Why do horses and circus or variety 
performances figure so prominently in the collection? And why, of 
all the famous horses in history, should he select Bucephalus to 
transform into a modern lawyer? Behind these and many similar quest-
ions that might legitimately be raised, there lies the general issue 
of the author's artistic intention, the purpose informing his fiction 
and determining the resources he employs. Already it has been argued 
that this issue is not to be resolved by reference to allegory or, 
with two exceptions, parable. Consequently, in opposition to Anders 
(1951), Emrich (1958; 1960; 1968) , 4 Henel (1967) and, more recently, 
P. Richter (1975:206-217), but in support of the position oonsistent-
ly adopted by E. Heller (1948;1974), a resolution will be sought in 
terms of symbol. 
Immediately, however, one is faced with the problem of an accept-
able definition. And here the difficulty is even greater than in the 
case of allegory, for 'symbol' has also become the common property of 
I 
ma~hematics, the physical sciences, philosophy, psychology, anthro-
pology (cf. Firth, 1973), and semiotics (cf. Lyons, 1977:99ff.). 
Sorenson (1972), Todorov (1977) and ~obbe (1980) have all reviewed the 
relevant literature and clearly demonstrated the historical relativity' 
I: I 
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of Goethe's still widely accepted definition (cf. Emrich, Frenzel, 
P. Richter). But the only alternative they offer consists of Kobbe's 
explanation that the SymboZ.isant is "eine para-semiotische Gri::iBe inner-
halb des Feldes der ontologischen Semantik des Real en" (op .ci t.: 325) 
and the SymboZ.isat is "eine ontologische Instanz in der 'Tiefe' der 
menschlichen Erfahrungswelt oder 'jenseits' der menschlichen Seins-
ordnung" (ibid.:330), While both of these statements are undoubtedly 
true and Kobbe's study, as a whole, is a remarkable example of 
scholarship, it is difficult to imagine such notions becoming part 
I' 
of the literary critic's vocabulary. Nor are they really sufficiently 
specific to be of practical use. Like E. Heller (1974:116), one is 
therefore led to conclude that, at the present time, a certain 
personal arbitrariness in the definition of this term is inescapable. 
As understood in the present study, a literary symbol is any 
fictional phenomenon, from a single object or action to a whole work, 
which, while retaining its literally denoted reality, nevertheless 
becomes so charged with meaning as to suggest a more general or 
abstract reality beyond, yet related to itself. Thus, in E. Heller's 
words (loc .cit .) , the symbol "possesses a double reality". The 
means by which this added reality is created resides in context: 
not simply that of the particular work itself, but also that of the 
historical period and the whole cultural tradition within which the 
work is composed. Furthermore, because this wider meaning is only 
suggested, symbols are generally characterised by a "degree of 
complication of relationships, and their quality, especially of 
emotion or sentiment in the thing represented", so that the "interpre-
tation of symbols is usually a much more difficult matter than inter-
pretation of signs" (Firth, 1973:65). Finally, some symbols may be 
private, what Martini (1954:323) calls "Existenzsymbole" and others 
.:1 
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Chiffren (cf. Frenzel, 1963:37f.), in the sense that their added 
reality may be specific to a particular author (e.g. windows and 
bachelors in Kafka's earlier works), while others may be public, 
that is, common to a particular group or culture. Concerning this 
last point, it i.s nor. without significance for Kafka's work that, 
in the western ::radition, horses have long been regarded as symbolic 
of "the blind forces of primigenial chaos", of "intense desires and 
instincts" (Cirlot, 1962: 144f .) and the number eleven of "imper-
fection aiming at perfection" (Abbot, 1962:79). Taking due account 
of these and all the other, previously considered elements of Kafka's 
rhetoric, a reinterpretation of the Landarzt collection can now be 
undertaken in full. 
,i 
4. EIN LANDARZT. KLEINE ERZl{HLUNGE'N 
AN INTERPRETATION 
In trod uc tion 
136. 
To the best of contemporary knowledge (Ba 228ff.; Bezzel, 1975; 
Binder, 1975~ 1979) , two of the La.ndarzt pieces, E'in Traum and Vor 
dem Gesetz , were composed as early as the second week of December, 
1914 . Then, after a gap of more than two years, another seven were 
written during the first two months of 1917, while the remaining 
five were completed during March and April of the same year. Thus, 
as a whole , the collection spans one of the most turbulent periods 
in all of Kafka ' s life. 
The most obvious cause of the author's co ncern at this time 
was naturally the First Wor l d War, in which his two brothers-in-law, 
Josef Pollak and Karl Hermann, were actively ngaged, and which was 
to result in the complete dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy, as 
well as the Austro- Hungarian empire . Kafka, himself, was exempted 
from mili t ary service on the grounds that he was performing 'an 
essential civilian function' (cf. Brod, 1954: 164). However , he fre-
quently expressed a strong desire to enlist (cf . Bf 632f.,638,640, 
644; Tb 499f.) and on 2lst June, 19 16 , actually underwent an army 
medical examination that declared him fit for "Lands turmdienst mi t 
der Waffe " (Bezzel , 1975: 112), although within two days thi s decision 
had been overruled and his call-up deferred " laut ErlaB des k.k. 
Staathaltereiprasidiums auf unbestirnrnte Zeit" (loc,cit.). Instead, 
therefore, he was obliged to devote more of his time to the family's 
asbestos factory, which ultimately closed down in March, 1917 (Hv 
432), and to his own official position at the semi-nationalised 
,, 
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Arbeiter-Unfall-Versicherungs-Anstalt, where two extra business 
hours were introduced from March, 1916. 
Because of the war, Kafka was also obliged to move from his 
parental home, giving up his room early in August, 1914, to his eldest 
sister, Elli, and her children. At first he stayed in the apartment 
of his other married sister, Valli, who was temporarily resting with 
her parents-in-law in Bohmisch-Brod. Then, in September, he shifted 
to Elli' s apartment in Nerudagasse. But finally, on lOth February, 
1915, he asserted his independence by renting a room of his own in 
the same building as the apartment of his sister, Valli Pollak, in 
Bilekgasse. And although, as a result of his sensitivity to noise, 
he subsequently moved to Lange Gasse during March, 1915, and from 
26th November, 1916, regularly spent each afternoon at a small house 
in Alchimistengasse, leased and placed at his disposal by his youngest 
and favourite sister, Ottla, he did not return to his parents' house 
until the first clear signs of the tuberculosis, from which he was 
to die, began to manifest themselves, at the beginning of September, 
1917. Given the extremely teµse nature of the relationship between 
Kafka and his domineering father, this interval of relative distance 
between the two is obviously unlikely to be without its significance. 
The period during which Kafka composed the Landarzt pieces 
encompassed the second phase of his tormented courtship of ~elice 
Bauer as well. After their first engagement had ended on 12th July, 
1914, Kafka did not resume his voluminous corresponden~e with her 
until about the beginning,of November, 1914, and they,met again for 
I 
the first time late in January of the following year (Tb 495f.; Bf 
624). In early July, 1916, they then spent almost a fortnight together 
in Marienbad, where they agreed to marry soon after the end of the war, 
to live in Berlin, and for each to be financially self-supporting 
I I 
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(Br 140), although Kafka's continuing nagging doubts about the matter 
are clearly evident from the list of arguments for and against 
marriage entered in his notebook at the end of the following month 
(Hv 238). Nevertheless, the second official engagement took place in 
Prague at the beginning of July, 1917. By August, however, Kafka had 
begun spitting blood (Bm 160), and his illness provided a means of 
finally resolving the issue, so that his correspondence with her 
apparently ceased in September and the engagement was officially 
I 
dissolved on 28th December, 1917: "Als Auflosungsgrund der Verlobung 
gilt nach auBen hin nur die Krankheit, so habe ich es auch dem Vater 
gesagt" (Bo 4 7) . 
These facts are mentioned here, not in order to deduce the 
meaning of the Landarzt collection from them, but simply in order to 
establish the background against which the individual pieces were 
composed and arranged (cf. Binder, 1975:233£.). To what extent any of 
these events and experiences fell within Kafka's artistic range will 
only become evident once the collection has been analysed in its own 
right. For, as Liddell (1947) has accurately remarked: "Our evidence 
for a writer's 'values', for what he thinks important, can( ... ) only 
be drawn from his writings. If we know, for example, from other 
sources that a writer was in the maquis, or that he was wit~ Petain, 
we should forget it as a piece of irrelevant gossip. If it was not 
a part of his experience that fell within his range, it has nothing 
to do with his work; if it fell within his range as a writer, he 
will himself tell us what we need to know about it - he cannot avoid 
it" (op.cit.:39; cf, Walser, 1961:17). 
Der neue Advokat 
0 
1 Although Der neue Advokat (Jan.,1917) is more gently ironic 
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than most of the pieces that follow, it nevertheless establishes the 
basic concern of the collection from the outset. Raising Alexander 
the Great's warhorse from its grave beside the Hydaspes (now Jhelum), 
Kafka creates of it an equivocal, human-equine figure, confers upon 
it a doctorate of laws, and places it in the midst of the modern legal 
conununity, an apparent member of which reports and comments on the 
strange Dr. Bucephalus's situation. 
The effect of the expositor's commentary is twofold. First, in 
lighter view, it tilts at the imperturbable, unimaginative legal mind 
as it rationalises its general approval of Bucephalus's admission to 
the bar: "Mit erstaunlicher Einsicht sagt man sich, daB Bucephalus 
bei der heutigen Gesellschaftsordnung in ~iner schwierigen Lage ist 
und daB er deshalb, sowie auch wegen seiner weltgeschichtlichen 
Bedeutung, jedenfalls Entgegenkommen verdient" (Se 123). But, more 
important, it also serves to define the nature of modern times by 
comparison with the past. 
In this context, the figure of Alexander assumes a symbolic 
significance. For although his times were not without their share of 
violent destruction and are not, therefore, represented as a spotless 
ideal, they were nevertheless shaped by an energetic, unequivocal, 
absolute power2 which pointed the way towards a clearly defir:-ed, though 
distant and ultimately unattainable goal. Alexander, as the embodi-
I 
ment of the Law, had imparted to his people a vital sense of purpose 
and direction, which man has since lost. Consequently, although the 
present age seems to resemble his in some respects, 3 the similarity 
-is purely external. Without the authority and grandeur of design a 
figure s,uch as he could give, ~ife has become constricting, confusing 
- 4 
and uncertain, an empty ritual: "Heute . d d. T S , d . h. sin ie ore ganz an erswo in 
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und weiter und hoher vertragen; niemand zeigt die Richtung; viele 
halten Schwerter, aber nur, um mit ihnen zu fuchteln; und der Blick, 
der ihnen folgen will, verwirrt sich" ( Se J 23f.). Nor is true aid 
to be found in the existing legal system, which, far from substitut-
ing for t he law of Alexander, has evidently proved impotent as a 
human guide, and thus forms an essential part of modern society's 
profound wretchedness. 
In his transformed state, Bucephalus, too, develops a symbolic 
stature. Without Alexander, he has lost his previous raison d 'etr e. 
He is isolated, uprooted, lacking in certainty and definite direction. 
In this respect, he is representative of modern man as seen by the 
expositor. Thus, in the last paragraph of the piece, his reaction 
to the situation in which he now finds himself is proposed as a 
possibly valid course for all to follow : "Vielleicht ist es deshalb 
wirklich das beste, sich, wie es Bucephalus ge tan hat, in die 
Gesetzblicher zu versenken" (Se 124). 
The nature of Bucephalus's occupation is extremely signi f icant. 
Since the passing of figures like Alexander the Great, man has lost 
continuing contact with and faith in a grand, purposive, authoritat-
ive life-principle. He has become divorced from any vital law trans-
cending, yet informing individual existence. This he must now seek 
to rediscover or replace, if he is to overcome the deep loneline ss 
and uncertainty of modern existence, the negative freedom with which 
he has be en left and in which Buce phalus pursues his studies : "unb e-
druckt die Seiten von den Lenden des Reiters, bei stiller Lamp e , 
fern dem Ge tose der Alexanderschlach t ( ... ) " (Se I 24) . 
The basic problem, therefore , is one of finding a positive 
modus v i vendi in the face of spiritual isolation and confusion, a 
moral means of c0n1ing to terms with the unhappy reality of an age 
141. 
' which has lost sight of any ultimate goal and, with its empty ritual, 
hinders the individual's attempts to regain sight of it. Directly or 
indirectly, it is this search for existential purpose and value 
that informs the whole of the Landarzt collection and constitutes 
its fundamental source of unity. Whether such a modus vivendi is to 
be found in a thorough study of the law or in a preoccupation with 
one's circumscribed Beruf remains an unanswered question at this stage, 
although it is already clearly implied that no definite or helpful 
direction is to be expected from the prevailing system of laws. 
Bucephalus's acconunodation to the forlorn circumstances of his new 
existence is perhaps, but not necessarily, the best solution. It is 
the effect of the following narratives and expositions to test its 
general validity by defining in more detail the nature of life's 
uncertainty, by examining more closely the various elements of 
Bucephalus's present situation (Beruf, Gesetz~ Freiheit), and by 
proposing alternative resolutions to the problem of existence in 
modern times. 
E'in Landarzt 
The title-piece of the collection (Jan./Feb., 1917) 1 initiates 
the more detailed treatment of the socio-historical view presented 
in Der neue Advokat by directly relating the troubles of this 
"ungllickseligsten Zeitalters 11 (Se 128) to man's loss of r~ligious 
faith: "So sind die Leute in meiner Gegend. ( ••. ) Den al ten Glauben 
haben sie verloren; der Pfarrer sitzt zu Hause und zerzupft die 
MeBgewander, eines nach dem andern; aber der Arzt soll alles leisten 
mit seiner zarten chirurgischen Hand" (Se 127). From ultimate reality 
the people have turned to innnediate matter, from a search for salva-
tion (Heil) to a contentment with physical cure (Heilung) , 2 from 
, I I ' 
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' ' ~ I the metaphysical to the medical. And the country doctor finds himself 
cast in the impossible role of substitute saviour. 
I 
But instead of rejecting this role, which he recognises as 
being utterly false, he devotes himself unsparingly to his Ber'Uf~ 
considering the demands of his patients before all else: "Ich bin 
vom Bezirk angestellt3 und tue meine Pflicht bis zum Rand, bis dorthin, 
wo es fast zuviel wird. Schlecht bezahlt, bin ich <loch freigebig und 
hilfsbereit gegenilber den Armen" (Se 126). Thus, in· the depths of 
winter, although he has already worn out one horse through his devotion 
to duty, he still insists on answering the night-call of a seriously 
ill patient, and is ."zerstreut, gequalt" (Se 124) when, for want of 
a horse, he sees no possibility of making the visit. The reason for 
this self-sac;::rificing diligence is not a lack 9f awareness, on the 
doctor's part, of the deception that is being practised. Rather, in 
his view, it is a lack of any real alternative:- 11 '( ••• )Nun bin ich 
aber Arzt. Was soll ich tun?' " (Se 128). And, in fact, the whole 
story takes shape in a world of helplessness, futility and bitter 
despair, from the opening situation that is "aussichtslos 11 ancl 
"zwecklos" (Se I 24) to the final lament: "es ist niemals gutzumachen" 
(Se 128) • 
µowever, the hopelessnes~ of this fundamentally deceitful 
situation cannot be attributed merely to the age in which the doctor 
lives and the typ~ of people he serves. In part it also derives from 
his own submissiveness. As he says of himself: "Ich bin kein Welt-
verbesserer ( •.. ) " (Se 126). Finding it difficult, if not impossible, 
to come to an understanding with the people, he'prefers to acquiesce 
in their self-deception: "Rezepte schreiben ist leicht, aber im ilbrigen 
I 
,, 
sich mit den Leuten verstandigen, ist schwer" (Se 126). Thus he con-
tinues to devote himself untiringly to his Beruf, to allow himself t;:o 
'' ! 
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be used "zu heiligen Zwecken" (Se 127): in short, to support the 
people in their godlessness and false faith. Basically, then, there 
is a contradiction in the modus vivendi the doctor has chosen, a 
contradiction which he recognises, but feels unable or lath to 
resolve. It is this combination of lucid awareness and a somewhat 
self-pitying acquiescence that makes of him, as narrator-agent, a 
complex mixture of reliability and unreliability and creates a certain 
moral ambivalence towards him. 4 
In order to reveal the true nature of the doctor's position 
and its inevitable outcome, Kafka employs in this story his peculiar 
device of actualised, preternatural agents which rush the situation 
headlong to its inherent and inescapable conclusion. Here these 
agents take the form of a groom and two horses which suddenly appear 
from a dilapidated, long disused pigsty5 that the doctor kicks, in 
tormented frustration, when his maid returns with no horse. 
Though surprised by the sudden, inexplicable appearance of these 
creatures, the doctor does not hesitate to make use of them as a means 
of dutifully pursuing his Beruf. Even when the groom has demonstrated 
his bestiality by laying hold of the maid and biting her on the cheek 
as she helps him harness the horses, the doctor is still not prepared 
to reject him: " 1 Du Vieh', schrie ich wlitend, 1 willst du die 
Peitsche?' , besinne mich aber gleich, daB es ein Fremder: ist; daB 
ich nicht weiB, woher er kommt, und daB er mir freiwillig aushilft, 
wo alle andern versagen" (Se 125). However, these second thoughts 
are to prove fatal. For although the doctor is well aware of the 
groom's brutal intent and insists on their driving together to his 
' ' 
patient, he is no sooner in the gig than the groom claps his hands 
and he is whirled away by the horses, while the groom bursts 'into his 
house in order to find and take his pleasure with Rosa, the maid who 
I 
had fled from him and hidden herself behind locked doors "im richtigen 
Vorgeftihl der Unabwendbarkeit ihres Schicksals" (Se 125). 
The first effect, then, of these brutal agents is to violate 
the doctor's trusted, indefatigable servant, "dieses schone Madchen, 
das jahrelang, von mir kaum beachtet, in meinem Haus lebte" (Se 126).' 
And the significance of her violation is clearly seen by the doctor, 
although he places the blame for it on his patients, who torture him 
through the use of his nightbell. Rosa is the victim of his Beruf. 
In faithfully carrying out his medical duties, the doctor has relied 
unquestioningly on her aid and has not hesitated to use her in pursu-
ing a course which he frankly regards as false, as founded on decep-
tion and dishonesty. In fact, he has come to rely on her to such an 
extent that she has become an indispensable part of his equivocal 
modus vivendi, so much a servant that, despite her many years in his 
household, he has hardly noticed her as a human being. And now, when 
as a human being she needs his help, he is prevented from providing 
her with it. 
In separating the doctor from his maid and in violating her, 
the groom makes brutally actual a concealed fact of the doctor's 
life, namely, that in the interests of his Beruf and in spite of him-
self he has sacrificed his servant as human being, and for an end 
which he himself sees as almost worthless, certainly deceptive. In 
this respect, too, his Beruf had been based on a lie, and the truth 
is violently revealed by the groom's action, the thought of which 
continually haunts the doctor, since it attacks him at the very basis 
of his existence. When, therefore, he is later abused by the people 
he has been whirled off to serve, he does not resist, for he no 
longer cares: "was will ich Besseres, alter Landarzt, meines 
Dienstmiidchens beraubt!" (Se 127). 
., 
The second effect of the unearthly, uncontrollable agents is to 
confront the doctor with a patient he is p~werless to heal. This 
wh?le episode, with its swift changes of direction, its confusing 
mixture of natural and unnatural, its grotesque· details and bizarre 
ritual, is one of the most elus~ve and repulsive Kafka ever wrote. 
His thoughts in a turmoil, the doctor is rushed from his gig 
into the smoky,almost unbreathable atmosphere of the boy's room, where 
the lean, feverless patient immediately whispers in his ear: "'Doktor, 
la13 mich sterben' " (Se 125). Embittered by the sacrifice this appar-
ently pointless errand has caused him, the doctor curses the gods 
for their co-operation and feels ill at ease in the presence of the 
simple-minded family, who have no idea of what has happened to him 
or of what their son has just said, and would probably not believe the 
doctor if he told them. In particular, he is troubled by the father, 
whose thoughts are so fixed on the welfare of his son that he is pre-
pared to sacrifice his "Schatz" (Se 126), his rum, in the hope of 
making the doctor comfortable and better able to perform his duty. 
In view of the boy 1 s whispered request and the doctor's first impres-
sion of his condition, the father's thoughts are indeed narrow. And 
by comparison with the other thoughts whirling around in the doctor's 
head, they are even more so. Little wonder, then, that the doc tor 
refuses to drin~ the rum, that the thought of doing so should nauseate 
him. For, in accepting the drink, he would be comri1itting himself to 
the father's 11engen Denkkreis" (Se 126), thus betraying the latt~r' s 
"Vertraulichkeit" (Se 126) and adding still further to the mutual 
deception underlying their relationship. 6 
However., beckoned by the mother, he goes to the bed, where he 
listens to the boy's breathing and heartbeat, while one of the horses, 
which have somehow loosened their reins and thrust their heads through 
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the window, neighs loudly to the ceiling. Conv,inced by this cursory 
examination that the boy is perfectly healthy, the doctor prepares 
to return home, finding it difficult not to vent his anger on those 
who have called him out on yet another needless errand, one which 
this time has cost him his maid, But, moved by the sad, disappointed 
looks of the family and a heavily bloodstained handkerchief held by 
the daughter, he suddenly feels obliged to concede that perhaps the 
boy is sick after all. And on re-examining him, while both horses 
neigh in unison, he discovers that this is in fact so, that in the 
area of the right hip the boy has a large wound: "Rosa, in vielen 
Schattierungen, dunkel in der Tiefe, hellwerdend zu den Randern, 
zartkornig, mit ungleichmaBig sich aufsammelndem Blut, offen wie ein 
Bergwerk obertags. ( ... ) Wurmer, an Starke und Lange meinem kleinen 
Finger gleich, rosig aus eigenem und auBerdem blutbespritzt, winden 
sich, im Innern der Wunde festgehalten, mit weiBen Kopfchen, mit 
vielen Bei nchen ans Licht" (Se 127) . 
This wound has been variously linked with others in a similar 
position: Rotpeter's (Emrich, 1958:131), Jacob's (loc.cit,) and 
Christ's (Sokel, 1964:280) . 7 But, through the use of the word Rosa 
and the curious participation of the horses, the immediate association 
within the work itself is with the opening events of the story, and 
the association proves to be of vital importance, For a comparison 
of this scene with the opening episode reveals a close parallel 
between the plight of the boy and that of the doctor. Both have a 
fatal weakness which, though at first hidden, is ultimately brought 
to light, and in both cases this weakness inheres in the very nature 
of the person's existence; it is his "gauze Ausstattung" (Se 128), 
his sol~ raison d'etre3 his vocation in life. As a source of ines-
capable ruin, this weakness naturally gives rise to bitter lament, 
I' 
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bt1t the discontent is futile and must ultimately give way to sub-
mission, resignation. In both cases, the revelation of this fatal 
flaw is also associated with Rosa and mysterious, unnatural, destruct-
ive forces (the horses and groom; the worms) 9 which go beyond man's con-
t~ol, assert themselves at the expense of others~and are at once 
beautiful and repulsive. 8 The ritualistic scene in which the doctor 
is first stripped of his clothing and then placed in bed beside the 
boy merely underscores, in a grotesque way, the links that have al-
ready-been established between the two characters. Both fall victim 
to a materialistic age whose false values, deceptive security and 
underlying impotence are brutally exposed by the irruption of 
destructive, trans-empirical agents into the physical sphere. 
Although the doctor does not directly relate the boy's wound 
to his own situation, he does show an awareness of its general impli-
cations as he tries to calm the boy and reconcile him to his fatal 
weakness: 111 Junger Freund', sage ich, 'dein Fehler ist: du hast 
keinen tiberblick. Ich, der ich schon in allen Krankenstuben, weit 
und breit, gewesen bin, sage dir: deine Wunde ist so libel nicht. 
Im spitzen Winkel mit zwei Rieben der Hacke geschaffen. Viele b ieten 
ihre Seite an und horen kaum die Hacke im Forst, geschweige denn, 
daB sie ihnen naher kommt'" (Se 128). 
In his explanation, the doctor is not trying to deceive the 
boy by underrating the seriousness of the wound, which he has already 
' 
silently diagnosed as incurable and fatal. He is simply trying to 
reduce the intensity of the young patient's reaction to it. Faced 
with the impossibility of providing him with physical remedies, the 
doctor tries to comfort him in the only other way he can in an age 
of unbelief, that is, by reducing the uniquely pers;nal significance 
of the wound in the boy's eyes and thus helping him to accept it. 
I 
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This he succeeds in doing by relativising the wound's degree of 
, I 
nastiness and by giving it a tangible, yet symbolic frame of 
reference. 
The analogy underlying the explanation is one that also occurs 
1.n the very early piece Die BClwne!J namely,,that between men and trees, 
though here the specific details and implications are naturally dif-
ferent. Like trees, many men expose themselves to the danger of a 
fatal blow to their existence and remain almost totally unaware of 
their approaching doom until it is too late. In the doctor's eyes, 
then, the boy's iWtmd is representative of a fatal existential weak-
ness conunon to many men. 
From this it should be evident that the doctor is not preaching 
some "Auserwiihl thei t des Kranken" (Sokel, 1964: 280) in his analogy. 
For the boy is one of the many, not one of the few. ~imilarly, there 
is no justification for interpreting the doctor's attitude to the 
wound as "erzromantisch, todesmystisch" (loc .cit .) . In fact, to do 
so is not only to miss the bitter irony behind the use of the words 
Blwne and schon in this scene, but also to overlook the socio-philoso-
phical framework of the story as a whole. The people have lost all 
faith in the gods, and the doctor, himself, curses them and their 
emissaries as violent, wilfully frustrating forces. Within such a 
framework, it is inconceivable that he should preach some form of 
Todesrrrystik or that the boy.should be convinced by it. On the con-
trary, when the doctor actually is moved to speak of death (Se 126), 
he does so in terms of an end to his futile existence, to the torture 
of his profession and especially to the troubles arising from the 
appearance of the unearthly gr_oom and horses. He does not see it as 
a joyful, mystical g9ing-beyond, for he recognises that these horses 
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and their groom, who have brought ruin upon him, come from the 
beyond. 
Although the doctor's "Uberblick" (Se l 28) indirectly defines 
his own existential position and succeeds in pacifying the incurable 
boy, it does not bring a similar calm to the doctor himself. Having 
done all he can to help the boy, he now turns to thoughts of his own 
Rettwig, hurriedly gathers up clothes, bag and fur-coat, throws them 
' 
in a heap into his gig and leaps on to one of the horses, expecting 
to be carried home as speedily as he had been swept away. But for 
the third time he is cheated by the unearthly horses, which have al-
ready prevented him from helping his defenceless maid and have carried 
him to a patient he is powerless to cure. Now, instead of showing 
their original speed, they move raggedly, at the pace of decrepit old 
men, through .:he wastes of snow, and the doctor senses his ultimate, 
protracted defeat:: "Niemals komme ich so nach Hause; meine bllihende 
Praxis ist verloren; ein Nachfolger bestiehlt mich, aber ohne Nutzen, 
denn er kann mich nicht ersetzen; in meinem Hause wUtet der ekle 
Pferdeknecht; Rosa ist sein Opfer; ich will es nicht ausdenken" (Se 
128) • 
As already mentioned, much of this statement is completely 
advantaged knowledge and, as such, accentuates the story's .constant 
shift away from normal points of orientation, the increasing confusion 
of levels of reality. I For here the reader is not only presented with 
information the doctor cannot possibly know by natural means, he is 
also called upon, in the first part of the sentence, to imagine the 
passing of a considerable amount of time in a moment, while in the 
second half the story's normal time-values seem to apply. 
However, the chief difficulty lies in the apparently contra-
• • I . I . 
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dietary claims made by the.doctor about hi~ successor. If he has a 
successor, then it would seem that,professionally, he not only .can be, 
b~t already has been, replaced. Similarly, if the successor is rob-
bing the old man, then financially the former is most certainly 
profiting by the latter's absence. Unless, therefore, one is to 
adopt the view that the doctor's claims are totally nonsensical, it 
is evident that ersetzen and ohne Nutzen must be understood as refer-
ring to a level other than the physical or material. Construed in 
this way, the statement forms a,n important part of the story's total 
view, in that it eliminates a possible misunderstanding of the ending 
and reinforces the true significance of the events. 
In the old doctor's absence, a successor has taken over and is 
reaping financial gain from the flourishing practice to which the 
narrator, as a result of the disastrous flaw in his chosen way of 
life, can never return. However, his successor's gain, his triumph 
over the old docto~, is not to be taken as ultimate profit or gain. 
His success is purely material and presents no valid alternative to 
the ruinous path the old doctor has chosen, a path which he must now 
follow, helplessly, to its desolate end: "Nackt, dem Froste dieses 
ungliickseligsten Zeitalters ausgesetzt, mit irdischem Wagen, 
unirdischen Pferden, treibe ich mich alter Mann umher. Mein Pel.z 
hangt hinten am Wagen, ich kann ihn aber nich t erreichen, und keiner 
aus dem beweglichen Gesindel der Patienten rlihrt den Finger. 
Betrogen ! Betrogen! Einmal dem Fehllauten der Nachtglocke gefolgt -
es ist niemals gutzumachen" (Se 128). 
With extr~me succinctness, the doctor's last cry summarises 
the story's moral view, at the centre of which lies deception. ·This 
deception derives, in the first instance, from the nature, of the 
times, which find their embodiment in the doctor's simple, but 
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materialistic and godless patients. In supposing that life can be 
lived securely and morally without a belief in some ultimate, trans-
cendent reality, modern man deceives himself. So, too, do the country 
folk who seek a substitute for salvation in medication. Thus their 
ringing of the doctor's nightbell, that "Zeichen und Instrument seines 
Bcrufs" (Sokel, 1964: 276), is informed from the very beginning by a mis-
guided faith, a fundamental lie, which is powerfully exposed by the 
nature of the boy's wound and their reaction to it. Their calls are 
a 'Fehllauten' not only in the sense that they frequently bring the 
doctor out needlessly, but also in the sense that they arise from false 
values. The patients deceive themselves, albeit unwittingly, and ruth-
lessly use the doctor as a part of their deception. To this extent~ 
\ 
the old man is justified in feeling that they have cheated him and in 
referring to them as 'Gesindel' , when, despite his unswerving devotion 
to them, they make no effort to help him retrieve his coat. 9 
Nevertheless,' as already pointed out, it would be a mistake to 
imagine that the doctor is simply the innocent victim of a godless 
I 
society and age. On the contrary, in submitting to the will of his 
clients by conscientiously answering their calls, even at night and 
in the depths of winter; he both encourages his patients 1 deception 
and betrays his own moral awareness. Thus, from the first time he 
answered their Fehl lauten_, he connnitted himself to a series of conse-
quences which were to lead inevitably to his oWn. ruin. The particular 
false call with which the story is immediately concerned is but the 
culmination of many (cf. Se 126) and, as such, provides a 
quintessential statement of their significance. 
Insofar as he deliberately acquiesced in deceit, the doctor 
is morally culpable, and the function of the horses and groom, which 
I 
also constantly cheat him, is to reveal and punish this guilt by 
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reducing his circumstances to their underlying, desolate reality. 
At the same time, it cannot be denied that, to a large extent, the 
doctor's guilt results from a lack of any real alternative. For, if 
he had neglected or ignored those in need of him, he would have been 
equally, if not more culpable. In effect, then, he has chosen what 
is probably the lesser of two evils. But evil it remains and there-
fore ruinous, in spite of extenuating circumstances.· 
In several ways, Ein Landarzt recalls aspects of Kafka's earlier 
writings. The scrupulous moral view, the concern with deceit and 
deception, the ruthless punishment of the central character, are all 
to be found in such works as Das Urteil and Die Verwandlung. The bitter 
despair and fatalism, too, are not uncommon. But, in other important 
respects, it is also quite unique among the works he had produced so 
far in his career. Its open concern with religion as a social force 
and the success with which the author establishes an ambivalent atti-
tude towards the narrator-agent are two of its more unusual features. 
Another, and probably its chief source of individuality, is the 
particular form in which the trans-empirical is introduced into the 
action. Here, for the first time in Kafka's shorter fiction, it 
appears in violently physical, uncontrollable, animal form in order 
to have its moral effect. 
But, quite apart from its originality, the work also assumes a 
particular significance within the framework of the present collection, 
in that it provides a bleakly negative answer to one of the questions 
posed at the end of Der neue Advokat. The complete preoccupation with 
Beruf does not, of itself, lead to a genuine modus vivendi in modern 
times. On the contrary, its inevitable outcome, as experienced by 
the doctor, is utter ruin. 
In view of the story's originality and its significance within 
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the collection, its historical value is considerable. But, intrinsi-
cally, its merit is doubtful, largely because it becomes uncontrolled 
and overstated. Kafka's exploitation of the irrational, the unnatural 
and the repulsive is, of course, one of the hallmarks of his mature 
writing. But here it seems to exceed the demands of the work's 
realised intention. Particularly in the episode with the young patient 
and his family, one has the impression that the author is wilfully 
indulging mood and technique, that he is almost wallowing in grotes-
querie, apparent contradiction and confused levels of reality. The 
excessive horror and mystification of the episode serve only to 
distort the story's artistic intention and thus to reduce its aesthetic 
value. 
Auf der Galerie 
By contrast, Auf der Galerie (Jan./Feb., 1917) , 1 which resembles 
the preceding story in its flowing, almost breathless movement, pro-
vides an excellent example of controlled effect. Taking as his point 
of departure a circus performance, Kafka gives new expression, in 
the two long sentences of this piece, to the general problem of exis-
tence informing Ein-Landa:l'zt, That is to say, he again portrays man's 
inability to come to terms with the underlying reality of existence 
because that reality is firmly masked by an intractable and deceptive 
surface. 
But, even at this most general level, there are several import-
ant differences between the two works. In Ein Landarzt, man's inabi-
lity is also, to some extent, his unwillingness; the mask of deception 
is largely of his own making and therefore gives rise to questions 
of guilt. This, in turnDleads to punishment, which occurs when the 
brutal agents of trans-empirical reality irrupt into the physical 
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sphere, thus causing the inner truth of human life, the desolate 
underlying reality, to reveal itself at the expense of misleading 
appearance. These developments are not to be found in Auf der Galene, 
where sight and vision remain intact, because they are kept apart. 
The work's first paragraph, which is cast in the form of a 
lengthy hypothesis, presents the possible reality underlying a circus 
performance. It is a vision of unrelenting oppression, innninent 
peril, meaningless ritual, infinite despair. And in the centre of 
this vision stands the frail, consumptive individual performer, destined 
to go through a never-ending act staged by a threatening,potentially 
violent force, to the applause of an insatiable, automaton-like mass. 
If this possible reality underlying the performance were to become 
actual, if in all its horror it were to become concrete reality, then 
perhaps one could come to grips with it, perhaps a young circusgoer 
in the gallery would rush headlong into the ring to put a stop to it. 
But, in actuality, the vision remains unrealised. The colourful 
surface of unceasing solicitude and gentle devotion, of love and 
admiration, continues to mask the possible underlying reality with 
such force that the latter is nowhere apparent. And because this 
is so, the person who sees through the postulated mask, the circus-
goer who is actua~ly witnessing the performance, remains powerless 
before both the surface and the possible reality. Laying his head on 
the railing and "im Schlul3marsch wie in einem schweren Traum versinkend, 
weint er, ohne es zu wissen" (Se J 29) . As the performance comes to 
an end, the possibility that surface and projected underlying reality 
might coincide also passes, together with the opportunity for an 
active Auseinandersetzung between the penetrating observer and reality. 
Thus the spectator is left, immersed in the profoundly sad intuition 
of the continuing and unalterable disparity between vision and 
''' 
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actuality, between a terrifying inner potentiality and a rosy out-
ward appearance. This disparity is underscored by his weeping without 
1 . . 2 ~nowing it. 
Despite its close thematic and emotional links with Ein Iandarzt_, 
Auf der Galerie differs from the preceding story not only in the 
respects already mentioned, but also in that its ultimate effect is to 
cast some doubt on the view of life embodied in the previous work. 
For the disparity between surface and underlying reality, which is 
taken· for granted in Ein Landarzt and leads to such drastic conse-
' 
quences, here becomes uncertain. What was previously regarded as 
actually inherent in and perilous to modern existence is now only 
possibly so. This change in viewpoint, though scarcely more consoling 
than the original firm conviction, is reflected in the hypothetical 
form the vision of inner reality is now made to take, In keeping with 
such a shift in focus, surface reality gains in strength.' But it is 
not thereby vindicated at the expense of the original vision. Nor is 
there any question of the one's cancelling the other out. Rather, 
the two remain equally equivocal; and the individual, in his new, 
distant position, up in the gallery, is left as the centre of this 
I 
tense equipoise, a fact which is emphasised by the close balancing 
of details between the first paragraph and the second. 
Auf der Galerie is an example of Kafka 1 s mature art at its best, 
of his ability to convey an intense and complex view of life in a 
form which is outwardly very simple and in a style which is all the 
more poignant for its firm control. At the same time, this piece, 
like Der neue Advokat, is of particular importance in the author's 
artistic development (cf. Kraft, 1972:160£.; Henel, 1979), since it 
indicates, however tentatively, his gradual movement away from a point 
of desperate, sometimes indulgent self-involvement towards a position 
I, 
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of restrained, often ironic distance, from an all-pervasive, sometimes 
unbalanced preoccupation with guilt and punishment towards a tense, 
melancholy, but viable uncertainty. Furthermore, its central image, 
the circus·' or variety performance, is one that recurs and assumes a 
decisive role in Ein Bericht fur eine Akademie, as well as the later 
HungerkunstZer collection. 
Considered apart from its individual value, however, Auf der 
GaZerie assumes the additional significance of combining with the pre-
ceding two pieces in order to reveal certain basic structural prin-
ciples which, it will be shown,inform the whole Landarzt collection. 
As already sugges~ed, Der neue Advokat serves to pose the general 
problem of the collection and to indicate some of its more important 
elements: Beruf, Gesetz, Freiheit. Together with Ein Bericht fiir 
eine Akademie, which proposes a final resolution of the problem, this 
first piece may therefore be seen as defining the framework of ideas 
within which the following twelve pieces are to move. This is the 
most basic structural principle of the collection (cf. H. Richter, 
1962:126; Binder, 1975:235). 
Within the framework provided by Der neue Advokat and Ein Bericht 
fur eine Akademie~ the first principle governing the arrangement of 
the ~emaining narratives and expositions is that established by the 
title-piece and Auf der> Galerie, namely, the grouping of these indivi-
dual works in pairs according to the particulfir aspect of modern life's 
uncertainty they portray and its implications in the search for posi-
tive existential purpose (cf. Binder, 1975:235f.; Kittler, 1979:212££.). 
Thus, despite the abovementioned development between Ein Landarzt 
and Auf der Galerie, a development which not only characterises the 
collection as a whole, but also operates, as a second principle of 
arrangement, within each thematic pair, these two works were nevertheless 
\ 
157. 
both concerned with a single problem, that is, with the difficulty, 
if not impossibility, of achieving a genuine modus vivendi in modern 
times because of the disparity between appearance and underlying 
reality, between actuality and vision, the second and third degrees 
of knowledge. Such is the persuasive power of empirical reality that 
it is capable of becoming the sole object of human awareness, the 
only concern of human existence. Though nothing more than a mask, 3 
it is so convincingly deceptive4 that life's inner truth ultimately 
remains hidden, even from the searching visionary, who is thus prevent-
ed from clearly grasping its nature and from coming to terms with it 
before it is too late. 
The same bleak view of existence also informs the next two 
pieces. But here the terms are more specific and the range of artistic 
vision is, accordingly, more limited. This gradual reduction in scope,5 
the increasing restriction to a more narrow and particular aspect of 
existence, constitutes the final basic principle of arrangement within 
the collection. As the quest for positive existential value proceeds, 
the possible a~2as of hope become ever fewer, and man is confined with 
increasing intensity to his own isolation and uncertainty. If one 
were to juxtapose Ein Landarzt and Ein Traum, for example, this prin-
ciple would be readily apparent. However, its influence can also 
be seen in the fourth and fifth pieces of the collection, wh~re the 
problem of establisbing a genuine modus vivendi is linked, more 
specifically, with the relationship between the individual and the 
Law, the latter in the sense of an absolute authority which, though 
' 
external to and remote from man, nevertheless exer'ts a decisive in-· 
fluence on the entire course of his existence. 
I' I I ' 
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In Ein altes Blatt (mid/end March, 1917) 1 this authority is 
vest
1
ed ·in a human representative of the ultimate Absolute, the 
Emperor. On him the ordinary inhabitants of the country rely complete-
ly for protection from external threats to their livelihood. But the 
faith on which the artisans and merchants have founded their apparent-
ly secure way of life is seriously questioned when the capital of 
their country is mysteriously invaded and its centre occupied by a 
group of "Nomaden aus dem Norden" (Se 130) • 2 
These armed nomads with their wild, carnivorous horses represent 
the very antithesis of the expositor, a cobbler who speaks in the 
name of his fellow countrymen, They are alien not only in that they 
come from over the border, but also in that they constitute a violent 
denial of all established values in the imperial homeland. Instead 
of trying to found an orderly, civilised community, they roam about as 
lawless, primitive marauders, show no regard for cleanliness or hygiene, 
abhor houses, communicate with one another like screeching jackdaws, 
grimace as if possessed, and have no understanding of or interest in 
the language, way of life or institutions of the country they have 
invaded. Before such mysterious, uncontrollable and potentially 
ruinous beings, the cobbler and his fellow citizens are powerless. 
Unable to resist, they co-operate in their own downfall. 
However, the influence of the nomads is not limited to the inevi-
table and radical changes they produce· in the way of life formerly 
led by the Emperor's subjects. On the contrary, their effect on the 
ordinary citizen is dependent, in the first place, on the negative 
! 
reaction they induce from the .imperial power. For, instead of attempt-
ing to defend the citizens by driving the nomadic invaders out of 
the country, the imperial guards retreat behind the palace gate: 
',' 
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"Das Tor bleibt verschlossen; die Wache, frilher immer festl ich ein-
und ausrnarschierend, halt sich hinter vergitterten Fenstern" (Se 131). 
Consequently, the ordinary citizens are left to defend themselves 
and the country as a whole: "wir sind aber einer solchen Aufgabe nicht 
gewachsen; haben uns doch auch nie gerilhmt, <lessen fahig zu sein" 
(Se 131) • 
By their presence, then, the nomads create a rift between the 
Law, as embodied in the imperial authority, and its adherents, the 
imperial subjects. But this situation is not fundamentally new. In 
fact, it differs only in degree from the relationship which had pre-
viously'existed. For the withdrawal of the imperial power in upon 
itself had apparently been going on for some time and had come so near 
to being complete that the cobbler is doubtful whether the Emperor 
could have been brought to the window even by the deafening roar of 
a live ox being devoured by the nomads and their horses in the palace 
square: "Gerade damals glaubte ich den Kaiser selbst in einem Fenster 
des Palastes gesehen zu haben;niernals sonst kommt er in diese auBeren 
Gemacher, inuner nur lebt er in dem innersten Garten; diesmal aber stand 
er, so schien es mir wenigstens, an einem der Fenster und blickte mit 
gesenktem Kopf auf das Treiben vor seinem SchloB" (Se 131). 
But although the cobbler and his fellow citizens have evidently 
been aware of the Emperor's withdrawal from the affairs of the country, 
they have not bothered themselves about it. Instead of considering 
the possible implications of such a withdrawal and the shift in 
responsibility it involves, they have continued to go about their 
business as if nothing had happened. Their implicit faith in the 
Emperor's protection proves to be blind and thus misleading.I 
Viewed in this light, the "Miisversti:indnis" (Se 131)1 of which 
I 
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the cobbler speaks takes on a rather different meaning, since it 
applies to the ordinary citizens as well. Certainly the imperial 
power has failed to carry out its assumed responsibilities, and insofar 
as it has neglected the country's defence, it could be said to have 
misunderstood its role vis-a-vis the people. But the people, too, 
have shown a lack of true understanding. For, until the nomadic 
invasion, they had ignored the implications of the Emperor's with-
drawal and, in consequence, had failed to remedy the potentially danger--
ous situation in which they were placed. By continuing to act a·s 
if the relationship between them and the imperial power had not changed, 
they betrayed themselves. 
It is the function of the nomads and their horses to bring this 
deceptive relationship into stark relief. Like the horses and groom 
in Ein Landarzt, they are the brutish agents of an inexorable, trans-
empirical reality that irrupts into the physical ~phere in order to 
reveal the latter's fundamental weakness, its inherent threat to life. 
They are, as it were, attracted by the situation, in much the same 
way as the court officials of Der ProzeB claim to be drawn towards 
guilt (Pz 15). Thus, although the "Einrichtungen" (Se 130) of the 
cobbler's country are said to be as incomprehensible to the nomads 
as the latter are indifferent to them, it is nevertheless also claimed, 
in that piece of advantaged knowledge mentioned earlier, that it 'is 
precisely the most important of the country's 'Einrichtungen1 which 
is responsible for their presence: '~er kaiserliche Pala~t hat die 
Nomaden angelockt, versteht es aber nicht, sie wieder zu vertreiben" 
(Se 131). And the palace attracts them because it has become the 
focal point of a crucial weakness in the relationship between the 
empire's ultimate authority and its ordinary citizens. 
If, as was previously suggested, Auf de:r Galerie casts some 
I 
I' 
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doubt on the view of life informing Ein Landarzt, it should be clear 
that in Ein aZtes BZatt all such doubt is dispelled, as the values 
of the earlier story are strongly reaffirmed, Reference has already 
been made to the similarity in function and character between the 
trans-empirical agents in both pieces. Analogous, too, are the situ--
ations of deception and misunderstanding into which these agents 
irrupt, as well as the part played by the conscientious pursuit of 
Beruf in producing such situations. A further resemblance is to be 
found in the outcome of the preternatural agents' intervention, namely, 
the protracted, yet inevitable ruin of the narrator or expositor, 
towards whom,in each case, one retai~s a somewhat ambivalent 
attitude. 
Probably less obvious than these similarities, yet of equal 
importance, is the link between the priest of Ein Landarzt and the 
' Emperor of Ein aZtes Blatt. In their different ways, these two 
figures represent the impotence in modern life, as construed by Kafka, 
3 
of what were formerly intermediaries between man and the Absolute. 
Though evidently occupying a position similar in potential influence 
to that of Alexander, this Emperor has lost contact with his subjects. 
Far from inspiring in them a sense of true existential purpose based 
on a living awareness of the Absolute, he has allowed them to become 
totally preoccupied with their own narrow concerns, while he, himself, 
I 
has withdrawn into a fortified,irresponsible isolation. That this 
s~tuation also implies a rift between the Absolute and its earthly 
representative may be inferred from the very nature of the nomads and 
their horses. But since it is an implication that gains in definition 
from the insights provided by two later pieces, Vor dem Gesetz and 
Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft~ its elaboration will be delayed until after 
those two works have been analysed. 
i' 
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Despite its significant affinities with Ein Landarzt, however, 
Ein aZtes Blatt still gives some evidence of that development which 
has already been noted in the case of Auf der GaZerie. For, unlike 
Ein Landarzt, it is more of an exposition than a narrative, and its 
speaker, though a part of the situation.he presents and discusses, 
is more of a generalised witness than an isolated, deeply involved 
individual. As a result, by comparison with the doctor's narrative, 
there is a greater degree of emotional distance and artistic control 
in what the cobbler has to say. 
Nevertheless, the work is not entirely satisfying, b'ecause it 
tends to leave one cold. The very distance granted the expositor 
and the natural limitations of his personality reduce the emotional 
intensity, so that the piece lacks sufficient innnediacy to produce 
any strong commitment, however momentary, to the mysterious world it 
embodies. Rather, one is left with a certain intellectual curiosity 
about a situation that scarcely disguises its contrivance, an impres-
sion reinforced by the work's clumsy use of advantaged knowledge and 
. b" 1 . 1 . 1 4 its ar itrary, a most meaning ess tit e. 
Vor dem Gesetz 
Much the same impression is created by Vor dem Gesetz (early 
Dec., 1914), 1 which, in the almost rigid functionality of its compon-
1 
ents, betrays its original, didactic purpose (cf. Pz 255). The narrative 
begins in a matter-of-fact, untroubled manner: "Vor dem Gesetz steht 
ein Tilrhliter. Zu diesem Tlirhliter konnnt ein Mann vom Lande und bittet 
um Eintritt in das Gesetz" (Se 131). Everything in this opening situ-
ation has a self-evident ring about it. The man's arrival seems to 
belong to the norm~l order of things. He comes apparently of his ovm 
I I 
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free will and shows no surprise at finding a doorkeeper before the 
entrance to the Law, which in this context denotes the ultimate, 
transcendent Absolute. 2 Nor does he appear to doubt that the door-
keeper's function is to grant admittance upon request. At this stage, 
then, the man from the country evidently considers his relationship 
to the doorkeeper and the Law to be so clearly defined as to· be beyond 
all question. 
However, from the very moment the doorkeeper answers the man's 
' first request, -this sense of unequivocal normality disappears and is 
replaced by the confusion of conflicting interpretation. As the open-
ing suggests, the man from the country does, indeed, approach the Law 
with an untroubled mind, for to him the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the Law is quite straightforward. There is, he believes, 
i 
but one entrance to the.Law, and all men strive towards it (Se 132). 
Once they have reached it, he expects that they should be admitted, 
' 
regardless of person or time (Se 131). But the doorkeeper; an initi-
ate of the Law, presents a -very different view. Admittance, he irrnned-
iately makes clear, is not automatic upon arrival or request. Nor 
is it necessarily to be gained by waiting. Furthermore, there are, 
he implies, as many entrances to the Law as there are people (Se 132), 
and admittance is controlled not by one doorkeeper, but by a hierarchy 
of increasingly more powerful and forbidding guardians, of whom he 
is but the lowest in rank (Se 131). 
Confronted with this forceful challenge to his assumptions, 
the man becomes progressively more uncertain. At first his curiosity 
is excited by the doorkeeper's refusal to admit him. But once he has 
I 
been told about the hierarchy of guardians and has carefully noted 
the doorkeeper's appearance of severity and mystery, his confidence is 
I 
I 
so shaken that he is prepared to sit and wait. This act'of submission 
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marks the turning-point in the story and is followed by a rapid 
decline. 
Although the man's will to gain admittance remains as strong as 
ever, the reason for admittance, namely, the Law, becomes over-shadowed 
in his eyes by the instrument of admittance, that is, the,doorkeeper. 
The goal becomes increasingly remote as he becomes more and more pre-
occupied with the immediate means to that goal. Importunity, attempted 
bribery, curses and grumbling: all are of no avail. With the onset 
of senility, he even begs the fleas in the doorkeeper's fur-sollar 
to help him. Finally, as death approaches, his eyes grow dim, "und 
er weiB nicht, oh es um ihn wirklich dunkler wird, oder ob ihn nur 
seine Augen tauschen. Wohl aber erkennt er jetzt im Dunkel einen 
Glanz, der unverloschlich aus der Tlire des Gesetzes bricht" (Se 132). 
But this somewhat uncertain glimpse of the reality he has been seeking 
is incapable of remedying the situation. In fact, the question to 
which it gives rise leads only to further disillusionment and ultimate 
frustration, as the doorkeeper bellows in the man 1 s ear:'" Hier konnte 
niernand sonst EinlaB erhalten, denn dieser Eingang war nur flir dich 
bestimmt. Ich gehe jetzt und schlieBe ihn'" (Se 132). 
At this point, one might be tempted to leave the story, agree-
ing with a whole body of scholars, from Neumann (1968) and Kobs (1970) 
to Steinme~y (1977) and Elm (1979), 3 that it presents an insoluble 
epistemological problem, or c9ncluding with Rhein (1964) that it 
portrays the decline and fall of an existentially guilty man: "Death 
comes to the lonely man as it comes to the lonely K. Both become 
aware of the most obvious question only after they have squandered 
their lives. The bellowing of the doorkeeper mocks their failure and 
they die 'wie ein Hund'. There can be no understanding of the law by 
the man who refuses to question himself ( ... )" (op.cit·.:49) . 4 However, 
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such interpretations are a considerable oversimplification in that 
they suppose the doorkeeper to be a reliable informant, when in 
fact the weight of evidence suggests the opposite. 
In this regard, the impersonalised narrator assumes an extremely 
important role, for, as already pointed out, it is he who relates, 
5 from his position of advantaged knowledge, that the door to the Law 
is always open (Ee 131), Consequently, there ~s every reason to 
believe, as the priest maintains in Der Froze~ (Pz 262f.), t~at the 
d_oorkeeper is mistaken when he says that he is going to close it. 
His claim about the existence of several, if not many d9ors to the Law 
would appear to be similarly ill-founded, since the narrator consist-
ently creates the impression of singularity: "Vor dem Gesetz steht 
ein Tlirhliter 11 (Se 131); "Da das Tor zum Gestz offensteht wie immer" 
(Se 131); "aus der Ti.ire des Gesetzes 11 (Se 132). While it is true that 
these statements do not unequivocally contradict the doorkeeper's 
assertion, they certainly do not support it. 
As for the two remaining explanations the doorkeeper offers, 
their inherent weakness reveals itself. When taking each of the man's 
intended bribes, he says: '" Ich nehme es nur an, damit du nicht 
glaubst, etwas versiiumt zu haben'" (Se 132). Since it is obvious that 
the intended bribes are useless, this reason for accepting them is 
ridiculous. It can scarcely ease the man's mind to know that he is 
parting with all his valuables to no purpose. 
There is a similar self-contradictory element in the doorkeeper's 
claims about the hierarchical nature of entry into the Law. As a 
I 
doorkeeper, he is within the Law, in that he is its appointed servant. 
This aspect of his nature is stressed by the fact that, unlike the 
man from the country, he does not age. One can hardly give much cred-
1 
ence, therefore, to his statement that he finds the sight of the 
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third doorkeeper unbearably terrifying. For this would imply that he 
had never gained final admittance to the Law, and if he had not, it 
seems unlikely that he could be its appointed servant. Furthermore, 
if he finds the Law ultimately inaccessible, there can be no certainty 
at all about his service, for he does not yet fully know the Law. 
Indeed, he cannot even be sure it actually exists. Thus, all that 
remains clear about the doorkeeper is that, by his presence before 
the door, a door which, the highly impersonalised, reliable narrator 
relates, remains always open, he prevents the countryman from gaining 
admittance (cf. Pz 257-264) . 6 
The ultimate effect of Vor dem Gesetz,like that of so many other 
pieces in this collection, is to create a situation in which the extent 
of individual culpability remains uncertain. In fact, if wilfulness 
be taken as a necessary precondition of guilt, then one may doubt that 
the characters are guilty at all, since it is by no means clear wheth-
er their apparent self-deception is deliberate or not. As a result, 
the reader's attitude to both the man and the doorkeeper remains ambi-
valent, and this ambivalence is a crucial part of the story's realised 
intention. For the characters, as such, are not of prime importance 
in the work. They merely serve to reveal a confused and equivocal 
relationship, that between the individual and the Law. 
Like the cobbler in Ein aZtes Blatt~ the man from the country 
has certain preconceived notions about his relationship to the Law. 
Whether, ideal ~-Y speaking, these assumptions are right or wrong is not 
a matter with which either work concerns itself. The cruciial point, 
as presented in both pieces, is that these ideas simply do not accord 
with actuality. In particular, the countryman's beliefs fail to take 
account of the doorkeeper, that ageless and inscrutable, institutional 
aspect of the Law which, though taken for granted, distorts as it 
serves and thus becomes an obstacle in man's path to the Law. It is 
I 
I I 
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this deceptive mask before the Law that the individual never pene-
trates, partly because of his own unchanging preconceived ideas, and 
partly because the mask itself has such persuasive power. In conse-
quence, the Law remains remote, to be glimpsed uncertainly only when 
death is near and man has fretted away his life on its doorstep, 
engaged in a hopeless struggle with its deluded, immovable and immortal 
servant. To attempt to find a genuine modus vivendi in total, ideal-
istic connnitment to the Law is to yield oneself up, like the man from 
the country, to impenetrable confusion and destructive uncertainty' or, 
like the cobbler, to expo~e oneself to the danger of protracted, but 
inescapable ruin. 
Viewed in the total context of the Landarzt collection~ Ein 
aites Blatt and Vor dem Gesetz serve a like purpose, both implying 
that, in modern times, commitment to an ultimate Absolute, the Law, 
has become impossible as a means of overcoming life's uncertainty, for 
the very reason th~t the nature of the Law, itself, has become uncert-
ain. Since the passing of figures like Alexa'nder the Great, direct. 
contact with the Law has been lost, so that its official guardians 
and representatives are no longer what they seem to be. Instead of 
providing access to the Law,_ they have become inscrutable, institution-
al masks, closed, but hollow systems. 'Although they retain the appear-
ance and office of the Law's guardians, they in fact deceive manland 
form an impenetable barrier to his moral enlightenment. As an inevi-
table consequence, the Law has become utterly remote, unknowable and 
1 
unattainable. In the words already quoted from Der neue Advokat: 
"Heute sind die Tore ganz anderswohin und weiter und hoher vertragen; 
niemand zeigt die Richtung ( ... ) 11 (Se l 23ff .) . Under such cir cum-
stances, man's assent to the Law, however natural it may be, can only 
compound his existing uncertainty and lead to crushing disillusionmen~, 
I 
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while Bucephalus's thorough study of old legal writings would seem 
to become a futile occupation: 
However, despite the negative conclusions of Ein aZtes Blatt 
and Vor dem Gesetz, the possibility of finding a genuine modus vivendi 
in commitment is not entirely precluded. Although the acceptance of 
and reliance on an external absolute has proved ruinously deceptive 
as a basis for modern existence, the possibility still remains of 
commitment to a subjective ideal as a valid, purposeful life-principle, 
and it is this possibility which is explored in the next two works. 
By a process of reduction, the concern of the previou~ two pieces is, 
as it were, internalised and relativised. 
SchakaZe und Araber 
With an irony at first playful, then brutal, SchakaZe und Araber 
(early Jan., 1917) treats of an ideal that is fervently, even devoutly 
racialist. This ideal is the.creation of the jackals, whose leader 
is another of Kafka's partially, but essentially humanised animals. 
From time immemorial, the leader explains to the narrator, jackals 
have hated Arabs, because in their cold arrogance the latter kill 
animals for food and disdainfully ignore carrion, on which jackals 
feed. For this reason, jackals regard Arabs as the very epitome of 
filth and devilish horror: "Schmutz ist ihr WeiB; Schmutz ist ihr 
Schwarz; ein Grauen ist ihr Bart; speien muB man beim Anblick ihrer 
Augenwinkel; und heben sie den Arm, tut sich in der Achselhohle die 
Holle auf" (Se I 34) • 
In despising the Arabs, the jackals see themselves not only as 
completely justified, but also as loftily virtuous. For their hatred 
is not bred of anything so ignoble as personal jealousy or fear. 
Rather, it derives from a powerful and instinctive aversion to impurity. 
'I 
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Thus the very sight of a living Arab is sufficient, they claim, to 
drive them out into the purer air of the desert, where they have 
perforce made their home. Purity is the cause to which the jackals 
as a race are dedicated. And since they have been exiled among the 
Arabs, they must destroy them, if ever their ideal is to be realised: 
11 
'Frieden milssen wir haben von den Arabern; atembare Luft; gereinigt 
von ihnen den Ausblick rund am Horizont; kein Klagegeschrei eines 
Hammels, den der Araber absticht; ruhig soll alles Getier krepieren; 
ungestort soll es von uns leergetrunken und bis auf die Knochen 
gereinigt werden. Reinheit, nichts als Reinheit wollen wir ( .. ,) '" 
(Se 134) . 
However, the jackals' aspirations are full of contradictions 
(cf. Sokel, 1967), not the least among which is their inherent inability 
to attain the goal they have created for themselves. Owing to their 
nausea at the mere sight of living Arabs, they are incapable of ever 
killing one of them. And, in any case, such murder would only cover 
them in the very uncleanness they seek to eradicate: "Wir werden sie 
doch nicht toten. Soviel Wasser hatte der Nil nicht, um uns rein zu 
waschen" (Se 13!•), Thus, in relation to their ideal, they remain 
impotent, as their arid home also suggests. 
Nevertheless, the jackals do not despair. On the contrary, 
they live in unending hope, always longing for the arrival of a 
messiah, whom they see as one so endowed with "Verstand". (Se 133) 
as to be capable of immediately espousing their cause and killing the 
Arabs for them. Anyone who is not an Arab is potentially the appoint-
ed one. Consequently, the narrator, a traveller "aus dem hohen 
Norden" (Se 133), is quickly singled out for their acclaiU1. 
Unfortunately, however, the traveller proves to be a rather 
reluctant saviour. Though greeted as the fulfilment of the jackals' 
170. 
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age-old longing, he retorts that he is in the desert only by chance 
and has no intention of staying for long. Not to be deterred, the 
jackals continue to claim him as their appointed deliverer. After 
all, he is from the north, where the:r:e exists that "Verstand, der hier 
unter den Arabern nicht zu finden ist" (Se 133). But, regrettably, 
he fails them in this respect as well. Far from trying to understand 
their situation, he prefers, like the explorer of In der Strafkolonie~ 
to remain at a dispassionate distance: "' ich maBe mir kein Urteil an 
in Dingen, die mir so fern liegen; ( ... )'" (Se 133). If, as the 
jackals maintain, they are engaged in a "'Streit ( ••. ) , der die Welt 
entzweit'" (Se 134), then the narrator evidently belongs to another 
world, for he knew nothing of the quarrel till they mentioned it, and, 
despite their appeals, he continues to stand outside it. 
By his reactions, the narrator draws attention to the inherent 
absurdity of the jackals' attitude. His very distance from them 
creates a gentle irony that becomes increasingly apparent as the con-
versation progresses. For the more the leading jackal says, the more 
ludicrous his fervid, elevated tone becomes, Thus, when the narrator 
complains that he is unable to stand u~ because two young jackals 
have bitten firmly into his shirt and jacket, he is told in all 
seriousness: "' Sie hal ten deine Schleppe, ( .•. ) eine Ehrbezeigung' 11 
(Se 134). This irony reaches a climax in the jackal's last plaintive 
cry to the European:"'wie ertragst nur du es in dieser Welt, du edles 
Herz und suBes Eingeweide? ( •.. ) o Herr, ( ... ) o teurer Herr, mit 
Hilfe deiner alles vermogenden H::inde, mit Hilfe deiner alles vermogen-
den Hiinde schneide ihnen mit dieser Schere die Halse <lurch! 1 " (Se 
134). The incongruity between the laudatory, almost psalmic language 
and the person to whom it is addressed is equalled only by that between 
the messianic mission the traveller is called upon to accept and the 
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rusty pair of scissors with which he is expected to accomplish it. 
From this point, however, the irony becomes quite brutal. Having 
interrupted the jackals' performance, the leader of the Arabs pro-
ceeds to expose the deeper contradiction in their ideal by having a 
dead camel brought on to the scene. Despite their vehement protesta-
tions of loathing towards the Arabs, ·the jackals do not now flee into 
the desert, for they find the carrion irresistible. In a moment their 
hatred is forgotten and their chaste ideal cast aside, as their bodi-
ly appetites draw them, on their bellies, towards the reeking corpse: 
"Schon hing einer am Hals und fand mit dem ersten BiB die Schlagader. 
Wie eine kleine rasende Pumpe, die ebenso unbedingt wie aussichtslos 
einen ilbermachtigen Brand loschen will, zerrte und zuckte jede Muskel 
seines Korpers an ihrem Platz. Und schon lagen in gleicher Arbeit 
alle auf dem Leichnam hoch zu Berg" (Se 135) . Such is. their state 
of "Rausch und Ohnmacht" (Se 135) that they are not to be driven off, 
even by the Arab's whip. 
The jackals' ideal proves to be a sham, mere "unsinnige Hoff-
nung" (Se 135), because it is based on a dis tort ion, even a denial 
of reality. Despite their exalted claims, their dedication to 
'Reinheit' is apparently nothing more than an attempt to create virtue 
out of their own natural instincts. Unable to resist the very flesh 
the Arab scorns, they try to raise themselves above his contempt by 
I 
construing their physical appetites as the instrument of a lofty ideal 
which also demands the destruction of all Arabs. In this way· they 
hope to rid themselves of scorn and, at the same time, to sublimate 
their innate instincts. They who are by nature devoted to rotting 
bodies, who have by nature a foul breath (Se 133), thus conceive and 
pursue an ideal which, if it were to be fully realised, would requi~e 
their own annihilation as well. 
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It is the effect of the ending to reveal, with telling severity, 
the basic self-deception and contradiction in the ja~kals' cause. 
They remain "wahre Narren" (Se 135), born to be the Arabs' carrion-
eating dogs, but aspiring to be the chosen people of a peaceful world 
purified of Arabs. However, though they are destined to be forever 
frustrated, they are not completely condemned. On the contrary, by 
a final irony, it is their absurd hope that endears them to the very 
Arabs they despise. And the reader, like the narrator when he finally 
stays the leader's whip-hand, is moved to share the Arabs' sentiments. 
Al though Schakale und A1,aber has attracted considerably more 
critical attention than is indicated by A. Flores (1976:166f.), 1 most 
connnentators have shown a strong tendency to allegorise the work by 
simply identifying the jackals with some group or principle extrinsic 
to the work. In view of Kafka's background, politico-historical 
factors, overtones of the Old Testament and the story's concern with 
ritual, the most obvious possible equivalent is, of course, the Jewish 
race (cf. Rubinstein, 1952:59f.; 1967; Beck, 1971:179ff.; Gray, 
2 1973: 134f .) . But others have argued just as convincingly for an 
equation of the story's opponents with various similar dualities in 
Nietzsche's Zur Genealogie d.er Moral (Sokel, 1967; Bridgwater, 1974: 
3 115ff.). The important point, however, is that this very multipli-
city of equally valid or invalid equivalents makes the whole process 
futile. For the jackals are at once all of these groups, and none of 
them, in that they are symbolic of any group dedicated to a like cause. 
It is the penetrating clarity and suggestive control with which Kafka 
portrays the jackals' situation that makes this one of his most 
successful works. 
I I 
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Ein·Besuch im Bergwerk 
1 In technique, Ein Besuch im Bergwerk (Jan/Feb., 1917) presents 
a strong contrast to the preceding piece, its tone being rather flat 
and factual, while its content is restricted to the empirical order 
of things. There is a similar divergence in the subjective ideals 
the two works embody. Unlike the jackals with their exalted, global 
aspirations, the miners, through their observer-spo,kesman, espouse 
a more limited ideal, namely, the apparent manner of being of the 
mine's chief engineers, ten2 young men who, at the direction of the 
management, ~re making the initial survey for new galleries. 
To the ordinary miners, these representatives of the highest 
professional ranks are a source of wonder and admiration: "Wie jung 
diese Leute sind und dabei schon so verschiedenartig! Sie haben sich 
alle frei entwickelt, und ungebunden zeigt sich ihr klar bestiIIlllltes 
Wesen schon in jungen Jahren" (Se 136). Because of their free self-
development, the engineers, with the humility that comes from exten-
sive knowledge (Se 137), have achieved a clarity and certainty of 
being which allows them to be completely involved in what they are 
d.oing, even when they seem to be neglecting the immediate task in 
hand, as is the case with the' sixth and seventh: "Wie sicher mlissen 
diese zwei. Herren ihrer Stellung sein, Ja welche Verdienste mlissen sie 
sich trotz ihrer Jugend um unser Bergwerk schon erworben haben, daB sie 
hier, bei einer so wichtigen Begehung, unter den Augen ihres Chefs, 
nur mit eigenen oder wenigstens mit solchen Angelegenheiten, die nicht 
mit der augenblicklichen Auf gabe zusarrnnenhangen, so unbeirrbar sich 
beschaftigen dilrfen. Oder sollte es moglich sein, daB sie, trotz alles 
Lachens und aller Unaufmerksamkeit, das, was notig ist, sehr wohl 
bemerken?" (Se 136) • 
In and through their Beruf, the engineers display a state of 
I 
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being which is to the miners integral and positive. The freedom in 
which t~1ey have d~veloped is the freedom to be entirely themselves 
·and to give themselves fully to whatever they are doing. It is not 
' the negative freedom of uncertainty in which Bucephalus pursues his 
Ber>uf. Nor is it the arid freedom that the jacka1s seek. For the 
engineers have achieved self-fulfilment not by distancing themselves 
I 
from their narJrsl environment, but by involving themselves in it. 
And their humble involvement is imbued with such certainty, such confi-
deuce, that it remains undaunted, despite inevitable, accompanying 
worries and troubles, which have already left their mark on the 
features of the fifth engineer. 
-
Although the miners regard the engineers with admiration and 
respect, they also find them inscrutable, mystifying. The implied 
distance between the engineers' manner of being and that familiar to 
the ordinary miners is so great that the latter are unable to under-
stand or judge the former. Thus, after a lengthy attempt to account 
for the behaviour of the sixth and seventh engineers, the narrator-
expositor finally concludes: "Man wagt iiber solche Herren kaum ein 
· b estinnntes Urteil abzugeben11 (Se 136). Like the nature of their 
companions, that of these two engineers remains. ultimately "unver-
standlich" (Se 137) to the miners-. 
'-'] 
In order to reinforce the significance of the engineers in the 
miners' eyes, Kafka here employs a technique which is almost unique 
in his art, a method of presentation which has led Poiitzer (1962:94) 
to describe this work and EZf Sohne as "basically plotless enumerations" 
and, as already mentioned, Pasley (1965) to regard both works as 
deliberate mystifications. In choosing to refer to-the ~ngineers by 
number, rather than name, and in allowing numerical succession to 
become one of the main structural principles of the text, Kafka does, 
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it is true, create an air of mystery .. And al tho.ugh this enigmatic 
quality is in keeping with the miners' view of the engineers, it 
also gives rise to several problems. 
Chief among these is the actual number of engineers. At first 
sight, the choice of ten would seem to be entirely arbitrary. However, 
it can also be construed as an integral part of the work's inner 
necessity. For, in almost all cultural traditions, but especially in 
I 
the Judaic, the number ten has long been symbolic of completeness, 
integrity, harmony, perfection (cf. Abbot, 1962:236ff.; Cirlot, 1962: 
223), and it is precisely these qualities which characterise the 
engineers' manner of being as viewed by the miners. Accordingly, the 
choice of the number ten can be interpreted as a ·symbolic means of 
underpinning the ideal nature the engineers assume in the story. 
If the number of engineers can be thus related to the inner 
necessity of the piece, so too can the set of qualities with which 
each engineer is endowed. Far from being a random selection, these 
qualities seem to have been deliberately chosen so as to arrange the 
engineers in complementary pairs about a central point or pivot, the 
fifth engineer, a determined Einzelganger who is "vielleicht der 
oberste im Rang" (Se 136) and exercises a controlling influence on 
the movement of the whole group. Thus the first engineer's somewhat 
carefree, lively, wide-ranging view is complemented by the second 
I 
engineer's precise, careful observation. The tense dignity of the 
withdrawn third engineer finds its complement in the almost insensitive 
loquacity of the fourth. To all appearances, the sixth and seventh, 
who are treated as a unit, are least attentive to their work, while 
;the eighth is the epitome of concentration. The ninth, too, is intent 
on his ta.sk, often dangerously so, but the tenth, with his nonchalant 
control and technical understanding, prevents possible accidents. 
i!' I 
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Viewed in this light, the qualities attributed to each engineer and 
,the order in which they are arranged may also be said to reinforce 
the ideas of wholeness, integrity, harmony. Having chosen the number 
ten for its tr~ditional symbolism, Kafka then exploits the normal 
numerical succession in order to strengthen the number's symbolic 
associations. 
The full significance of the unoccupied "Kanzleidiener der 
Ber gdirektion" (Se 137), who accompanies the engineers, is evidently 
to be discovered- in the same traditional, symbolic pattern. For he 
is the eleventh member of the group and, as pointed out earlier, 
eleven "is a number which in one aspect represents imperfection aiming 
at perfection" (Abbot, 1962:79; cf. Cirlot, 1962:223£.). Like the 
engineers with whom he associates, the attendant is so involved in 
himself as to be oblivious of the miners' actions and reactions, so 
that he, too, remains "als etwas Unverstandliches" (Se 138) in their 
esteem. But, unlike the engineers, he is full of haughty pride about 
his position and his relationship to the miners, so that the latter 
nevertheless laugh at him behind his back. Lacking the engineers' 
extensive knowledge and its accompanying humility, he becomes an 
unconvincing, imperfect imitation of them. Thus, by contrast, he 
helps to define still more closely the true nature of the miners' ideal, 
the cause of their admiration, mystification and wistful longing: 
"Heute wird wenig mehr gearbeitet; die Unterbrechung war zu ausgiebig; 
ein solcher Besuch nimmt alle Gedanken an Arbeit mit sich fort. Allzu 
v~rlockend ist es, den Herren in das Dunkel des Probestollens nachzu-
blicken, in dem sie alle verschwunden sind. Auch geht unsere 
Arbeitsschicht bald zu Ende; wir werden die Rlickkehr der Herren nicht 
mehr mit ansehen" (Se 138). 
Because it is contingent upon a high level of knowledge and 
177. 
professio!J.al skill, the ideal embodied in the engineers remains 
forever beyond the reach of the ordinary miners, who, like the jackals, 
must yearn in vain. However, although the engineers' manner of 
being is necessarily limited as an ideal, it is not thereby invali-
dated in itself. That is to say, although the ordinary miners will 
never achieve the engineers' apparent certainty and freedom, their 
integrity and clarity of being, these qualities are nevertheless 
affirmed as possibilities in the engineers themselves. The principal 
difference, then, between this piece and the previous one resides in 
the fact that, intellectually speaking, the jackals' ideal is totally 
rejected as unattained and unattainable, whereas the miners' ideal 
is affirmed as a state evidently already realised in others, but is 
negated as an ideal for the miners and thus for the generality of 
men. It remains for the last piece of the collection to redefine the 
engineers' mode of being in such a way as to make it universally 
valid and attainabl~ 
Despite its more affirmative conclusion and its greater signifi-
cance in the 'development of Kafka's attitude to existence, Ein Besuch 
~m Bergwerk is of much less aesthetic value than Schakale und Araher. 
To a large extent, this is due to its enumerative technique which, 
though one may be able to explain and justify it without recourse to 
esoteric, allegorical equations, nevertheless reduces the work to 
little more than an abstract, intellectual puzzle. In part, it also 
derives from the character of the narrator-expositor, who is so 
intellectually disadvantaged that his observations lack any depth 
and thus tend lo become boring. 
Through Schakale und Araber and Ein Besuch ~m Bergwerk, then, 
the general concern of the collection is related to the particular 
question of subjective ideals. In other words, these two works may 
' i 
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be s~id to deal with the possibility of finding valid existenti~l 
purpose in the commitment to a purely personal absolute or, at least, 
to one which is limited to a very specific group of beings.. And if 
this interpretation is correct, then it is evident that, with varying 
intensity, both works deny the possibility. In view of the conceiv-
able range of subjective ideals, this is an extremely drastic conclu-
sion and obviously requires a more detailed explanation, if it is to 
be seen in its proper perspective. 
As subjective ideals, the states with which the jackals and 
miners become preoccupied are mental-emotional projections of and by 
the self, out of its existing, implicitly undesirable situation into 
one that is eminently desirable, but as yet unrealised by the self. 
To this extent, they are like all such ideals. But there is one 
crucial respect in which they differ. The states which the jackals 
and miners regard as ideal are not only non-existent in them at 
present, they also lie completely beyond their potentialities. Owing 
to their very nature, the jackals can never achieve the state of 
purity they so ardently desire. Nor, for the same reason, can the 
miners ever become the chief engineers they so much admire. In fact, 
their preoccupation with these ideals implies a flight from the self 
and a rejection of it, a somewhat desperate desire for release or 
escape. And, in both cases, this desire must forever be frustrated, 
because the ideal is inherently unattainable. 
If one compares the apparently broad intention underlying the 
Landa,rzt collect ion with the narrow concerns of Sahakale und Araber 
and Ein Besuah ·im Bergwerk, it may seem that, in limiting his consider-
ation of subjective ideals to those which are inherently unattainable, 
Kafka is being unduly restrictive. Indeed, it may even seem that he 
undermines the whole framework of the collection by rendering 
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unacceptable any general conclusion drawn from such limited evidence. 
But these possible impressions are far from the truth. In fact, it 
is the very limitation of the jackals' and miners' ideals that makes 
them most pertinent to the general argument of the collection. 
As previously stated, the basis of the Landa1?zt pieces is the 
view that, intellectually and spiritually, modern life lacks any cer~ 
tainty of direction or purpose, that it is confused and deceptive. 
Placed in such an intolerable situation, man may seek to overcome it, 
like the miners and jackals, by con~emplating and even actually pursu-
ing an ideal which embodies the opposite of his present situation. 
But all his endeavours in this direction are futile, because the uncert-
ainty, as the first five pieces have shown, is an unalterable, inescap-
able part of the modern human condition. The engineers, it is true, 
appear to contradict -this generalisation. However, it should not be 
overlooked that the reader knows them only as the ordinary miner 
construes them. What they are actually like in themselves, the author 
nPver indicates, so that they remain only postulated exceptions to 
the rule of modern life's inherent and profound uncertainty. Given 
this condition, to commit oneself to the ideal of intellectual-
spiri tual certainty is to be like the jackals and cherish an 
"unsinnige Hoffnung" (Se 135), The commitment, however natural it may 
be, involves a fundamental self-contradiction, since it is an impli-
cit denial of the very reality from which it arises. As such, it 
can only lead to lasting frustration and discontent. 
From this forlorn conclusion a certain narrowing of scope and 
outlook naturally follows. For in a world which permits of no 
intellectual-spiritual certainty, man's stature, his relative power 
and value, must be drastically reduced. So, too, must his possibili-
ties of development. Indeed, if man's present estate is as Kafka 
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implies, then one can hardly conceive of human development at all 
any more, because to do so is to presuppose an organic view of change 
and, in an unalterably uncertain world, that is impossible. Further-
more, if this is true of the intellectual, emotional and spiritual 
dimensions of human existence, it must also have its physical corre-
lative, since in man all these aspects are combined and interdepend-
ent. That is to say, if man's intellect, emotions and spirit are prey 
to an irrevocebles existential uncertainty, then his relationship to 
the purely physical world must be similarly affected, This notion 
has already been suggested in some of the earlier pieces, especially 
those directly concerned with the disparity between surface and under-
lying reality. But its most explicit formulation is to be found in 
the next two works, where the author deliberately presents situations 
in which it is asserted that, even on the purely physical level, the 
conscious attempt to reach a goal, be it the most immediate or the 
most distant, is also subject to a profound, inescapable uncertainty, 
so that here, too, man can find no real hope of deliverance from 
his desolate situation. 
Das nachste Dorf 
It is one of the distinguishing features of the Landarzt 
collection that, through its narrators and expositors or, where they 
are different, its principal characters, the view of life it conveys 
is closely linked with middle or old age. Even in those pieces where 
this association is not made explicit, it is still suggested by social 
position or by some contrast with youth, as in Auf der 1aazerie and 
Ein Besuch im Bergwerk. In the second last work of the collection, 
it is true, this sense of age ·and, with it, the previously established 
spcio-historical perspective are almost entirely lacking, especially 
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for readers unfamiliar with Josef K. of Der ProzeB> as was the case 
during Kafka's lifetime. Consequently, at least in this respect, 
Ein Trawn must be regarded as not altogether typical of the coll.ection. 
However, its very atypicality accentuates the fact that the vision 
underlying the remaining pieces is intimately related to an advanced 
position in life and thus in time, a position which, in the case of 
the speaker, permits a certain distance from immediate situations and 
events, enabling him to view existence in the light, however dim, of 
not inconsiderable experience, and to recognise some of its basic 
qualities. It is from this position that life has already been 
characterised as lacking in real purpose or value, as being fatally 
deceptive and profoundly uncertain. Moreover, since in these pieces 
the situation of the individual narrator, expositor or chief character 
assumes a symbolic significance for modern man, his position in time 
has historical as well as personal or technical implications, suggest-
ing a culture that has lost its youth and is now experiencing a 
wretched decline. 
A sense of age is, therefore, inseparable from the largely 
fatalistic view of man informing most of the L::indarzt pieces, and the 
indissoluble link between these two aspects of the collection provides 
further evidence of Kafka's clear insight into the nature of existence. 
For all awareness of man as self is necessarily and closely related 
to a particular awareness of time. "What we call the self, person 
or individual is experienced and known only against the background of 
the succession of temporal moments and changes constituting his bio-
graphy ( •.. ).,The question, what is man, therefore, invariably refers 
to the quesion of what is time. The-quest for a clarification of the 
self leads to a reaherahe du temps perdu. And the more seriously 
human beings'become engaged in this quest, the more they become 
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preoccupi~d and concerned with the consciousness of time and its 
I 
meaning for human life" (Meyerhoff, 1955:1£.; s.a. Church, 1963:17lff.; 
Harvey, 1965:10lff.) 
Within the present collection, this link between time and the 
self is nowhere more apparent than in the shortest piece, Das nachste 
Dorf (Jan. /Feb. 1917), 1 where the desolate uncertainty of modern man 
finds its correlative in the view of time often expressed by the 
expositor's grandfather. From his position of advanced age and 
corresponding uncertainty, the grandfather sees time as an uncontrol-
lable, terrifyingly rapid process of disjunctive or inorganic change. 
Thus, to him, life appears "erstaunlich kurz" (Se 138). It contracts 
in his memory, because it has evidently been a succession of fleeting 
2 
moments unconnected by any awareness of underlying order or growth. 
The effect of the grandfather's sense of time, however, is not 
only to make his own life appear as extremely brief. It also causes 
him to consider almost incomprehensible the attempt to reach a goal, 
no matter how near and tangible it may be. For even under normal,, 
favourable circumstanc~s, the attempt is inevitably subject to th~ 
passage of time, which, once viewed in all its swiftness, assumes a 
force sufficient to make the mind shrink f~om the undertaking. Between 
will and goal, resolution and realisation, there is a necessary dis-
tance, which an intense awareness of transience perpetuates through 
3 fear. 
In principle, the grandfather's awareness of time anq its signi-
ficance for life is entirely consistent with the vision of human 
uncertainty conveyed by earlier and later pieces of the collection. 
Consequently, in principle, it must be imputed to the author as well. 
This does not mean, however, ~hat Kafka also shares or affirms the 
intensity of the old man's awareness. On the contrary, through the 
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introductory sentence, "Mein GroBvater pflegte zu sagen: ( .•. )" 
(Se 138), his expositor clearly relates this intensity to an age much 
in excess of his own, and leaves completely in doubt whether and to 
what extent he is to be identified with the grandfather's extreme, 
even morbid sentiments. Indeed, if it were not for the context of 
the collection, it would be impossible to establish a clear associa-
tion at all between the grandfather's view and that of the expositor 
or the author. Thus the work must be taken as indicating a direction 
of thought and emotion, rather than a fixed or unequivocally defined 
position. But the guiding principle remains plain enough, namely, 
the awareness that, in a world where time is experienced increasingly 
as transient, the possibility of purposive action, even on the purely 
physical level, is correspondingly reduced, as man becomes the 
helpless victim of his own paralysing fear and uncertainty. 
Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft 
A similarly extreme view of the modern human condition is 
embodied in the story Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft (early March, 1917), 1 
which originally formed part of Kafka's much longer, posthumously 
published work, Beim Bauder chinesischen Mauer (s. BkI 77f.) •2 
Through two of its principal figures, the Emperor and his helpless 
subject, this brief narrative immediately calls to mind Ein aZtes 
Blatt which, as already noted, also has close links with the same 
original. But apart from obvious similarities in subject matter, the 
two pieces actually have little in common. One need only compare the 
psychologically advantaged, almost totally impersonalised narrator 
of the one with the intellectually and emotionally very limited, yet 
clearly personalised expositor of the other to be strongly aware_of 
their d'ifferences, especially in their impact on the reader. 
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It is on the moral level, however, that these differences are 
most striking and significant. Unlike Ein altes Blatt3 Eine kaiserliche 
Botschaft shows no concern with responsibility or guilt, and thus 
lacks any punitive element corresponding to the nomads. For here 
the remoteness of the Emperor is not the result of withdrawal on his 
part. Nor has it been brought about by a preoccupation with Beruf 
on the part of his subjects. Rather, it is inherent in the very nature 
of the imperial position. As the centre of his O!'ffi solar system, 
the Emperor is that vital, illuminating point about which all life 
within his empire revolves and arranges itself in descending order. 
Thus he is necessarily and increasingly distant from his subjects. 
The effect of this inevitable distance is to make direct communi-
cation ultimately impossible. Although on his deathbed the Emperor 
entrusts a robust, faithful servant with a message for his lowliest 
subject, the sheer weight and extent of intervening physical reality, 
the "Dazwischen" (Milhlberger, 1960:20), is such that, despite the 
servant's unflagging efforts and the co-operation of others, the 
message can never be delivered. The unending mass of imperial insti-
tution frustrates the dying Emperor's wish and causes the loyal 
messenger to strive in vain: 
( ... ) wie nutzlos milht er sich ab; immer noch zwangt 
er sich <lurch die Gemacher des innersten Palastes; 
niemals wird er sie ilberwinden; und gelange ihm dies, 
nichts ware gewonnen; die Treppen hinab mUBte er sich 
kampfen; und gelange ihm dies, nichts ware gewonnen; 
die Hofe waren zu durchmessen; und nach den Hofen.der 
zweite umschlieBende Palast; und wieder Treppen u~d 
Hofe; und wieder ein Palast; und so weiter <lurch 
Jahrtausende; und stilrzte er endlich aus dem tiuBersten 
Tor - aber niemals, niemals kann es geschehen - liegt 
erst die Residenzstadt vor ihm, die Mitte der Welt, 
hochgeschilttet voll ihres Bodensatzes. Niemand 
dringt hier <lurch und gar mit der Botschaft eines 
Toten. 
(Se 138f .) 
Here, as in Das niichste Dorf~ there is a necessary gap between 
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will and goal, resolution and realisation, a gap which, owing to 
the very nature of modern existence, cannot be bridged. 
Thus the imperial authority and its indefatigable emissary 
prove ultimately powerless before the physical and institutional 
reality of which they are a part. And if they are powerless, how 
much more so is the solitary individual, reduced in stature from the 
beginning to ndern j ammerlichen Untertanen, dem winzig vor der kaiser-
lichen Sonne in die fernste Ferne gefltichteten Schatten" (Se 138) . 
Utterly insignificant and isolated, knowing of the imperial message 
only through legend and, therefore, uncertain of its very existence, 
he is incapable.of action, almost of willing. Unlike the countryman, 
who confidently approaches the entrance to the Law, is only gradually 
brought into physical subjection and never accepts final defeat, 
this anonymous 'Du' is resigned from the outset to waiting in vain 
for a messenger of the absolute authority to approach him. His lot, 
like that of the actual circusgoer in Auf der Galerie, is' a lasting, 
melancholy helplessness, as he sits in idle dreams and gazes out into 
3 the evening, imagining the message·that might have been. Though 
more wistful than desperate, in essence he nevertheless corresponds 
closely to the grandfather's vision of roan in Das nachste Dorf. And 
again, as in that piece, the speaker's relationship to him remains 
somewhat ill-defined, though evidently tending towards complete 
identification. 
Of all the La:ndarzt pieces, Eine kaiserliche Botschaft is, 
aesthetically speaking, one of the best, combining stylistic siropli-
city, directness and control with a strong undercurrent of emotional 
involvement which clearly distinguishes it from the cold virtuosity 
of some earlier pieces. At the same time, it is probably also the 
most typical, in that more than any other of these works it is 
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suggestive of the whole, providing a focal point not only for much 
of the collection's imagery, but also for its principal themes. 
Among the latter, perhaps none is of more importance than the rela-
tionship between man and the Absolute, since it may be said to provide 
a framework for all the rest. And because it is of such importance, 
an attempt to summarise the author's views on the matter has been 
deliberately delayed until now, when all the Landarzt pieces 
directly related to them have been analysed. 
Excursus: The Law 
According to many, if not most critics, the fundamental principle 
of Kafka's world-view is to be discovered in Eine kaiserliche Botschaft 
or, more precisely, in the figure of the Emperor, whose emblem is the 
sun and who is finally said to have died, as the Emperor Franz Joseph 
had done on 2lst Nevember, 1916. This, they maintain, is obviously 
an imaginative representation of the Nietzschean dictum: "Gott is 
1 tot". Consequently, the author must be an a theist, albeit "verschamt" 
( • 2 And er s, 19 51 . 7 1 ff.) . However, to arrive at such a conclusion is 
not only to distort Kafka's views and to oversimplify Nietzsche's, 3 
it is also to make several erroneous assumptions about this story and 
one of its principal characters. 
In ~he first place, it is false to assume that, because his 
emblem is the sun, the Emperor is therefore to be identified with God. 
Indeed, to make such an assumption is to confuse a traditional, public 
symbol with allegory. That the imperial emblem naturally and imrned-
iately suggests the Divine is hardly to be doubted. But this does not 
make the Emperor God, any more than a flag with skull and crossbones 
transforms a pirate into Death. The emblem merely establishes a direct, 
conventional link between the two; it does not make them identical. 
187. 
Thus, in the present case, the sun indicates that Emperor and God 
are alike in being a gravitational centre which is at the same time 
a source of life-giving light, warmth, and so on. It does not sug-
gest that they are alike in other respects or that, even in the 
mentioned respects, there is no difference between the types of light, 
heat and gravitational force each possesses. 
It is also false to assume that the individual Emperor is to 
be equated with the imperial office and dignity. In other words, it 
does not follow from the death of a particular Emperor that the 
'Kaisertum' disappears w~th him. On the contrary, _the story clearly 
implies that the imperial system is so firmly established as to be 
immovable. And, in Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer, the speaker makes 
the point quite explicit before relating the parable of the imperial 
message. The Emperor "a ls scilcher", he explains, is "groB <lurch al le 
Stockwerke der Welt", but "der lebendige Kaiser" is only "ein Mensch 
wie wir" (BkI 76). Thus, although "der einzelne Kaiser" may decline 
a 11d fall, the "Kaisertum" remains "unsterblich" (BkI 77). Obviously, 
there can be no question here, either, of equating the Emperor's 
death in Kafka 1 s story with the news announced by Nietzsche in Die 
frohliche Wissenschaft (1882). Consequently, for want of further 
evidence, one must conclude, in terms of the,abovementioned argument, 
that Kafka is not an atheist, 'verschamt' or otherwise. 
But to infer from this that he is therefore a theist, a deist 
or even an agnostic would obviously be rash. His attitudes and values 
are much too unorthodox for that. Indeed, their lack of orthodoxy 
is such that, if it is to be conveyed with any accuracy, definitions 
specifically relating to God are probably best omitted altogether 
from the discussion, since they will usually imply much more than is 
either appropriate or intended (cf.. W. Kraft, 1968:65-78). 
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Insofar as Kafka conceives at all of a metaphysical absolute, 
he does so in terms of the Law. Even the rare references to divinity 
in his works4 are coloured by this idea. In other words, for him 
the ultimate reality of life is an absolute, transcendent authority 
which is the final seat of j~dgement and the real source of all gen-
. . . 1 1 5 uine existentia va ue. 
When figures like Alexander the Great were alive, however, the 
Law was not only transcendent, but clear.ly immanent as well, working 
through its temporal representative, who transmitted its spirit to 
. b. 6 his su Jects. As the absolute head of an earthly empire, Alexander 
imparted to those below and about him a genuine and unequivocal sense 
of value, purpose and direction. In accomplishing this, he acted as 
a true representative of the Law, arousing and sustaining in his 
subjects a vital awareness of the Ultimate and their relationship 
to it. 
But, with the passage of time, this situation has been drasti-
cally altered. The 'Kaisertum' or its equivalent, be it church or 
7 legal system, has of course remained, because it is immortal. However, 
immortality is no guarantee of immutability, 8 as the Christian doctrine 
of the soul also recognises. And the first effect of this apparently 
inevitable change has been to create a rift between the people and 
the Law's earthly representatives. Instead of playing a role similar 
to Alexander's, these mediators have withdrawn into themselves (Ein 
aUes Blatt), or have fallen victim to'' their own institutional 
existence (Eine kaiserliche Botschaft), or have simply been deserted 
by man, as he has become increasingly preoccupied with his own 
materialistic concerns (Ein Landa.rzt) . Whatever the cause and the 
e~tent of guilt (if guilt ther~ be), the distressing fact nevertheless 
remains that these supposed intermediaries between man and the Law 
:11 ,, 
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have become utterly remote, inscrutable, misleading and functionally 
impotent (Vo1~ dem Gesetz). Far from imparting a vital awareness 
of value, purpose and direction to their subjects, they create 
uncertainty, confusion, frustration or despair, 
Thus they have ceased to be true representatives of the Law. 
Like the doorkeeper, they retain the office and appearance, but lack 
9 the substance. Between.surface and underlying reality there has 
arisen a deceptive, potentially ruinous disparity. Consequently, 
the very nature of the Law, itself, has become uncertain. 
Faced with this situation, man may experience some form of 
anguish or eventually arrive at a wistful resignation, as in Eine' 
kaiserZiche Botschaft. 10 On the other hand, however, he may also 
be lulled into a false sense of freedom and security, 11 choosing to 
ignore the Law or even to deny its actual existence, But he does so 
at his own peril_. For although the Law _may no longer work through its 
immortal representatives, it is still capable of directly asserting 
itself. With inexorable force, it may at any moment irrupt into 
the physical sphere, transforming the ~xisting empirical (Die 
Verwandlung; In der Strafkolonie) 12 or assuming the form of trans-
empirical, violent, vengeful creatures that call to mind the Erinnyes 
(Ein wndarzt; ,Ein aZtes Blatt) • In this way, it continues to 
establish its values, especially by revealing and punishing both 
human deception and the evasion of personal responsibility, two of 
the capital sins in Kafka's world-view (cf. Hv 39ff .) . 
Why Kafka should have construed the Law in this way, one can 
13 
only speculate, as many already have, since even his extra-literary 
utterances on the subject provide no unequivocal clues (cf. Tb 2lf., 
549, 554f.; Hv 84; BkI 283; Gk 227 ,231,242f .) • That his overbearing, 
i 
social-climbing.,philistine father implanted in him a strong sense of 
I 
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guilt 
. I and .author'itative arbitrariness is scarcely to be doubted, 
i whatever the acknowledged legalistic tricks employed in Kafka' s 
' i Br~ef a:n den yater. Nevertheless, this Oedipal dimension of the issue 
I . 
: t 
has clearly been much exaggerated, especially when one considers, for 
example, that the very first of Kafka's fictional judges, Herr Bende-· 
mann of Das Urtei l, condemns to death the very type of son Kafka' s 
father would unquestionably have preferred, rather than the determined 
bachelor and sickly, unsuccessful businessman, Georg',s friend in 
Russia, whom he calls a "Sohn nach meinem Herzen" (Se 29). This 
I 
same fact must also create deep reservations about theories which 
associate Kafka's Law with the Torah's injunctions against bachelor-
hood (cf. Walther, 1977:143), although the Old Testament's emphasis 
on the Law and its partial image of Yahweh as a rigorous judge and 
ruthless avenger, even a warrior (Ex. 15:3ff.), are extremely unlikely 
not to have affected Kafka's outlook, and certainly did occupy his 
attention for a time about six months before most of the-LandaI'zt 
pieces were written (Bezzel, 1975:112ff.). E. Heller (1948;1974) has 
consistently argued that Kafka's world-view, including his notion of 
the Law, also contains a distinctly Gnostic or Manichean element, and 
there is much in the author's writings, especially the aphorisms, to 
support such a proposition (e.g. matter is inherently evil, demonic 
intruders, etc.). However, according to available evidence, it is 
highly improbable that Kafka became acquainted with Gnosticism, let 
alone Marcionism (cf. Anders, 1952:87£.; Kuna, 1974:45ff.), before 
1921 (Wagenbach, 1958:263). A more plausible explanation of his 
work's apparently Gnostic features would therefore seem to lie in 
the related teachings of neo-Platonism (cf. Copleston, ·1946:207-228, 
esp. 222ff .) , a tradition with which Kafka was undeniably familiar, 
if only through the work of Meister Eckhart (Br 20; Pasley, 1966) and 
! 
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St. Augustine (Hv 446), although Walther's study (1977) of the 
subject, because of his schizophrenic and oneiric bias (op.cit.:lOff., 
72ff.),fails to explore the matter at al1. 14 
A link between these psychoanalytical or religio-philosophical 
speculations and possible socio-historical influences is provided by 
Nietzsche, whose ideas had aroused Kafka's interest as early as 1900-
1901, that isi during his last year at school (P. Heller, 1971; 
Bridgwater, 1974). In the third of his Unzeitgemal3e Betrachtungen, 
a treatise significantly devoted to "Schopenhauer als Erzieher", of 
I 
whose works Kafka was evidently also an avid reader (cf. Wagenbach, 
1958:260), Nietzsche (1874) gives the following analysis of his own 
era: 
Wenn es aber einse1t1g sein sollte, nur die Schwache der 
Linien und die Stumpfheit der Farben am Bilde des modernen 
Lebens hervorzuheben, so ist jedenfalls-die zweite Seite um 
nichts erfreulicher, sondern nur um so beunruhigender. Es 
sind gewiss Krafte da, ungeheure Krafte, aber wilde, 
ursprlingliche und ganz und gar unbarmherzige. Man sieht mit 
banger Erwartung auf sie hin wie in den Braukessel einer 
Hexenkliche: es kann jeden Augenblick zucken und blitzen, 
schreckliche Erscheinungen anzuklindigen. Seit einem 
Jahrhundert sind wir auf lauter fundamentale Erschlitterungen 
vorbereitet; und wenn neuerdings versucht wird, diesem 
tiefsten modernen Range, einzustlirzen oder zu explodie~en, 
die constitutive Kraft des sogenannten nationalen Staates 
entgegenzustellen, so ist doch flir lange Zeiten hinaus 
auch er nur eine Vermehrung der allgemeinen Unsicherheit 
und Bedrohlichkeit. Dass die Einzelnen sich so gebarden, 
als· ob sie von allen diesen Besorgnissen nichts wlissten, 
macht uns nicht irre: ihre Unruhe zeigt es, wie gut sie 
davon wissen; sie denken mit einer Hast und Ausschliesklichkeit 
an sich, wie noch nie Menschen an sich gedacht haben, sie 
bauen und pflanzen flir ihren Tag, und die Jagd nach Gluck 
wird nie grosser sein als wenn es zwischen heute und morgen 
erhascht werden muss: weil uoermorgen vielleicht liberhaupt 
alle Jagdzeit zu Ende ist. Wir leben die Periode der Atome, 
des atomistischen Chaos. I 
(op.cit. :367) 
Nothing, it seems, could be more evocative of Kafka's relationship 
to his own time than this passage, a period when the Austro-Hungarian 
empire was crumbling and about to be totally dissolved, when Kafka, 
I 
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a fully qualified lawyer and reluctant employee of a semi-nationalised 
workers' insurance company, educated in' German, but surrounded by 
increasingly nationalistic Czechs, reared in Judaism, but encircled 
by ever more bitter and violent Christians, rightly sensed the under-
! 
lying lawlessness, emptiness and aimlessness of his epoch (cf. 
Mi.ihlberger, 1960; Stern, 1976; Hilsch, 1979; Stolzl, 1979). As he 
was later to explain to Janouch: "Das Volk der Bibel ist die Zusarnmen-
fassung von Individuen <lurch ein Gesetz. Die Massen von heute wider-
' ' 
setzen sich aber jeder Zusammenfassung. Sie streben auseinander auf 
Grund der inneren Gesetzlosigkeit. Das ist die Triebkraft ihrer 
I • 
rastlosen Bewegung. Die Massen hasten, laufen, gehen im Sturmschritt 
.<lurch die Zeit. Wohin? Von wo konnnen sie? Niemand weiB es. Je mehr 
sie marschieren, um so weniger erreichen sie ein Ziel. Nutzlos 
verbrauchen sie ihre Krafte. Sie denken, daB sie gehen. Dabei 
sti.irzen sie - auf der Stelle marschierend - nur ins Leere. Das ist 
I 
alles. Der Mensch .hat hier seine Heimat verloren" (Gk 232). It is 
in revelation of and opposition to this awareness of his era's under-
lying reality that Kafka creates his own image of the Law, with its 
utterly deceptive, impotent earthly representatives and its violently 
punitive, trans-empirical emissaries. 
Already it has been suggested, however, that Kafka's vision, 
even of such an important reality as the relationship between the 
individual and the Law, is by no means a static or fixed set of insights. 
Rather, it shows a distinct development. As the author becomes more 
deeply aware of the nature and extent of life's uncertainty, the ruth-
lessly severe outlook informing works like Die Verwandlung and Ein 
Landarzt gives way to a broader, more balanced view, so that after 
Ein altes Blatt the motif of destructive moral atonement does not 
i 
recur in the works Kafka published in his own lifetime. Instead of 
ii ·I 
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lipiiting himself to a somewhat morbid preoccupation with guilt and 
horrific punis1n,1ent, he now adopts a more gently ironic~ ambivalent, 
but not indifferent ~ttitude, focussing his attention on situations 
of enduring tension and anguish, independent of guilt. Even in Ein 
Brudermord, where the central act is again violent and destructive, 
there is no simple reversion to the moral values of preceding works. 
An essential part of this shift in focus is a decisive change in 
Kafka's characteristic literary technique of juxtaposing, in tangible 
form, two different levels of reality or modes of being~ In Die 
Verwandlung, In der StrafkoZonie, Ein Landarzt and Ein aUes Blatt, 
man is confronted with a materially actual, yet physically inexplicable 
phenomenon, which imposes itself forcibly and irrevocably upon one 
or more of the work's central figures. And, in each case, the effect 
of this imposition is to establish some moral value through the physi-
cal ruin of the figures concerned. Thus, as indicated earlier, these 
strange phenomena may be regarded as passing judgement on a situation 
that is morally confused and misleading. For this reason and because· 
of their trans-empirical nature, they may also be interpreted as 
issuing from the Law. 
However, with creatures like Bucephalus and the jackals, this 
is no longer the case. · For although, as partially humanised animals, 
they too are materially actual, yet physically inexplicable, they 
nevertheless lack the irresistible, destructive, moral force of such 
phenomena as the horses and groom. Far from reflecting· or represent-
, 
ing the values of a merciless, transcendent Absolute, they display 
a close affinity with the specifically human condition of modern 
times, at least as Kafka saw it. Instead of ruthlessly exposing and 
punishing man's guilt, they embody, in a concentrated, generally 
I 
ex:treme form, some'fundamental, yet problematical aspect of his 
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existence, and thus provide him with the possibility of. gaining 
insight into his own nature. 15 In form and function, therefore, they 
have much in connnon with the characters of literary fable, 16 and are, 
like them, mere fabrications of the author's mind for a literary 
purpose,whereas figures like the nomads and their horses, which point 
to a primal, relentless 'reality beyond themselves and the author, 
belong more to the world of Erlkonig and similar ballads. 
Die Sorge des Hausvaters 
It is with this distinction in mind that one should approach 
the next Landarzt piece, Die Sorge des Hausvaters (end April, 1917), 1 
for its central character is one of Kafka's fabular 2 creatures and 
differs from others in the collection only in being a partially, though 
essentially hum<>nised thing, rather than an 1 animal. Odradek, the 
character in question, is closely related to a theme which is clearly 
enunciated in Der neue Advokat and which forms the basic premiss of 
the following pieces, namely, the view that modern life lacks any 
real purpose, value or meaning. Convinced of such a lack and of the 
absolute necessity to remedy it, Kafka has undertaken, in and through 
the Landarzt collection, an implied quest for these fundamental life-
principles. But; from one work to the next, the possibility of ever 
finding them has been progressively reduced, so that one might already 
be tempted to conclude that modern life is unalterably lacking in 
them. It is this possible conclusion, divorced from any desire for 
its opposite, that the creature Odradek apparently embodies. That is 
to say, it represents a state which, in the eyes of the expositor, 
the 'Hausvater', seems to be purely, even positively valueless, 
purposeless and meaningless. 
To all outward appearances, nothing about the being Odradek 
I 
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makes sense. Though it can comprehend and make intelligent use of 
human discourse, it seems to lack the most vital human organs and is 
not even remotely human in its physical form. Rather, it is a 
conglomerate of disparate parts which, though they may resemble 
familiar concrete objects, are now so far removed from their original 
function that the 'Hausvater' is at a loss to know what their present 
purpose might be and thus whether Odradek has or ever had any purpose 
e:j..ther. "Es ist Ding und zugleich Nicht-Ding, Mensch und zugleich 
Nicht-Mensch" (Emrich, 1958:95). In manner and habits, it is equally 
elusive, moving about too nimbly to be caught, never settling in one 
place, often staying away for months on end, and alternating in mood 
between a wry reticence and a wooden silence. Even its name is 
apparently without sense or meaning. Some claim that it is of Slavonic 
origin, 9thers that it is derived from German and only influenced by 
the Slavonic. "Die Unsicherhei t beider Deutungen aber laBt wohl mit 
Recht darauf schlieBen, daB keine zutrifft, zumal man auch mit keiner 
von ihnen einen Sinn des Wortes finden kann" (Se 139). 
If this apparent lack of sense, meaning and purpose were an 
unequivocal description of Odradek's nature,then he might easily be 
dismissed as unworthy of puman attention, especially since he is quite 
hannless. But the description is not unequivocal. On the contrary, 
like all the expositor's attemp_ts to interpret Odradek' ~ nature, it 
is totally uncertain. For the most remarkable thing about this strange 
creature is that, while he certainly gives the impression of- lacking 
sense, meaning and purpose, at the same time he also appears to lack 
nothing. What the human mind naturally construes as a negative state 
is, in l1is case, evidently no privation at all: "das Ganze erscheint 
zwar sinnlos, aber in seiner A;:-t abgeschlossen" (Se 139). In other 
I 
words, it would seem that in him a basic assumption of human life 
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eithe~ is transvalued or simply ceases to be relevant. For if he is 
pointless, then he is so purely and positively, and that is obviously 
a contradiction in terms. 
In every aspect of his being, then, Odradek completely eludes 
the grasp of the family man. Yet, for all his harmlessness, he cannot 
be dismissed as a mere nonsense, since the fundamental notion of sense 
appears peculiarly irrelevant to his whole nature. Consequently, he 
has the effect of challenging the very basis of the father's existence, 
casting serious doubt even on the validity of his normal mental 
processes. In particular, he brings into question the family man's 
implicit, indeed- instinctive assumption that all creatures must have 
some 'Sinn' and that this 'Sinn' may be found in the procreation and 
nurturing of a family. Thus, when the speaker compares his own pur-
poseful life with Odradek' s, he is filled with care: "Vergeblich frage 
ich mich, was mit ihm geschehen wird. Kann er denn sterben? Alles, 
was stirbt, hat vorher eine Art Ziel, eine Art Tatigkeit gehabt und 
daran hat es sich zerrieben; das trifft bei Odradek nicht zu. Sollte 
er also einstmals etwa noch vor den FliBen meiner Kinder und Kindes-
kinder mit nachschleifendem Zwirnsfade·n die Treppe hi~unterkollern? 
Er schadet ja offenbar niemandem; aber die Vorstellung, daB er mich 
auch noch liberleben sollte, ist mir eine fast schmerzliche" (Se 140). 
Confronted with the possibility of pure purposelessness, the family 
man senses thevery real uncertainty of all he stands for. Odradek 
becomes, as it were, his 'Sorgenkind', since by his existence he makes 
the value of fatherhood, family life and any purpose whatever seem 
fundamentally equivocal. 
Ironically, therefor~, this strangely elusive creature does 
have a 'Sinn' after all, and paradoxically it consists in his very 
appearance of 'Sinnlosigkeit'. The same is also true of his name, 
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as Emrich (1958) has discovered: 
Im Tschechischen (und allgemein Westslawischen) gibt es 
das Verbum "odraditi" (= jemandem etwas abraten). Dieses 
Wort stammt etymologisch aus dem Deutschen (rad = Rat). 
Die slawische "Beeinflussung" erstreckt sich danach auf 
das Prafix od (= ab, weg von) und auf das Suffix -ek, das 
eine Verkleinerung ausdrilckt. Aber auch die erstere 
Ansicht ist ja berechtigt, wonach das Wort ein rein 
slawisches Gebilde ist und sich auch aus dem Slawischen 
in seiner "Bildung" ganz erklaren laBt. Odradek wilrde 
namlich danach ein kleines Wesen bedeuten, das jemandem 
etwas abrat, bzw. ilberhaupt' immer abrat. 
(op . ci L : 9 2f . ) J 
Since Kafka,_as the creator of the word Odradek, was evidently 
also aware of its hidden meaning, one may be led to wonder why he 
should haverdeliberately withheld this information from both the 
family man and the general reader. And the reason is, of course, 
that the mystification is absolutely necessary to the work's embodied 
intention. For, if the expositor had not been denied this information, 
Odradek would not have completely e1uded his grasp. Nor would he 
have seemed to be. entirely or positively 'sinnlos'. Thus he would 
have failed to hcnre the effect that his name implies, that is, he 
would have failed to dissuade the expositor from taking for granted 
the validity of the values on which the whole idea of 'Hausvater' 
is based. 
However, although Odradek's mysterious nature implicitly casts 
doubt on the very basis of the family man's existence and thus ulti-
mately assumes an extremely important 'Sinn' for expositor, author 
and reader, it must be remembered that this 'Sinn' is no more than a 
description of the effect produced by th~ weird creature's appearance. 
It does nothing to define his actual nature, which still remains a 
mass of apparent contradictions and, therefore, as equivocal as the 
values his appearance brings into question. Consequently, it would 
be a mistake to assume, as Emrich (1958:95) and Politzer (1962:97) do, 
198. 
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that Odradek is intended to represent a valid or viable alternative 
to the family man's purposeful existence. On the contrary, the 
author affirms the values neither of the one nor of the other. Rather, 
through the invention of an utterly elusive being, he suggests a 
possibility that renders uncertain even the most fundamental of human 
i 
assumptions, namely, that 'Sinn' is a positive quality and that life 
without it is unthinkable. Whether this assumption is, in fact, 
wrong is neither stated nor implied. The important point is that it 
may be wrong and that in a world separated from the Absolute there is 
no way of knowing whether it is or is not. 
Because of its brevity, its largely unemotional tone and the 
necessary limitations of its expositor, Die Sorge des Hausvaters may 
fail to elicit any positive response at all from the reader. In fact, 
despite the mysterious quality of its central figure, it may seem 
altogether slight, dull and hardly worthy of attention (cf. Sokel, 
1964). But this surface impression is deceptive. Certainly the work 
is narrow in compass and mainly intellectual in appeal. It is also 
imbued with the spirit of Kafka's chilling humour, the effect of which 
is perhaps best described by the family man's reference to Odradek's 
laughter: "es ist ( •.. ) nur ein Lachen, wie manes ohne Lungen 
hervorbringen,kann. Es klingt etwa so, wie das Rascheln in gefallenen 
Blattern" (Se 140). Yet, within these limits, the piece shows a 
brilliance of conception and execution that is seldom equalled in 
Kafka's shorter fiction. Probably nowhere else among these works is 
a similarly elusive insight conveyed with such imaginative economy, 
originality and utter precision. 
In view of its intrinsic merits and its direct relevance to the 
general theme of the foregoing pieces, Die Sorge des Hausvaters 
I 
natural~y assumes a position of consideraple importance in the 
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Landarzt collection. However, as yet the extent of that importance 
has not been fully outlined. For there still remains the question 
of the work's particular position in the total scheme of the collection, 
and that can onfy be answered by means of a more specific.comparison 
with the two innnediately preceding pieces. 
Though very different in structure, style and subject matter, 
Das nachste Dorf and Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft are closely related 
in the view of life they embody. Both suggest that man is no longer 
master of the physical reality to which he belongs. Rather, he has 
become its helpless victim. Consequently, even on the purely physical 
level, any conscious attempt to reach a goal, be it the most immediate 
or the most distant, is subject to a deep-seated, ineluctable 
uncertainty. Thus the possibility of achieving a purpose, even on 
this same level, becomes so remote that the attempt seems futile and, 
with some certainty, a negative result can be foretold. 
A very similar awareness also informs Die Sorge des Hausvaters. 
However, here the concern is no longer with conscious will or resolu-
tion. Instead, by the usual process of reduction, the author again 
narrows his focus, this time to consider the possibility of establish-
ing and achieving some valid purpose through physical instinct. Under 
normal circumstances, to become a 'Hausvater' is to perform an innate, 
physical function and thus to fulfil a natural, intuitiye p~rpose of 
the human person. At the same time, insofar as the par~nt lives on 
in all his descendants, it is also to transcend the limits of indivi-
dual mortality, For both these reasons, parenthood might well be 
regarded as providing human life with the secure, unequivocal, even 
j l ' 
ultimate value which maµ sees as necessary to his existence., However, 
I,' 
I' 
as already pointed 'out, it is the effect of Odradek to challenge this 
I 
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intuitive assumpt,ion by suggesting the possibility that the very 
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notion of purpose is uncertain, that it may not even be a positive 
value, let alone an ultimate one. 
Elf Sohne 
In dealing with the relationship between a father a~d his 
children, Elf Sohne (end March, 1917) 1 raises the same issue as the 
preceding piece. It also arrives at a similarly negative conclusion. 
But here t~e challenge to the assumed value of fatherhood derives not 
from a fabular creature like Odradek, but from the father's sons, 
as they appear in his regard. 
I I ,, 
' Although, in the characterisation and assessment of his sons, 
the father affirms his love for all of them, he also makes very plain 
the dissatisfaction and disillusionment which·, in varying degrees, 
they all cause him. Indeed, ~t times he is so conscious of their 
alleged failings and so intent on fault-finding that one may wonder 
just how much charity there really is in his love. Be that as it may, I , , 
it is quite clear that he does not see them as the fulfilment of a 
positive life-purpose, however innate and instinctive. Nor does he 
find in them the consoling promise of a continuing family line. For 
I 
,, 
' the seventh son is the only one whom he would really like to see become 
a father, and he shows not the slightest interest in the opposite sex, 
while the only son to ~isplay any concern at all for his father's 
future is the eleventh, and he is so frail, so otherworldly that the 
father trusts him least of all, realising that his characteristics 
are calculated to destroy the family. 
To the head of this family, then, paternity is far from repre-
1 
senting an unequivocal, enduring existential value .. Rather, it 
I 
appears to him largely as the propagation of imperfectiOn. Thus, 
despite his professed love for his sons and his awareness of their 
l 
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good points, he recognises in all of them, as their one common 
characteristic, a general family weakness, which he defines in refer-
ence to his second son's defective left eye: "Es ist natlirlich nicht 
dieser korperliche Fehler, der mir web tut, sondern eine ihm irgendwie 
entsprechende kleine UnregelmaBigkeit seines Geistes, irgendein in 
seinem Blut irrendes Gift, irgendeine Unfahigkeit, die mir allein 
sichtbare Anlage seines Lebens rund zu vollenden. Gerade dies macht 
ihn allerdings andererseits wieder zu melnem·wahren Sohn, denn dieser 
sein Fehler ist gleichzeitig der Fehler unserer ganzen Famili~ und 
an c,i.iesem Sohn nur liberdeutlich" (Se 141). 
However, although the father is conscious of this failing in the 
whole of his family, there is no indication that, the sons share his 
awareness. Indeed, if they are all like the second, they cannot pos-
sibly share it, since the father alone is aware of the potentiality 
that is never fully realised. From this one may conclude, as argued 
in the earlier discussion of advantaged knowledge, that the supposed 
general weakness in the sons is merely a projection of the father's 
own self-awareness. Thus, when one considers the extremely critical 
and disappointed attitude he nevertheless adopts towards them, it 
becomes clear that the real ~ource of his discontent is not so much 
the particular faults of each son as the knowledge that in them he has 
failed to overcome himself. The positive fulfilment he had evidently 
hoped to find in procreation has been denied him. In his sons he has 
merely.propagated his own imperfection. 2 
As if to highlight this somewhat concealed, yet crucial aspect 
of the father's position, Kafka employs here a technique essentially 
identical with that in Ein Besuch im Bergwerk. That is to say, in 
this exposition, as in the preceding one, he reinforces the signifi-
cance of the situation by the use of a traditional numerical symbol. 
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In choosing the otherwise arbitrary, not to mention improbable 
I 
number of eleven sons~ and in causing the father to refer to them 
i 
'exclusively by number, rather than name, Kafka draws attention to the 
fact that the father represents 1 imperfection aiming at perfection' . 
This suggestion may seem to entail a complete contradiction of the 
symbolic principle. After all, it is the sons who are eleven, not 
the father. However, the appearance of contradiction is deceptive. 
For it must be remembered, that, unlike the engineers' attendant, the 
father strives to achieve his goal not in and through himself, but 
in and through his sons. Consequently, they are eleven, not he, 
because they are the symbolic embodiment of his purpose, as well as 
its actual frustration. 
Within this framework of traditional symbolism, the specific 
numbering of the sons is governed by the principle that each succeed-
3 ing son shall f:ontrast with the previous one. Even where the two 
are alike in some respects, the total effect will still be one of 
contrast. The first two sons, for example, are both 'klug', but whereas 
the first displays his cleverness within narrow limits and never comes 
to terms with the world, the second combines it with broad experience 
and worldly wisdom. Similarly, the second and third are both hand-
some, but differ in the type of handsomeness each possesses. By 
these means, using the sons' outward appearance, temperam~nt and 
relationship to their socio-historical environment as specific terms 
of reference, the author creates an organic whole. 
Yet, while one may rightly speak of inner unity and necessity 
in Elf Sohr~ 3 there is also considerable justification for the view 
that, in a manner curiously opposed to the rigid functionality of the 
work's enumerative technique, its detail often exceeds the demands 
of its unifying intention. In other words, although the father's 
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remarks may all be construed as directly or indirectly relevant 
to the underlying purpose of the work, at times they are so elaborate 
that the construction itself becomes improbable. As a result, one 
is left with the impression that, in the case of the second son, for 
example, much of the detail is unnecessary and thus distorts the 
work's apparent intention. Certainly the detail creates a more 
plastic quality and some emotional intensity in a work which, in other 
respects, tends to be abstract and flat. But it also confuses, makes 
the whole piece seem obviously contrived, and lends weight to Pasley' s 
otherwise demonstrably unjustified allegoresis of the father and sons 
as Kafka and eleven of his stories. 4 For these reasons, despite its 
intrinsic interest and its special significance within the collection 
as a whole, Elf Sohne proves to be of little aesthetic merit. 
In terms of the search for a positive modus vivendi in an age 
of spiritual, intellectual and emotional uncertainty, Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters and Elf Sohne thus clearly provide no more grounds for 
hope than the preceding pieces of the collection, D,espite its funda-
mental relevance to life and the promise it holds of unequivocal 
purpose and enduring value, fatherhood is shown to be no less a source 
of disillusionment and anguish·than absolute earthly authority or 
subjective ideals. Consequently, in a last desperate reduction of 
scope, the author now focusses on thoughts of release through death. 
If modern life is so intractably uncertain that even procreation be-
comes equivocal in purpose and value, then perhaps man's only remain-
ing hope lies in the destruction of that life. Since the detailed 
examination of the human condition has failed to reveal any other means 
of affirming existence, it may be that man's only real alternative is 
to affirm it by physically negating it, that is, to attempt to create 
sense by destroying the embodiment of senselessness. It is this 
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utterly extreme and paradoxical undertaking·which provides the link 
between the next two pieces, the last thematic pair of the Landarzt · 
collection. 
Ein Brudermord 
Assuming the guise of a crime reporter, Kafka first gives 
expression to this drastic possibility in Ein BrudePrnord (Jan./Feb., 
1917) •1 The story is brief, yet one of the most intricate and per-
plexing of the whole collection. In no small measure, this is due 
to its peculiar style, which is a perverse mixture of factual sobriety, 
sensationalism and Classical allusion. 
The work opens in the manner of an official report, but soon 
begins to display characteristics more typical of delinquent journal-
i3m. Complex sentence structure gives way to staccato phrases, past 
tense to present historic, unembellished information to lurid detail, 
dispassionate narrative distance to overtly emotional involvement, as 
the story acquires a thrilling, almost melodramatic quality. 2 Stylised 
characters, prolonged suspense, large gestures, semi-hysterical soli-
loquy,extreme pathos: all form part of a highly coloured development, 
which, with the murderer's arrest, comes to a halt in one last, 
incomplete sentence: "Schmar, mit Mlihe die letzte Ubelkeit verbeiBend, 
den Mund an die Schulter des Schutzmannes gedrlickt, der leichtfliBig 
ihn davonfilhrt" (Se 145). 
With a similarly grotesque perversity, the significance of the 
work's title is also radically altered as the events unfold. For 
although the murderer is sufficiently familiar with his victim to 
know the whereabouts of his office and home, the hour at which he 
finishes work, certain details of his domestic life and the Christian 
name of his wife, it is nevertheless obvious from their surnames that 
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the two men are not full blood-brothers. On the contrary, the indi-
cation is that they are nothing more than close friends and drinking 
companions. In this light, the title is suddenly transformed, and the 
significance of the action with it. For here fratricide refers not to 
a family crime in the usual sense, but more generally to a fatal attack 
by man on his fellow man. Primarily, therefore, the murderer and his 
victim are opposed representatives of the human family, rather than 
individual persons at enmity. It ~s presumably in order to reinforce 
the sense of their representative function that the author gives them 
such stylised, typifying names. 
Wese, the victim, suggests the essence or substance (Wesen) of 
the good, ordinary citizen and human being. A diligent, evidently 
successful office-worker, he is also happily married, friendly, 
convivial, and capable of taking a simple delight in the beauty of 
nature. Apparently untroubled by questions of ultimate reality and 
their concomitant anguish in modern times, he leads the limited, but 
relatively serene life of the unaware or nalve, at peace with the 
world, loved and loving. Together with his utterly devoted wife, 
he represents the ideal of fraternal humanity. 
At the opposite extreme stands the murderer, Sclnnar, whose name 
aptly calls to.mind both the action and the effect of stabbing (cf. 
Sch.marrae,, dial. Schrra:fl?) •3 In his impassioned treachery and wanton de-
structiveness, he is the epitome of man's inhumanity to man. By killing 
his close friend, he travesties the very notion of a universal human 
brotherhood, a concept which gained wide currency during the Enlighten-
ment and developed into the Humanitatsideal of German Classicism. 
This travesty is nowhere more apparent than in the emotion he 
experiences immediately after the murder: "Seligkeit des Hordes! 
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Erleichterung, Beflligelung <lurch das FlieBen des frernden Blutes ! " 
0(Se 145). The soaring emotion which Schiller regarded as informing· 
! 
1the brotherhood of man, joy, which was for him "die starke Feder/ 
In der ewigen Natur", binding men together with its "sanfter Flilgel" 
(An die Freude) , is here perverted into the ecstatic thrill accompany-
1ng the destruction of a fellow human being. And when the thrill has 
passed, the resultant disillusionment is again expressed in terms 
which are a base mockery of their literary origins. Faced with the 
continuing reality of his friend's bloodstained corpse, Schmar wishes 
that he could innnediately make it disappear altogether, but realises 
that this is impossible: "Nicht alles wird erflillt, nicht alle 
Bliitentraume reiften, dein schwerer Rest liegt bier, schon unzu-
ganglich jedem Tritt" (Se 145). Prometheus, the embodiment of a 
humanly creative force in Goethe's poem of the same name, he whose 
dreams had been of powerfully affirming human life, independent and 
defiant of the gods, is now quoted by his grotesque moral opposite, 4 
Schmar, whose wish had been the complete annihilation of his brother-
rnan. 
Between the poles represented by Schrrmr and Wese stands the 
callous, righteous spectator, Pallas, the private· citizen who knows 
the murderer (cf. Se 145) and is evidently aware of what he is about 
to do, but makes no attempt to intervene. Though not viciously 
destructive, he nonetheless also acts in a manner utterly'opposed to 
the fraternal ideal, and thus provides a grotesque reflection of the 
.Classical spirit with which his name is traditionally associated: 
Offensichtlich soll diese Gestalt in ihrer sensations-
llisternen Neugier, menschlichen Gleichgilltigkeit und 
hamischen Genugtuung post festum den seines i~esens 
beraubten, philistros und unmenschlich zugleich 
gewordenen Rest von Pallas Athene darstellen, der 
machtigen und klugen Gottin der Weisheit und Kultur, 
der Beschiltzerin der Staaten in Krieg und Frieden, 
'' 
die als Hliterin der Ordnung und Humanitat, als 
"Stadtschirmerin" ihren festen Platz in·Athen und 
vielen anderen Stadten der Antike hatte. 
(H.Richter, 1962:153) 
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Of all the characters in the story, Pallas occupies a position 
~hich is visually nearest the narrator's. Yet, morally, the two are 
most distant. For Pallas is the only character of whom the narrator 
unequivocally and consistently disapproves. Indeed, so strong is 
his antipathy towards this embodiment of heartless,, morbid curiosity 
that it gives rise to his first direct and emotional comment on the 
actjon, as Pallas watches Schmar's gruesome preparations for murder: 
''Warum duldete das alles der Private Pallas, der in der Nahe aus 
seinan Fenster im zweiten Stockwerk alles beobachtete? Ergrlinde die 
Henschennatur !ll (.Se 144). Though applied to nature rather than man, 
it is this same incomprehension before the sheer callousness of 
'existence which also finds expression in the narrator's only other 
personal, interpretative comment. Before Wese turns the street 
corner where Schmar is waiting, he pauses to enjoy the gold and blue 
of the nightsky:- "Unwissend blickt er es an, unwissencl streicht er 
das Haar unter dem gellipften Hut; nichts riickt dor~ oben zusammen, um 
ihm die allernachste Zukunft anzuzeigen; alles bleibt' an seinem 
unsinnigen, unerforschlichen Platz. An und fiir sich sehr vernlinftig, 
daB Wese weitergeht, aber er geht ins Messer des Schmar" (Se 145). 
From this second intrusi~n. it is clear that the narrator, as 
the author's ostensible spokesman, does not regard Wese with the 
disapproval he obviously shows towards Pallas. Rather, it would seem 
that he feels considerable sympathy for him, an attitude which the 
action and the ending are calculated to arouse in the reader as well. 
Yet it would be a mistake to assume from this that, in the present 
i~stance, the relationship between narrator and character is one of 
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complete moral-emotional identification. For the same comment also 
shows that the narrator views the world with an awareness and bitter-
ness apparently lacking in Wese. Thus, at the very moment of the 
murder, he is able to distance himself entirely from the innocent 
victim and describe his death-rattle in terms which are peculiarly 
repulsive and powerfully destructive of sympathy: "Wasserratten, 
aufgeschlitzt, geben einen ahnlichen Laut van sich wie Wese" (Se 145). 
The complementary effect of this analogy is, of course, to create 
a sense of identity between the. narrator's and the murderer's moral-
emotional outlook. That is to say, here the narrator appears to be 
actually sharing Schrnar's gruesome delight in· the destruction of a 
good, fellow human being. In view of Schmar's character, this may 
seem to be an inexcusable indulgence of aberrant sentiment on the 
narrator's part. Yet, perverse though it be,' the sentiment in fact 
forms a crucial part of the work's attempted system of values. 
In murdering Wese, Schmar makes the brotherhood of man seem to 
be an empty, absurd idea and thus confirms, in an extreme way, the 
narrator's own interpretation of modern life as callous and inhuman. 
At the same time, however, the murder may also be construed as an 
attack on the apparent absurdity of the fraternal ideal, an attempt 
to overcome its assumed emptiness by destroying at least one of its 
embodiments. Whether this is, in fact, Schmar's motive for the crime 
is neither stated nor unequivocally suggested, for the nature and 
degree of his awareness remain somewhat of a mystery, much to the 
work's detriment. Nevertheless, from the fact that he deliberately 
chooses to kill a close friend and from the positive value he attaches 
to the thrill of murder, there is at least some justification for 
inferring that through the crime he is seeking release from a fraternal 
bond which, for an unspecified reason, he feels to be stifling. And 
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because his otherwise wantonly destructive act pennits of such an 
i~terpretation, regardless of his real motives, it may be seen in 
this respect as holding a certain natural attraction for the narrator, 
since it represents a possibly meaningful response to the oppressive 
senselessness he quite plainly perceives in man and nature. It is 
from this point of view that the narrator is able to identify himself, 
to some extent, with Schmar and thus to deliberately cultivate a style 
which mirrors the latter's values, especially the desire for thrilling 
experience as a relief and release. 
There is, however, a third dimension to the fratricide. Although 
it reveals the apparent absurdity of the fraternal ideal in modern 
times and may be simultaneously construed as an attempt to overcome 
that absurdity, it also necessarily reinforces the same absurdity, 
because it adds to life's inhumanity, In choosing to murder his 
friend, therefore, Schmar confirms the very senselessness he is evi-
dently seeking to escape,and Wese's corpse, with its mute question, 
becomes the symbol of his murderer's renewed and lasting frustration, 
As a result, arrest and nausea quickly follow the feeling of liberation 
and soaring ecstasy, while the possible paradox of the story is re-
duced to a mere vicious circle. 
Ultimately, then, Schmar's actions and implied values prove to 
be simply destructive, a travesty of human brotherhood and a delusive 
source of emotional relief. Far from overcoming life's oppressive 
inhumanity, they reinforce it, even to the point of granting Pallas 
the opportunity to indulge his hypocritical self-righteousness. Seen 
in this light~ the ending evidently supports the narrator's view that 
man is incomprehensible in his callousness and inhumanity. 
However, one has only to recall the largely sensational style of 
the work and the extent of the narrator's sympathy with Schmar to be 
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aware of the profound ambiguity underlying this final appearance of 
,clarity. And when, in addition, one considers that, despite Wese' s 
murder, the values for which he stands have not been destroyed, that 
they in fact live on in his wife's grief and the public's concern, 
the ambiguity is only intensified. For the endurance of these values, 
not to mention their existence in the first place, brings into question 
the whole moral basis of the work, namely, the narrator's general 
assumption that life is absurdly inhuman. Evidently the narrator is 
mistaken. Consequently, all his values and judgements become suspect. 
Furthermore, since he apparently speaks for the author as well, the 
whole work tends to dissolve in a haze of confusion, and one is left 
with the suspicion that the haze conceals nothing but a turbid 
reality born of a perverse misanthropy. Needless to say, such 
qualities are not the hallmarks of good art. 
Ein Trawn 
In contrast to Ein BrudeY'rflord, j!)in Traum (early Dec., 1914) 1 
is a model of artistic clarity and simplicity. Thro~gh the very 
brief, introductory sentence, which also establishes a somewhat over-
worked link with Der Proze/3 (s. esp. Sokel, 1964: 282-286; 1977)', 
the author immediately, though indirectly, defines the narrator's 
point of view as impersonalised and extremely advantaged:. From this 
the remainder of the work develops naturally, the narrator retaining 
his distant position, but limiting his psychological advantage almost 
exclusively to direct knowledge of the central character's mental 
processes. Together with the title, the few words of introduction 
also clearly indicate the level of reality on which the following 
narrative is to be understood. Here, as in all of his shorter fiction, 
when Kafka wishes something to be understood as a dream, he makes it 
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9uite explicit (cf. Emrich, 1958:270). Because the irrational and 
fantastic are readily accepted in dreams, this distinction between 
levels of reality obviously makes the author's and reader's task 
much easier. In the present story, it also has an important bearing 
on the significance of the ending. 
No sooner has Josef K. begun to dream than he finds himself 
involuntarily transported, in fine weather and with consummate ease~ 
to a cemetery. Carried along ''wie auf einem reiBenden Wasser in 
unerschlitterlich schwebender Hal tung" (Se 146), K. willingly co-
op'erates with the force of attraction, adopting the role of .a keen, 
almost fascinated spectator. In particular, he feels irresistibly 
drawn towards a fresh grave, where there are signs of jubilant ceremony. 
On arriving at the spot, he leaps from the path that races on beneath 
hi,s feet, and falls on his knees before the mound of earth, whereupon 
two men at the other end immediately set the headstone innnovably in 
place, while a third, ~stone-engraver, appears and begins the 
inscription, eagerly watched by Josef K. 
Initially, then, the dreaming K. limits the significance of 
his involuntary attraction, tacitly assuming that its goal is merely 
the close observation of a grand burial ceremony, the ritualistic 
trappings of death. Despite his keen interest, he remains at a 
certain secure distance, presuming that it is a matter of someone else's 
burial, of death as a state already achieved in another. But this 
limitation and its underlying assumption are very soon challenged 
when the artist, having begun the inscription with great skill and 
beauty, b~comes embarrassed by K.'s presence and cannot bring himself 
to engrave the name of the deceased. Suddenly the ease of the opening 
is replaced by a feeling of frustration and helpless confusion, as 
the whole ceremony goes awry and K. begins to weep "untrostlich liber 
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die Lage des Kilnstlers" (Se 147). Once K. has calmed himself, the 
artist, finding no other way out, very reluctantly resumes his work, 
but breaks off before completing the first pale letter: "Es war ein 
J, fast war es schon beendet, da stampfte der Kilnstler wiltend mit einem 
FuB in den Grabhligel hinein, daB die Erde ringsum in die Rohe flog" 
(Se 147). 
Through this angry gesture, the engraver finally brings home 
to K. the truth of the situation, the real reason for the ceremony 
and the underlying cause of the original attraction, namely, the 
dreamer's desire for his own death. 2 Instantly K. responds to the 
sudden awareness. From engrossed, distressed spectator, he changes 
to eager, leading participant. Death becomes for him a total, self-
willed engagement in the act of dying, and the joyful ease of the 
opening returns, intensified. For, in burying himself, K. acknowledges 
and achieves the real goal of his initial attraction to the cemetery, 
thus finally giving sense to the ritual prepared in his honour, a 
ritual which immediately races to its own logical conclusion: 
''Wahrend er ( ... ) unten, den Kopf im Genick noch aufgerichtet, schon 
van der undurchdringlichen Tiefe aufgenonunen wurde, jagte oben sein 
Name mit machtigen Zieraten ilber den Stein" (Se 147). 
For the dreaming Josef K., then, death ultimately becomes a 
self-willed and self-executed act, the fulfilment of an intense, 
though initially latent desire, providing blissful release from 
embarrassment, apparently insoluble misunderstanding and emotional 
' distress, while lending significance to an otherwise empty ritual. 
Because it assumes all these aspects, it is also a source of delight 
to the waking K.. However, while the delight is actual, its source 
is not. For, as a dream, K.'s vision of his own suicide remains 
unrealised and, in its specific detail, unreal1sable within the normal, 
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empirical order of things. Consequently, for all its delightful 
effect, it presents no real alternative to the life which, by impli-
cation, it rejects: the-life K. has led before the dream and from 
which his death-wish arises. Rather, like the dreams referred to in 
Auf der Galerie and Eine kaiserliche Botschaft, it remains an idle 
fancy. 
Although~ as already indicated, Ein Traum differs considerably 
in technique, content and aesthetic value from Ein Brudermord, the 
two works are nevertheless alike·in suggesting the general conclusion 
that the physical destruction of human life, whether as murder or as 
suicide, provides. no genuine relief or release from the nature of 
modern existence and no real means of affirming or coming to terms 
with it. In the case of murder, the validity of this generalisation 
is self-evident, since by their very nature the act and its desired 
end are :irreconcilable. However, where suicide is concerned, such 
a general inference may seem unjustified on the mere basis of Ein 
Traum. It is, after all, no difficult task to imagine circumstances 
under which suicide is not only a realisable act, but also one which, 
because it puts an end to the individual's human existence, appears 
'to be entirely consonant with any desire he may have for lasting 
relief and release from life's senselessness. Yet, on further reflect-
ion, it becomes evident that, even under these circumstances, the above 
generalisation remains valid~as the following remarks should demon-
s trate. 
Regardless of the conditions in which suicide occurs, it implies 
an utter despair about existence and a consequent intense desire to be 
rid of it, In other words, implicit in every act of suicide is the 
view that death provides sense where life provides none. But this view, 
as Schopenhauer realised, is obviously contradictory. For death as the 
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source of sense can only signify the existence of something meaning-
ful beyond the physical, and if such metaphysical meaning existed, 
then life itself would not be without sense, even for terminally 
ill patients. Consequently, where life is seen as utterly senseless, 
death, whether it be by suicide or not, can only form part of that 
senselessness. Certainly it constitutes an end to an individual's 
physical existence. But that is no guarantee of relief or release 
from senselessness. On the contrary, it is a final surrender to that 
3 
senselessness. 
If the La,ndarz·t collection had concluded with Ein Brudermord 
and Ein Traum, there can be little doubt that the reader would have 
been left with a powerful sense of the author's failure to find the 
existential purpose and value he has been seeking. Beruf, vision, 
external absolutes, subjective ideals, physical goals, fatherhood, 
death: all have proven impotent as a means of affirming or coming to 
terms with the reality of modern existence. Yet,' in the midst of all 
this failure and continuing uncertainty, the author has also estab-
lished certain grounds from which a form of positive resolution may 
still develop. 
In the first place, by implicitly rejecting self-destruction 
as a meaningful alternative to living, he necessarily recommits him-
self to his own existence in the modern world, despite his profound 
awareness of the anguish such a.commitment involves. Thus, from his 
contemplation of the mo,st extreme of possible human negations, a 
certain affirmation nevertheless arises and leads to a revaluation 
of all that has been established so far. Throughout the entire quest 
represented by the preceding Landar>zt pieces, the author has constantly 
proceeded on the assumption that those aspects of existence which he 
naturally construes as negative are to be overcome only by gaining 
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the positive, that is, by discovering some valid life-principle 
thr
1
ough which all that is now experienced as negative will be trans-
formed into its opposite: uncertainty into certainty, senselessness 
into sense, and so on. But no such principle has been discovered. 
Consequently, in keeping with the possibility suggested by the figure 
of Odradek, the author, cast back on life, is now able to view the 
negative not as a privation, to be overcome,but as a necessity, to be 
accepted (cf. Pz 264). And, to this extent, he is able to affirm 
existence, in all its uncertainty, for that uncertainty is, paradoxically, 
the only certain thing he has (cf. Brod, 1954:183; Gray, 1976:174). 
Needless to say, such an affirmation is not to be compared in 
strength or vigour with that of Nietzsche or even of Kierkegaard, to 
name but two of K.afka's possible influences in this matter. The 
extreme tension underlying the resolution, the continuing powerful 
awareness of the negative and of the limitations it places on existence 
naturally precludes the fervour of vitalism or religious faith. But 
within this admittedly tense and confi~ed world, purposeful development 
is still possibl-e. Though caged, as it were (cf. Foulkes, 1976:81££,), 
man feels free to act and achieve, because, in coming to terms with 
his imprisonment, he has created from it his own sense and value. In 
' 
other words, the manner of being which characterised the chief engin-
eers of Ein Besuch im Bergwerk has now been divorced from a high level 
of skill and knowledge and has thus become a universal possibility, 
the embodiment of which is to be found in the longest and probably the 
best piece of the present collection, the work with which it concludes. 
Ein Bericht f.ilr eine Akademie 
The borderline narrator of this work {early April, 1917), 1 an 
unusual performing ape, has been invited by an academy to present 
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a· report on his "affisches Vorleben" (Se 14 7) , that is, on the life he 
had led before being captured on the African Gold Coast by an expedi-
tion from the Hagenbeck Zoo (Se 148). In itself, the request for this 
report is not only a reflection of the esteem in which the chief 
character is held by society; it is also a formal and, presumably, 
learned recognition of' the extent to which he has become humanised. 
For, in making its request, the academy has obviously taken for granted 
that it is dealing with one who has achieved both an adequate level of 
I 
awareness to be capable of surveying his life and sufficient mastery 
of linguistic skills to be capable of giving expression to that aware-
ness. Yet, at the same time, the invitation also indicates that the 
narrator is quite a rare creature, possessing knowledge which the 
academicians lack, but wish to acquire. And it is here that the inner 
contradiction of the request becomes evident. 
In asking for a report on the narrator's existence before his 
capture, the academicians assume not only a high degree of humanisation 
in this performing ape, but also a continuity of awareness between 
his former manner of being and his present one, In other words, they 
assume that, although the-narrator has now developed the thought pro-
cesses and speech habits specific to human beings, he is still capable 
of mentally returning to the world of his former, purely simian exis-
tence and of then giving it expression in human terms. However, as 
the narrator quickly points out, such an assumption is completely 
unjustified, indeed contradictory, so that, with the best will in the 
world, he simply cannot comply with the academy's request. For the 
very abilities he has acquired, those which the invitation presupposes 
and which enable him to provide any report at all, are specifically 
human abilities. As such, they naturally played no part in his former 
existence and are applicable only to that period of his life in which 
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he has ceased to be the pure ape about which the academy is anxious to 
h~ar. Consequently, the fact that he is able to present any report 
whatever to human beings automatically precludes the possibility of 
a report on his 'affisches Vorleben'. In his present condition, his 
former, purely simian nature and way of life must remain inwardly as 
inaccessible to him as to the academicians (cf. Se 148). 
Insofar, then, as the narrator has become human, he is prevented 
from providing the type of information desired by the academy. Instead, 
he must limit himself to reporting on that period of his life in which 
he has ceased to be a mere ape. And, even within this reduced scope, 
his account is subject to certain inevitable and important reservations. 
In the first place, because the human skills he now possesses have 
developed only gradually over almost five years, he is largely .depend-
ent on others for information about the early stages of the change 
in his condition (Se 148, 149). Furthermore, in learning to think 
and speak like a human being, he has naturally adopted certain human 
attitudes that prejudice the accuracy of his report, much of which 
must needs consist of back-projections, that is, attempts to describe 
the earlier stages of his development in terms of and in relation to 
the state of awareness he has now achieved: "Ich kann natlirlich das 
damals affenmaBig Gefilhlte heute nur mit Menschenworten nachzeichnen 
und verzeichne es infolgedessen, aber wenn ich auch die alte Affen-
wahrheit nicht mehr erreichen kann, wenigstens in der Richtung meiner 
Schilderung liegt sie, daran ist kein Zweifel" (Se 149f .) . Because 
it often leads to an incongruity in tone between the action or state 
described and the language of the description, this distorted nature 
of the report is the chief source of its hum9ur. On one occasion, for 
example, the narrator tries to convey the turning-point in his adjust-
ment to captivity by characterising it as - the decision to cease 
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being an ape, and then, caught up in the human view of his develop-
ment as a progression from primitive to refined mental processes, he 
immediately adds the absurd comment: "Ein klarer, schoner Gedankengang, 
den ich irgendwie mit dem Bauch ausgeheckt haben muB, denn Affen 
denkcn mit dem Bauch" (Se 150). 
Because he draws attention to the inevitable shortcomings of his 
report, the narrator of Ein Bericht fih' eine Aka.demie is, as previously 
explained, aesthetically self-aware and thus occupies a position 
unique among the narrators and expositors of the fiction Kafka published 
in his own lifetime. On the emotional level, the effect of this narra-
' 
tive candour is to arouse in the reader a strong feeling of sympathetic 
trust in one who is so frank with him. Intellectually, however, the 
same self-awareness also establishes a certain distance between the 
narrator and his report, a distance the reader is expected to share, 
if he is to avoid misunderstanding the narrative. 
As already indicated, the need for this distance arises from 
the fact that the narrator is attempting to account, in human terms, 
for a phenomenon which is totally foreign to human experience, namely, 
the existence of a creature which is both ape and man. Such is the 
nature of the report he has undertaken to present that human thought 
and language are bound to prove somewhat inadequate to the task. 
However, since they are the only means at his disposal, he has no choice 
but to employ them, and the reader is therefore warned to make due 
allowance for inevitable distortions. 
This critical, intellectual distance is especially necessary 
when it is a q~estion of trying to grasp the narrator's actual nature. 
For, owing to the fact that the reader is aware of him principally 
as mind and voice, the natural tendency is to disregard the obvious 
evidence of his continuing simian physique and, instead, to think of 
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him as a complete human being. Moreover, on several occasions, this 
tendency is actually, if unintentionally, encouraged by the narrator, 
who, in attempting to describe his ,development, naturally adopts 
the viewpoint of full humanity and refers to it as the abandonment 
of his simian nature (Se 148), as ceasing to be an ape (Se 150), as a 
struggle against his simian nature (Se 153), which rushed head over 
heels from him (Se 154). In fact, however, these descriptions cannot 
be taken as anything 1\}0re than approximations, since they:iare based 
on human preconceptions. What his simian nature is or was in itself, 
he cannot possibly know, because by definition that nature is inacces-
s ible to human thought. Consequently, in describing his development 
as he does, he merely identifies himself with the viewpoint of full 
humanity, thus distorting the actual reality of the change that has 
occurred in him. For, while it i-s true that he is now essentially 
human, in that he has_ become a rational animal, it is also true that, 
in achieving this state, he has not fully abandoned his simian nature. 
Rather, he has become an ambiguous, but viable mixture of man and 
2 
ape, as he clearly implies when discussing the wounds he received 
while being captured. 
The first of these wounds was on the cheek and has left a scar 
which has caused him to be named Rotpeter, "so als unterschiede ich 
mich van dem unlnngst krepierten, hie und da bekannten, dressierten 
Affentier Peter nur <lurch den roten Fleck auf der Wange" (Se 148) . 
The ape-man objects to this name because it suggests a basic misunder-
standing of his nature. Certainly he has been forced, like the mere 
trained ape, to modify his behaviour and to live in circumstances 
utterly foreign to his former simian way of life. But, unlike the 
mere trained ape, he has, of himself, assented to this change, and has 
thus made no attempt to retain his previous simian inwardness while 
I : 
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adopting the outward signs of humanity. 
However, although he differs in this respect from the mere 
trained ape, the second wound provides evidence that he is neverthe-
less not fully human, even on the mental level. Because this wound 
lies below the hip, it has given rise to Rotpeter's predilection for 
removing his trousers before visitors in order to display the scar to 
them, and such behaviour has led to the remark, in a newspaper 
article, that his simian nature is 1'i10ch nicht ganz unterdrilckt" (Se 
148). Rotpeter is infuriated by this accusation, not so much because 
it is untrue, but because it misses the point. It is not that he, 
·; himself, does i1ot find his behaviour humanly unacceptable, but simply 
that he objects to being judged by the standard of full humanity. 3 
For, although he is obviously no longer purely simian and has refused 
to become just a trained 'Affentier', he is also not fully human. 
Nor has he ever ~triven to be, even on the mental level. Instead, he 
has merely sought to cultivate that degree of humanity which will 
permit him to establish a positive modus vivendi in the human commun-
ity. Thus he has become an elusive, hybrid creature. And within the 
limitations of this unique nature, he finds his action perfectly 
justifiable. Indeed, with a strong touch of irony, he explains his 
allegedly purely simian behaviour in terms of the highest human values: 
"kormnt es auf Wahrheit an, wirft jeder GroBgesinnte die allerfeinsten 
Manieren ab" (Se 149) • 
Through these references to his wounds, then, Rotpeter indirectly 
defines the actual nature he has now assumed and, in doing so, helps 
to counteract other acknowledged, possible sources of misunderstanding 
1n his report. At the same time, by implication, he also indicates 
the logic informing his present nature. Although during the past 
five years he has deliberately developed certain essentially human 
I, 
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characteristics, to him these characteristics, and humanisation as 
such, have never been an end in themselves. He has learned to think 
and speak, not in order to be human in these respects, but in order, 
as he later points out, to gain an "Ausweg" (Se 150), that is, a 
positive means of coming to terms with the impossibly unnatural position 
in which his capture has placed him, a form of existence which will 
keep alive his will to live under the intolerable conditions that 
have suddenly been imposed upon him. So important is this concept 
to the narrator that he again draws attention to the narrative act by 
warning the reader against possible misinterpretation. In particular, 
he is anxious that his desire for 'Ausweg' should not be confused with 
the connnon human desire for freedom: "Ich habe Angst, daf3 man nicht 
genau versteht:~ was ich unter Ausweg verstehe. Ich gebrauche das Wart 
in seinem gewoimlichsten und vollsten Sinn. Ich sage absichtlich 
nicht Freiheit. Ich meine nicht dieses grof3e Geflihl der Freiheit nach 
allen Seiten. Als Affe kannte ich es vielleicht und ich habe Menschen 
kennengelernt, die sich danach sehnen. Was mich aber anlangt, 
verlangte ich F:i;eiheit weder damals noch heute. Nebenbei: mit Frei-
heit betrligt man sich unter Menschen allzuoft. Und so wie die Frei-
heit zu den erhabensten Geflihlen z~hl t, so auch die entsprechende 
Tauschung zu den erhabensten" (Se 150). 
At first sight, it may appear from this statement that, in 
distancing himself from a connnon human ideal and from his own past 
as conceived by men, Rotpeter is rejecting all idea of freedom. But 
a closer examination of the text reveals that this is by no means the 
case. Rather, as the narrator explains, he is concerned with a 
particular type of freedom, that enormous and sublime 'Gefilhl der 
Freiheit nach allen Seiten'. 4 This kind of freedom he rejects because, 
as he innnediately suggests, the desire for it entails a denial or 
'' 
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dtstortion of one's present nature and therefore constitutes a form 
of self-deception, an escape from reality, like the performance of 
human trapeze-artists, as he sees it (Se 150) . 5 Consequently, despite 
the terms of his distinction, when Rotpeter chooses an 'Ausweg' in 
preference to the futility of flight (Se 151) or "jener erwahnten 
Freiheit" (Se 152), he may nonetheless be said to have chosen freedom. 
But it is the positive?purposeful freedom of being and doing what 
the limitations of his nature·and circumstances permit. Thus, unlike 
Bucepha1us's negative freedom, it implies a certain affirmation of 
actuality, an active_ involvement of the self in existence, despite 
the latter's shortcomings and restrictions. 
More specifically, Rotpeter's search for an 'Ausweg' implies 
the need to find a way of living among men, into whose comru1mity he 
has been irrevocably thrust. And that, in turn, implies the need to 
make himself socially acceptable among humans. Imbued with the calm 
of the crewmen (Se 150), the ape therefore sets about acquiring 
those abilities, actions and attitudes which will bring him out of 
the cage (Se 154) into human society and will allow him to live, like 
the crewmen, "unbehelligt" (Se 151). Renouncing all stubborn adherence 
to his origins and to memories of his youth (Se 147), he begins to 
imitate the humans about him, learning to shake hands as a sign of 
"Offenheit" (Se 148), to spit and smoke (Se 152), to drink schnaps 
(Se 152f.) and to speak (Se 153). But, in all of this, imitation is 
merely a means to the end of 'Ausweg' . In themselves, the crewmen 
do not attract him very much. On the contrary, he finds them a 
rather dismal sight (Se 152, 153). Thus he imitates, not in order to 
become one of them, but in order to be socially so like them as to be 
accepted by the human conununity, to get out of the cage and to create 
for himself the-possibility of an existence, calm and unmolested like 
I' 
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theirs, within the en.forced limitations of human society. The true 
nature of this imitation is accentuated by the schnaps drinking. For, 
although Rotpeter learns to drink like the crewmen, that is, to copy 
the socially acceptable form among them of drinking, he finds no 
pleasure in the content of the act. It becomes a ritual to be per-
formed merely as a means of gaining an 'Ausweg'. 
The same purpose also informs his behaviour once he has left the 
ship. When handed over to an animal trainer in Hamburg, he recognises 
the limited possibilities open to him and unhesitatingly decides: 
"setze alle Kraft an, um ins Variete zu kommen; das ist der Ausweg; 
ZoologischerGarten ist nur ein neuer Gitterkafig; kommst du. in ihn, 
hist du. verloren" (Se 154). Sparing no effort, he applies himself to 
learning, until he has finally achieved the average educational level 
·f of a European. But here, again, the learning has only been a means to 
an end: "Durch eine Anstrengung, die sich bisher auf der Erde nicht 
wiederholt hat, habe ich die Durchschnittsbildung eines Europ;iers 
erreicht. Das ware·an sich vielleicht gar nichts, ist aber insofern 
doch etwas, als es mir aus dem K.iifig half und mir diesen besonderen 
Ausweg, diesen Menschenausweg verschaffte" (Se 154) . 
By and large, then, Rotpeter's report is a 'success story', as 
Sokel (1964:341) calls it, 6 an account of the manner in which "ein ge-
wesener Affe in die Menschenwelt eingedrungen ist und sich dart fest-
gesetzt hat" (Se 148) . The visible sign of this success is his unshak-
able position on all the great variety stages of the civilised world 
(Se 148), for this position had been the goal informing the greater 
part of his development from pure ape. As a variety artist, he is not, 
like the mere trained ape or chimpanzee, an animal trying to give the 
impression of being human, for essentially he is human. Nor, like 
the trapeze-artists, is he a human being pretending to be an ape, for 
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the very basis of his new nature, namely, .'Ausweg', is a rejection of 
the deception which, in his opinion, they create, namely, 'Freiheit'. 
Rather, he is a viable mixture of ape and man, and as such he is a 
rarity, an oddity. Thus his position in the variety theatre is the 
true and complete expression of his new nature. As a result of his own 
art, he has become, as it were, a work of art and exhibits himself as 
such (cf. Philippi, 1966: 140). Far from bringing his new existence 
into question, his art is of its very essence, and his success on the 
. . . f" . 7 variety stage is its con irmation, 
Yet, for all this, Rotpeter's success is not unclouded, as he 
suggests when summing up his achievement: "Es gibt eine ausgezeichnete 
8 deutsche Redensart: sich in die Busche schlagen ; das habe ich getan, 
ich habe mich in die Blische geschlagen. Ich hatte keinen anderen Weg, 
i·nnner vorausgesetzt, ·daB nicht die Freiheit zu w1ihlen war" (Se 154). 
Although he has eluded the cage, has slipped away from the imprisonment, 
loneliness and confusion of the trained animal, has 'made himself 
-scarce' as ape, in doing so he has perforce altered his old nature in 
order to 'enter the brushwood 19 of the human connnunity and its neces-
sary limitations: "wohler und· eingeschlossener flihlte ich mich in der 
Menschenwelt" (Se 147f.). While it remains true, therefore, that he 
has achieved what he wanted to achieve (Se 154), so that personally 
and socially he now feels completely secure (Se 148), there is never-
theless a constant tension underlying and restraining his sense of 
achievement: "tiberblicke ich meine Ent-wicklung und ihr bisheriges 
Ziel, so klage ich weder, noch bin ich zufrieden" (Se 154). 
Fundamentally, this tension inheres in Rotpeter's very nature as 
ape-man. But it is not merely, or even principally, a matter of 
the tension between human mind and simian body. Certainly Rotpeter 
cannot bear to see his chimpanzee companion by day, al though he 
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11 takes his pleasure with her at night. However, the aversion he shows 
in this context is not to his or her physical nature, but rather to 
the "Irrsinn des verwirrten dressierten Tieres'" (Se 154), which he 
sees in her gaze. While being forced to perform motions inconsistent 
with her simian nature, she has nevertheless tried to retain her, 
simian inwardness, has clung obstinately to her past. The alternative 
he rejected she has accepted. As a result, she has become bewildered, 
mentally deranged. Unable to be her old self and unwilling to become 
a new one, she exemplifies the type of living death he has avoided. 
Thus she is a reminder of what he might have become and of the tense 
inner balance he has achieved. He finds her look unbearable, not, 
as Philippi (1966:128,137) maintains, beca1J.se he sees in it his own 
nature and is afraid of it, but because she represents the possibility 
he has overcome, and her unalterably disoriented condition troubles 
him. 
In Rotpeter's present situation, then, the tension does not 
reside in any potential conflict between body and spirit, between 
continuing simian physique and newly acquired human men,tality, Rather, 
it consists in his awareness of the necessary discrepancy between the 
achieved reality of his extremely limited present and the irretrievable 
potentiality of his past, his 'Affentum', as humanly conceived. In 
~ 
other words, the latent, inescapable weakness of his simian-human 
I 
existence is to be found, as he implies towards the beginning of his 
report (Se 147f.), in the tension between his knowledge of the single 
'Ausweg' he has necessarily chosen and his assumption, consequent upon 
that choice, of the freedom or numerous "Auswege" (Se 150) he has 
thereby inevitably and irrevocably forfeited. 
Earlier in this study of the Landarzt collection, it was suggested 
that Kafka's partially humanised animals embody, in a concentrated 
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generally extreme form, some fundamental, yet problematical aspect 
of the human condition in modern times, and that, because they possess 
.this particular affinity with modern man as viewed by Kafka, they 
provide him with the possibility of insight into his own nature. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of Rotpeter, who, des-
pite his unique oddity, explicitly generalises the significance of 
his condition: "Ihr Affentum, meine Herren, so fern_ Sie etwas Derartiges 
hinter sich haben, kann Ihnen nicht ferner sein als mir das meine. 
A d lO . . . f d d n er Ferse aber kitzelt es Jeden, der luer au Er en geht: en 
kleinen Schimpansen wie den groBen Achilles" (Se 148). 
Adopting the human attitude towards his former simian life as 
virtually complete freedom, and projecting that attitude on to others 
about whom he can apparently know nothing with any certainty, Rotpeter 
interprets all human and animal existence as subject to p'recisely the 
11 
same tension,as inheres in his own nature. From the lowest to 
the highest, all human and animal creatures are vulnerable, and in 
every case their basic weakness is for the one thing, namely, the 
titillating awareness of their 'Affentum', that is, their past construed 
as a state of freedom or almost unlimited possibilities. Whether all 
animals and fiumanbeings have at some time actually lived in such a 
state, Rotpeter is uncertain ( SeJ48,150). But regardless of whether 
they have, in fact, ~xperienced it or not, they instinctively postu-
late it, insofar as ·they are ablej and some men, he knows, long for 
it (Se 148). 
However, owing to the very nature of existence, such a state, 
be it actual or imagined, can never be retained or re'gained without 
denying the will to live (Se 150,151). For, in willing to live, one 
necessarily assents to the general reality of life, and that implies 
the constant need to choose and to compromise with the circumstances 
I, i' I, 
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of one's own existence. Consequently, to assen.t to life is to affirm 
the necessity of discarding or £orfeiting certain possibilities of 
J 
one's own nature and thus of abandoning freedom, in the sense already 
indicated. Yet, despite this affirmation, the memory, intuition or 
even mere assumption of freedom remains, whether one desires it or not 
(Se 150); and in remaining, it will never cease to tempt and to taunt, 
however much it may.diminish in intensity, because it is an awareness 
of what has needs been lost in order that life might continue to be 
gained. 
Applied to the concerns of the entire Landarzt collection, the 
implications of Ein Bericht filr eine Akademie are probably best 
indicated by Kafka, himself, in the following notebook entry, written 
only some eight months after Rotpeter's report was composed: 
Er ist ein freier und gesicherter Bilrger der Erde, denn 
er ist an eine Kette gelegt, die lang genug ist, um 
ihm alle irdischen Raume frei zu geben, und doch 
nur so lang, daB nichts ihn Uber die Grenzen der 
Ertle reiBen kann. Gleichzeitig aber ist er auch ein 
freier und gesicherter Bilrger des Hinnnels, denn er ist 
auch an eine ahnlich berechnete Himmelskette gelegt. 
Will er nun auf die Ertle, drosselt ihn das Halsband des 
Himmels, will er in den Himmel, jenes der Ertle. Und 
trotzdem hat er alle Moglichkeiten und flihlt es; ja, 
er weigert sich sogar, das Ganze auf einen Fehler der 
ersten Fesselung zurlickzufilhren. 
(Hv 46, 94; 14. xii.1917) 
Conclusion 
That Kafka should have chosen to convey the accumulated wisdom 
of the Landarzt pieces through an ape, a figure traditionally associ-
ated with human folly, clearly indicates the degree of jocular self-
irony he had achieved by the time he wrote much of the present callee-
tion. This aspect of the work as a totality is further accentuated 
once it is also recognised that, contrary to the claims of Weinberg 
(1963:54), Altenhoner (1964:60), Fingerhut (1969:101) and Spann (1976: 
I, 
.! I 
! 
I' 
'i 
228. 
122), the name of Alexander the Great's battle-charger, the central 
character of the collection's first piece, did not derive from any 
'bull~headed' qualities on its part. Rather, according to the author-
ity of Plutarch and Pliny, with whose writings Kafka's classical 
education is almost certain to have made him familiar, the horse was 
so called because it was "branded with an ox-head, the mark of 
Philoneicus's ranch: hence his name, Bucephalus" (Green, 1974:43). 
Apart from E.T.A. Hoffmann, it is difficult to imagine any author other 
than Kafka indulging in such evident and profound self-parody, deli-
berately allowing what he regards as the most fundamental problem 
of modern existence to be posed by an 'ox-head' and resolved by an 
1 ape'. 
A much more serious form of irony, however, underlies the 
collection's dedication (cf. Thieberger, 1953:53). As Kafka explained 
to Brod at the end of March, 1918: "Seitdem•ich mich entschlossen habe, 
das Buch meinem Vater zu widmen, liegt mir viel daran, daB es bald 
erscheint. Nicht als ob ich dadurch den Vater versohnen konnte, die 
Wurzeln dieser Feindschaft sind hier unausreiBbar, aber ich hatte 
doch etwas getan, ware, wenn schon nicht nach Pall:istina Ubersiedelt, 
<loch mit dem Finger auf der Landkarte hingefahren" (Br 237) • When 
one recalls the -complex questions with which the work is concerned 
and the manifestly narrow interests of Kafka's father (cf. Binder, 
1979a:ll2ff.), as well as Kafka's undelivered confession to his 
father: "Mein Schreiben handelte von Dir, ich klagte dart ja nur, 
was ich an Deiner Brust nicht klagen konnte" (Hv 203), the irony of 
this dedication becomes all the more poignant and may well be assoc-
iated with the choice of the collection's title. 
Generally the matter of this choice has been related to Kafka's 
frequently quoted diary entry of 25th September, 1918 (Tb 534), and 
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justified on the grounds of the author's personal preference £or the 
work in question. However, the basis of this widely accepted argu-
ment or tacit assumption is extremely insecure, since it is by no 
means certain whether, in the diary entry, Kafka is referring to the 
individual title-piece or to the collection as a whole, both of which 
were in existence at that time. A less equivocal, alternative explan-
ation, suggested by the preceding analyses, may be derived from the 
fact that Ein Landarzt initiates the testing of the hypothesis pro-
posed in Der neue Advokat, a process which is not concluded until the 
resolution of the underlying problem, in Ein Bericht fUY' eine Akademie. 
Viewed in this way, the title may be regarded as serving to reveal 
some of the collection's most important structural principles. How-
ever, given the irony of the dedication, another possible and likely 
interpretation may be inferred from the strong contrast bet~een Kafka's 
father and Siegfried Lowy who, as Wagenbach (1964) remarks, was 
"Kafkas Lieblingsonkel, ein eigentlimlicher Sonderling, Freiluft-
fanatiker, gebildet, belesen (er besaB als einziger der gesamten 
Familie eine groBe Bibliothek), witzig, hilfsbereit, glitig und nur 
auBerlich ein wenig kalt erscheinend, blieb Junggeselle und wurde 
Landarzt in Triesch ( .•. ) " (op .cit.: 15) • 
By and large, then, the significance of Kafka's relative distance 
from his father during the composition of the majority of the Landarzt 
pieces can be-fairly clearly defined. Regrettably, however, the same 
does not appear to be true of his renewed relationship wit!< Felice 
Bauer, another important element of the background •to the collection. 
For, according to recent accounts of this affair, extra-literary evi-
dence allegedly demonstrates beyond all doubt that the primary reason 
for Kafka's tortured, mainly epistolary courtship of this woman and 
his ultimate failure to marry her or anyone else was actually his 
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: I fear of sexual intimacy: "Gegenliber seiner Angst vor der Intimitat 
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sind alle andern Grlinde, die er gegen die von ihm heiB ersehnte Ehe 
vorbringt, nur 'vorgeschoben' ( .•. )" (Binder, 1979a:422; s.a. 129ff., 
158ff,). If this is true, then it should simply be regarded, in 
Liddell's terms, as 'irrelevant gossip', since th~re is no evidence 
whatever that it came within the range of Kafka, the author of the 
Landarzt collection, despite the fact that two of the pieces in this 
work explicitly deal with the issue of paternity and two others contain 
female figures who are involved in sexual acts: the maid in Ein 
Landarzt and Rotpeter's chimpanzee bedmate in Ein Bericht fiir eine 
Akademie. What does emerge as being of relevance to both author and 
would-be husband is the concern with Beruf and the search for a 
valid rr~dus vivendi, including the possibility of discovering the 
latter in fathering children, a possibility which is very significantly 
rejected in the fiction, but certainly not for sexual reasons. 
As indicated earlier, another major factor of potential import-
ance to the Landarzt collection was the First World War, during which 
the whole work was composed. In the opinion of Gray ( 1973), this 
event and its aftermath were of almost no significance to Kafka because, 
in his diaries, there are no references "to the fighting (except for 
a frank confession that he passionately wishes every kind of evil 
to those engaged in it), to the conditions on the home front, which 
must at times have been extremely difficult, or to the revolutions 
which flared up in Berlin, Munich, Budapest after the Armistice, or 
to the inflation which followed. The misery is all within his mind, 
and is almost always concerned wii:h the spiralling of his own self-
criticism, or with violent self-reproach over trifles" (op.cit.:34). 
Nothing could be farther from the truth than this statement and its 
implications. Quite apart from the references in the diaries overlooked 
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by Gray (e.g. Tb 418,4J9,420,420f.,437,456), Kafka' s letter to his 
publisher about In der Strafk.oZonie (Br 150), the composition of 
Der KilheZreiter (1916/17) and, above all, the author's conversations 
with Janouch (Gk 139,173,175,178,228f.) provide overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary, even if it is true that, in his published statements, 
he was more concerned with analysing the broader implications of the 
war than with recording the details of battles, uprisings, and so on. 
Two comments, in particular, are of extreme relevance to the present 
collection. The first occurs in a conversation with Janouch about 
a meeting of a Marxist students' league. There Kafka says: 
"Der Krieg, die Revolution in RuBland und das Elend der ganzen Welt 
erscheinen mir wie eine Flut des Bosen. Es ist eine t.lberschwennnung. 
Der Krieg hat die Schleusen des Chaos geoffnet. Die auBeren 
Hilfskonstruktionen der menschlichen Existenz brechen zusarnrnen. 
Das geschichtliche Geschehen wird nicht mehr vom einzelnen, sondern 
nur noch von den Massen getragen. Wir werden gestoBen, gedr1ingt, 
hinweggefegt. Wir erleiden die Geschichte" (Gk 173) . In the second, 
Kafka reacts to some reproductions of war paintings by main'taining:' 
"Der Krieg wurde eigentlich noch nie richtig dargestell t ( ... ) . 
Gewohnlich werden nur Teilerscheinungen oder Ergebnisse - wie diese 
Schadelpyramide - gezeigt. Das Schreckliche des Krieges ist aber 
die Auflosung aller bestehenden Sicherheiten und Konventionen. Das 
animalisch Physische liberwuchert und erstickt alles Geistige. Es ist 
wie eine Krebskrankheit. Der Mensch lebt nicht rnehr Jahre, Monate, 
Tage, Stunden, sondern nur noch Augenblicke. Und selbst die lebt er 
nicht mehr. Er wird sich ihrer nur noch bewuBt. Er existiert blo.B" 
(Gk 175). Viewed in this light and from the standpoint of Kafka's 
notions about the Law, the Landarzt collection, far from ignoring 
the First World War, becomes one of its most penetrating and important 
fictional representations. 
: I 
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NOTES 
1. Scholarship and the Collection 
1. (p.3) Although Neumann does not discuss Vor dem Gesetz or 
Ein Traum, since they were not composed during the period 
with which he is concerned, his study is nevertheless 
included here because its synopsis refers to the collection 
as a whole. 
2. (p.4) Had it not been for his omission of Auf der Galerie, 
Konig (1954) might also have been included in this group, 
although his study has the added disadvantage of examining 
the collection's remaining pieces out of sequence, using 
them, instead, to illustrate various alleged structural-
thematic principles of Kafka's fiction, especially 
"Inkongruenz zur Welt" (op .cit.: I 20ff., 144ff., 154ff .) , 
Emrich (1958), Sokel (1964) and Binder (1966), too, 
entirely ignore the issues of sequence and collective unity, 
although the first comments on ten of the collection's texts, 
the second on seven - four of them (Ein Landarzt, Vor dem 
Gesetz, Ein Traum, Ein Bericht fU1• eine Akademie) in consid-
erable detail - and the last on twelve, including seven 
at some length. 
2. Issues in Kafka Interpretation 
1. (p.11) s. Honig, 1959:15 et passim; Fletcher, 1964:322; 
Frye, 1965:14; Clifford, 1974:11 et passim; Quilligan, 1979: 
22. 
2. (p.17) cf. Bf 700; Br 401; Ck 223f.; Wagenbach, 1958; 1964; 
Politzer, 1965a: esp. 53ff.,151ff.; Beicken, 1974:175ff.; 
Beicken, 1979a:799ff.; Binder, 1979a; Binder, 1979b:56ff. 
3. (p.21) e.g. Binder, 1966; 1975; 1976; Bridgwater, 1974. 
4. (p.21) This approach is adopted in some parts or the whole 
of all the following: K. Flores, 1955; Pasley, 1964; 1965;.-
1971; Sokel, 1966; Fingerhut, 1969; Thorlby, 1972; Denuner, 1973; 
Gray, 1973; Corngold, 1976; 1976a; 197:7; Mitchell, 1974; 
Krusche, 197Lf; Binder, 1976; Sussman, 1977; Walther, 1977; 
Blunden, 1980. 
5. (p.34) s.a. Pascal, 1982:136ff. 
6. (p.37) As the discussion of Einsinnigkeit and Paradoxie 
will show, Die Baume (Se 19) satisfies all the requirements 
but one: it is not essentially narrative. 
7. (p.38) s. Allemann, 1963a; Arntzen 1963;.Hasselblatt, 1964; 
Flilleborn, 1969; Philippi, 1969; Strohschneider-Kohrs, 197); 
Kerkhoff, 19 72; Binder, 19"'5; 19 79b. 
i' 
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8. (p.46) s. Hillmann, 1964:128,137; Sokel, 1964:21,130f.; 
1966:9,13; J967:169ff.; Binder, 1966:188ff., 301£.,330£.; 
1979b:6lff.; Henel, 1967:265; Fi.illeborn, 1969:289. 
9. tp. 64) To these studies must now be added Pascal's post-
humous, comprehensive analysis (1982), which also argues 
strongly against the view that Kafka 1 s novels and some of 
his stories lack a narrato~ial presence (e.g. op.cit.:26). 
However, although its objections to orthodox Einsinnigkeit~ 
like its observations about the development in Kafka's' 
narrative technique, are basically sound, and its commentaries 
on some individual texts pr9vide many valuable insights, the 
analysis still has some serious weaknesses. Apart from 
ignoring many important contributions to the debate about 
Einsinnigkeit, including Kobs (1970), Beicken (1971) and H. 
Kraft (1972), it also fails to elaborate an adequate theory 
of narration, so that it draws no distinction between 
narrative and non-narrative texts, its notion of the narrator 
is limited and sometimes confused (e.g. p.2ff. 'personal' 
and 'impersonal', yet 'non-personal' and a 'function'), 
while it disregards the crucial factor of indirect commentary 
almost entirely. Furthermore, despite the fact that it 
correctly explains the nature of the parable (p.138f.), it 
still insists on applying the term to works which manifestly 
do not conform to the essential criteria it has already defined. 
10. (p.67) e.g. Friedemann, 1910:26; Petsch, 1934:lllff.; 
Stanzel, 1955:4f.; Kayser, 1956:236; Seidler, 1959:479; 
Booth, 1961:149ff. 
11. (p.70) Although the use of the first-person will always 
imply personalisation to some extent, it is also possible 
for a narrator who never uses 'I' or 'we' to personalise 
himself indirectly through his style and subject matter. 
This is the case, for example, in Ein Brude::tmord~ and Pascal 
(1982:105ff.) argues that the same is true of E~n HungerkUnstler. 
12. (p.77) Booth's equivalent (op.cit.:160) is 'privileged',· 
which he restricts to the cognitive dimension and wrongly 
opposes to 'limited', since privilege, itself, can be limited. 
Furthermore, as Booth acknowledges (op.cit.:160ff.), 'inside 
views' and 'omniscience' are really aspects of intellectual 
privilege or advantage, although they will generally also 
have emotional and moral dimensions as well. 
13. (p.77) These two terms, not being limited to the emotional 
and/or moral, also encompass what Booth (op.cit.:153f.) 
calls 'narrator-agents' and 'observers', who are simply 
physically involved or distanced, to varying degrees. 
14. (p.77) Booth's equivalent is 'self-conscious' (op.cit.: 
155). But since that term also has the negative connotation 
: of 'embarrassed, shy', 'self-aware' seems preferable. 
15. (p.77) Booth's separate category called ''variations in 
support or correction" (op.cit.: 159£ .) is merely an aspect 
of the ways in which narrative reliability or unreliability 
may be established. 
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16. (p. 83) On 1 erlebte Rede', see Kayser, 1948: I 46£.; Seidler, 
1959:498£.; Stanzel, 1959:7; Leopold, 1960:27; 'Binder, 1966: 
201-231. On 'narrated monologue', see Cohn, 1966; Chatman, 
1978:203. Adapting the French 'style indirect libre', 
Pascal (1977;1982) uses the term 'free indirect speech'. 
17. (p.84) Pascal (1982:23f .) interprets both of these last two 
examples as 'free indirect speech'. However "kurz mit aller 
Bestimmtheit" modifies the verbal expression "entschloB er 
sich" (Se 29) which, in Binder's terminology, is a 'Gedanken-
referat1 (Binder, 1966:235ff.) and derives from the narrator. 
The second example, it is true, could be construed as 
narrated monologue, but to do so would be to make nonsense 
of the immediately preceding, firm resolution by Georg, as 
well as his subsequent attitudes and actions. 
18. (p.85) Bezzel (1975:153) dates this letter as 4th July, 1920. 
Despite Kafka's promise, however, he seems not to have sent 
the letter, for on or about 7th August of the same year (cf. 
Bezzel, 1975: 159), he wrote to Milena: "ja du kennst den 
Vaterbrief nicht" (Em I 74). 
19. (p. 88) Cohn (I 9 66: I I 2) also refers to a profound ambiguity 
in the use of narrated monologue, and Pascal (1982:22,25) 
makes much the same point. 
20. (p.90) s.a. Kassel, 1969:144; Pascal, 1982:14£. 
21. (p.91) e.g. Martini, 1954:319£.; Leopold, 1959; Walser, 
1961:125£.; Hasselblatt, 1964:59,7lff.; Cohn, 1968; Ramm, 
1971:47££.; Krusche, 1974:119; Beicken, 1978:223. 
22. (p.98) Die Baume is dated by Pasley/Wagenbach (1965:81) 
as 1904/05. The work occurs, however, in Fassung A of BkII 
in the context of the fat man's account of his confrontation 
with the prayerful man. This forms a smaller framework, as 
it were, around the prayerful man's story (II 3c, Geschichte 
des Beters). That is to say, Die Baume occurs in precisely 
the same context as the story, repeated in Kafka's letter to 
Max Brod of 28.8.1904 (Br, 28ff.), about the answer from the 
woman in the garden. This story is first told by the prayer-
ful man in Fassung A, BkII 90, that is, in subsection II 3b, 
Begonnenes Gesprach mit dem Beter3 where it is also taken up 
again at the end of the subsection (BkII 94/96). It does not 
then recur until immediately after Die BO:ume in subsection 
II 3d, Fortgesetztes Gesprach zwischen dem Dicken und dem 
Beter (BkII 122), where it marks a significant change in the 
fat man's attitude. The most important point, however, is 
that the form of this anecdote about the woman's reply, as 
told in Fassung A, comes closest to that repeated in the 
letter to Brod, and this would seem to indicate that the letter 
and this section of Fassung A are of the same period, namely, 
autumn, 1904. Thus Die Baume, the published version of which 
is much closer to Fassung A than Fassung B, in all probability 
derives from the same period: autumn, 1904. 
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3. Towards a Rhetoric of the Collection 
1. (p.116) This fact provides another possible reason for 
Kafka's final exclusion of Der KUbeZreiter from the 
collection, since it has an entirely different structure, 
one frequently employed by Kafka in his earlier works, 
namely, the resolution of an impossibly difficult situation 
through a flight.of fancy cf. Kinder auf der Landstraf3e 
(Se 7 ff . ) , Der Aus fZug ins Gebirge (Se 12) , et c, 
2. (p.119) Although, despite marked differences in narratorial 
distance, Vor dem Gesetz and Ein Traum distinctly conform 
to the earlier formulated criteria· of the reflector technique, 
Auf der GaZerie and Eine kaiserliche ·'Bo.tschaft do so only by 
implication, in that the actual details of the realities they 
present are not explicitly attributed to the awareness of 
the central character in either work. Nevertheless, from 
the final reaction of both the characters in question, it 
must clearly be inferred that ideas at least very similar to 
those expressed by the expositor or narrator actually-have 
been passing through the minds of these characters at the 
time of exposition or narration, and this provides sufficient 
justification for placing both of these works in the same 
category as the other two. 
3. (p.128) Since the entire content of E-in Bruderrnord consists 
of allegedly proven facts, its obvious inside views of all 
the main characters cannot be regarded as advantaged 
knowledge and are, therefore, excluded from this discussion. 
4. (p.133) In his most recent article on Kafka, Emrich (1978) 
gives evidence of having changed his mind about this matter, 
since he remarks: "Schnee, Eiseskalte, Wliste sind bekanntlich 
auch in_anderen Dichtungen Kafkas, wie im SchloB oder im 
Landarzt,, Sinnbilder filr den Frost unseres unglu.ckseligsten 
Zeitalters" (op.cit.:119£.). s.a. Steiner's analysis (1978) 
of Amerika in terms of symbol and contained in the same 
volume (Caputo-Mayr, 1978:46-58). 
4. Ein Landarzt. Kleine ErzahZungen: An Interpretation 
Der neue Advokat 
1. (p.138) Although there are literally hundreds of commentaries 
on the Landarzt pieces as separate, individual works and as 
many as possible of such analyses have been consulted in the 
composition of this study, no comprehensive attempt will be 
made to review them in the following interpretations or 
these notes, because (a) the repeatedly stated, overriding 
concern of this study is with the collection as a whole, and 
all the commentaries pertinent to that concern have been 
examined in Chapter l; (b) the differences between other 
interpretations and those presented here are ultimately due. 
to fundamental questions of method, a topic which has been 
treated at considerable length in Chapters 2 and 3; and (c) 
detailed surveys of other analyses are readily available in 
I 11 
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Beicken(l974), A. Flores (1976) and the relevant sections of 
Binder (1979/II). Consequently, about Der n.eue Advokat, 
for example, let it suffice to say that, apart from the 
scholars discussed in Chapter 1, very few others have 
concerned themselves in any detail with this particular text, 
but that Binder (1966:esp 50ff.), Fingerhut (1969:100f.), 
Krusche (1974:97f.) and Spann (1976:120££.) should be added 
to the list in A. Flores (1976:176). The most extensive 
commentary is that by Binder, and the most useful are those 
by H. Richter (1962:128-136), Fingerhut (1969:100f.) and 
Krusche (1974:97f .) • 
2. (p.139) In theory, the old Greek cities of the motherland 
were not subjects of the Macedonian king, but sovereign states, 
which assembled at Corinth as members of a great alliance, 
in which the Macedonian king was included as a member and 
held the office of captain-general. But, in fact, the power 
of this king was so vastly superior that the Greek cities were 
as much subject to his dictation as was the rest of the empire. 
Alexander was thus an absolute ruler well before he adopted 
the more despotic style of oriental kings. Later he was also 
accorded divine honours, even by the Greeks, who at this 
period regarded such honours as more an elaborate form of 
flattery than as an acknowledgement of supernatural being or 
powers (s. Kitto, 1951:154ff.; Green, 1974). This distinction 
between the transcendent Absolute and its human representative 
is of considerable importance in Kafka' s total world-view, as 
the rest of the Landarzt pieces will show. 
3. (p. 139) The specific resemb 1 ances mentioned in the text 
are (a) the ability to murder; (b) the adroit technique of 
stabbing one's friend across the banquet-table; and (c) the 
feeling among many Macedonians that their country is too 
constricting, so that they curse Philip II, Alexander's father. 
Of these, the second is probably a punning reference to 
Alexander's murder of his old friend, Clitus, at Macaranda 
(now Samarkand)in 328 B.C., when both were drunk. The third 
is discussed below. 
4. (p.139) In 1910 (Tb 31f.), Kafka read Taten des gro/3en 
AZ.exander, a work by the Russian poet and novelist Michail 
Kusmin (1875-1936). While examining the possible influence of 
this book on Der neue Advokat, Binder (1966;50ff.) gives 
the following interpretation of the word 'heute' in the text: 
"Dieses 'heute' kann nach.dem Textzusammenhang nur die 
Regentschaft Philipps, des Vaters, meinen, der also nach 
dieser Version den Sohn iiberlebt ( ... ), wahrend bei Kusmin 
bezeichnenderweise Alexander vor seinem Feldzug seinen wirk-
lichen Vater, Nektaneb, totet, ( ... ) . Schon .gleich nach 
Alexanders Tod konnte niemand mehr nach Indien fiihren, 
d.h. wenn wir an die (i.e. KafkasJ Lebenszeugnisse und 
Aphorismen denken, ein menschliches Leben erreichen. Es 
lebt also das SchlachtroB, das einst im Kampf voranstiirmte, 
ein Ersatzleben, wird Jurist, wie Kafka. Gleichzeitig, meint 
das 'heute' natiirlich auch die Gegenwart des Lesers - man wird 
es bei unreflektierter Lektlire nur so verstehen, vor allem 
weil im Prasens erzlihlt wird ( ... )" (op.cit.:51; s.a. Binder, 
1975:204££.). 
:1 ,/ 
I '1 I; : I 
·; :· 
'I 
1! 
I 
., 
237. 
There is, however, no justifi~ation at all for such a view. 
In response to it, the following points might be made: 
(a) If the 1 heute' can only refer to the regency of Philip, 
then it cannot simul·ta:neously refer ~o the present of the 
reader. 
(b) Although Philip II, Alexander's real father, was regent 
of Macedonia for several months after his brother's death, 
he soon assumed the title and off ice of king and held them 
till his death. When his regency ended (359B.C.), Alexander 
(born 356 B.C.) was not even alive, let alone dead. 
(c) Philip, who was murdered when Alexander was twenty years 
old, raised his country from a wild, primitive, barely united 
land to the leadership of the Greek world· before his death 
(Kitto, 1951:154ff.). Thus he initiated that expansionist 
movement that culminated in the vast conquests of his son. 
When, therefore, it is said in Der neue Advokat: "vielen ist 
Mazedonien zu eng, so daB sie Philipp, den Vater verfluchen" 
(Se 123), this does not require that Philip should have out-
}ived Alexander. On the contrary, those who curse Philip 
today do so because he is the real origin of their now 
frustrated desire for space, their present feeling of 
constriction (cf. Green, 1974:44). 
(d) Bucephalus died on the banks of the Hydaspes in 326B.C., 
that is, three years before Alexander's death in Bablyon. 
And even if, in Kusmin's fanciful version, the battlecharger 
is made to outlive Alexander (though Binder does not say so), 
it can hardly have been as a lawyer. The very references to 
his admission to the bar, a 'Gerichtsdiener' and a 'Starnmgast 
der Wettrennen' are surely sufficient to make it obvious that 
the 'heute' in question does not refer to the period immed-
iately after Alexander's death, however 'unreflektie~t' 
such a reading may be. 
5. (p. 139) In apparent support of the abovementioned interpre-
tation, Binder (loc.cit.) also makes the point that, in Kusmin's 
work an<l in historical fact, Alexander reached India, whereas 
in Kafka 1 s version he is said not to have done so. But, 
again, chis is a distortion of the text. Kafka's expositor 
simply maintains thatAlexander did not reach "Indiens Tore" 
(Se 123). What exactly he means by this expression is not 
unequivocally clear. However, it may be that he is referring 
to India's larger seaports, in which case his statement is 
perfectly accurate. For Alexander saw remarkably little of 
India, penetrating no farther east than the Hyphasis (now 
Sutlej) River, at which point his troops adamantly refused to 
march on, so that, after three days of their stubborn opposi-
tion, Alexander very reluctantly agreed to return home. This 
he did by marching overland, after moving down to Patala, at 
the mouth of the Indus (cf. Green, 1974). 
Ein Landa.rzt 
1. (p.141) With the exception of Vor d.em Gesetz~ this work has 
attracted more critical attention than any other piece in 
the collection, many of such commentaries being unequivocally 
Freudian in nature or allowing an allegorical psychoanalytical' 
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dimension, e.g. Neider (1948); Lawson (1957); Busacca (1958); 
Leiter (1958); Salinger (1961); Marson/Leopold (1964); 
Sokel (1964); Kurz (1967)i; Tiefenbrun (1973). A detailed 
review of the secondary licerature, together with another 
interpretation (in terms of Kobs' alleged 'paradoxical 
circle'), are provided by Beicken (1974:293ff.), whil'e a , 
list of further studies is to be found in A. Flores (1976: 
156ff.), to which Spann (1976:120ff.) and the other, more 
recent analyses mentioned in Chapter 1 should be added. 
This interpretation will take issue principally with one of 
the most detailed, psychoanalytical commentaries, that by 
Sokel (1964:251-281). 
2. (p .141) Throughout the story there is a constant, often 
grotesque play on the double associations of heilen and 
retten and their substantival or adjectival forms. 
3. (p.142) This statement calls to mind many another character 
in Kafka's work who uses his occupation or profession as an 
excuse for evading personal responsibility or as a protective, 
but hollow end in itself, e.g. Josef K. and almost all the 
court officials in Der ProzeB~ the shoemaker in Ein altes 
Blatt. 
4. (p.143) In this respect, the present interpretation differs 
radically from Sokel's (1964), which construes the doctor as 
arrogant, cold and self-centred, and his 'tragic' situation 
as arising from the refusal of his fellow citizens to lend 
him a horse (op.cit.:276ff.). Among other things, this over-
looks the doctor's need to borrow a horse in the first place. 
5. (p.143) It is not improbable that this motif and that of the 
boy's wound were suggested by Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas, in 
which the 'Rappen' are kept in a pigsty at the Tronkenburg 
and one of Kohlhaas's servants suffers from the Rose, erysi-
pelas. That Kafka was very familiar with and fond of Kleist 1 s 
Novelle is attested by his diaries (1~ 341,705f.), his letters 
(Bf 291f.; Br 96,104,358) and his conversations with Janouch 
(Gk 220). s.a. Wagenbach, 1958:202. 
6. (p.145) Sokel (op.cit.:276) sees this refusal as yet another 
example of the doctor's scorn for his fellow citizens. In 
part, this one-sided view may be attributed to the fact that 
Sokel twice sub.stitutes "Dunstkreis 11 for the text's "Denkkreis" 
in his analysis (ibid.:273 t.3, 276 ~.4). 
7. (p.146) Sokel ( loc.cit.) also regards the whole scene, with 
the horses at the window, as reminiscent of Christ's birth, 
and the sister's bloody handkerchief as suggesting St. 
Veronica's 'SchweiBtuch' ! 
8. (p .147) cf. description of horses (Se 124, 125) with .the pigsty 
from which they appear and the actions of the groom. The 
admixture of the beautiful and the repulsive in the nature 
of the worms is revealed by the very description of them (Se 
127) , and is further underlined by references to them in 
terms of "Blume" (Se 127) and "schon" (Se 128). 
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9. (p.151) Sokel (op.cit.:276f.) sees the use of the word 
'Gesindel' simply as the doctor's attempt to blame the 
people for his 'tragic' situation, as if there were not guilt 
or default on both sides and trageqy did not require a 
certain personal 'magnitude' or grandeur d'&me singularly 
lacking in Kafka's characters. 
Auf der Ga'lerie 
1. (p .153) Beicken ( 197 4: 302-306) has reviewed much of the 
literature on this work, and further titles are mentioned in 
A. Flores (1976:185) as well as Chapter 1 of this study. 
To these should be added Binder (1966: 193ff.), Krusche (1974: 
28) and Spann (1976:120ff.). The most useful commentaries 
are those by Emrich (1958:35ff.), Philippi (1966:52-57) and 
H. Kraft (1972:49f.). 
2. (p.155) The same motif_ occurs in a letter from Kafka to 
Grete Bloch on 14th November, 1914, where it is also associated 
with a contrast between youth and implied maturity or middle 
age: "Sie spilren kein Nachlassen der Krafte, so dilrfen Sie das 
nicht ausdrilcken, es gibt eben eine Mildigkeit der Jugend, 
die das Alter zum Ersatz alles sonstigen nicht mehr kennt. 
Es ist kein Nachlassen der Krafte, wenn man oben in der ,Gallerie 
(sic) der Oper weint, glauben Sie das nicht" (Bf 502) . 
3. (p.157) cf. Aphorism 54 of 8th December, 1917: "Es gibt 
nichts anderes als eine geistigc Welt; was wir sinnliche 
Welt nennen ist das Bose in der geistigen, und was wir bose 
nennen~ ist nur eine Notwendigkeit eines Augenblicks unserer 
ewigen Bnl-wicklung" (Hv 44,91). 
4. (p.157) cf. Aphorism 55 of 8th December, 1917: "Alles ist 
Betrug: das MindestmaB der Tauschungen suchen, im ilblichen 
bleiben,das HochstmaB suchen. Im ersten Fall betrligt man 
das Gute, indem man sich <lessen Erwerbung zu leicht machen 
will, das Bose, indem man ihm allzuglinstige Kampfbedingungen 
setzt. Im zweiten Fall betrligt man das Gute, indem man also 
nicht einmal im Irdischen nach ihm strebt. Im dritten Fall 
betrilgt man das Gute, indem man sich moglichst weit von ihm 
entfernt, das Bose, indem man hofft, durch seine Hochststeiger-
ung es machtlos zu machen. Vorzuziehen ware also hiernach 
der zweite Fall, denn das Gute betrligt man immer, das Bose 
in diesem Fall, wenigstens dem Anschein nach, nicht" (Hv 45, 
91£.). 
5. (p.157) The term 'reduction' is used here in its normal sense 
and not that attributed to it by Ramm ( 1971) , namely,-
'retraction; reversion; revocation', something very akin to 
Walser's 'Aufhebung' (1961). What this study has in mind is 
closer to what Hasselblatt (1964:71££.) calls 'destruktive 
Entwicklung' or what Kafka expressed in the following aphorism 
of lst Febru·ary, 1918: "Zwei Aufgaben des Lebensanfangs: 
Deinen Kreis immer mehr einschrlinken und immer wieder nach-
prilfen, ob du dich nicht irgendwo auBerhalb deines Kreises 
versteckt haltst" (llv 51, 107). 
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Ein altes Blatt 
1. (p.158) Of the nine commentaries listed in A. Flores (1976: 
176) and those discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, the 
most detailed are those by M. & E. Metzger (1966) and W. 
Kraft (1968:41-47). However, the most penetrating remains 
that by Emrich (1958:196££.), which Flores fails to mention 
at all. Similarly lacking from his list is the analysis by 
Fingerhut (1969:148f.), who interprets the work as "eine 
verschlilsselte Darstellung der Wechselbeziehung von Kunst 
und Leben" (op.cit.:149). 
2. (p.158) Motifs such as the nomads (BkI 68 £.5), the people 
from the north (BkI 74 §2) and the Emperor obviously create 
strong ties between this work and Beim Bau der chinesischen 
Mauer, from which it is separated by only seven printed lines 
in the manuscript of the so-called sixth octavo notebook 
(s. Binder, 1975:221£.). 
3. (p.161) In the Christian tradition, to which the Austro-
Hungarian empire of Kafka's day belonged, the link between 
temporal and spiritual authority had been established since 
the conversion of Constantine in 312. In other traditions; 
such as the ancient Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Chinese and 
Japanese, the link had, at times,been even stronger, the 
temporal. leader being regarded as an actual deity. 
4. (p.162) According to Pasley (1971:204,n.18), the manuscript 
of this- piece bears the title Ein altes Blatt aus China. 
Although the last two words were probably omitted by 
Kafka in order to broaden the work's implications and to 
associate the latter more closely with his own era, they do 
not make the title any the less arbitrary or banal. They do, 
however, lend added weight to the interpretation this study 
places on the figure of the Emperor. 
Vor dem Gesetz 
1. (p.162) The number of commentaries on this work exceeds 
even that on Der Proze2 (cf. A. Flores, 1976:178-185). 
Beicken ( 1974: 273-286, esp. 279ff.) has reviewed a great many 
of them, but with an unjustified bias towards the views of 
Kobs (1970:esp. 524ff.), an attitude also strongly evident in 
the more recent survey and interpretation by Elm (1979). 
Among the more important analyses mentioned by neither Flores 
nor Elm are those by Binder (1966:199f .) , Gray (1976:esp.175f£.), 
Sheppard (1977), Steffan (1979), Sokel (1980) and Pascal (1982: 
145-153). From the viewpoint of this study, the most valuable 
comrnentaries are those by Sokel ( 19 67) , Kuds zus ( 1970) , Gray 
(1976) and, especially, Heller (1974:84ff.), Stern (1976) 
and Sheppard (1977). 
2. (p.163) Although Stern (1976) quite rightly .insists on the 
immediate, socio-historical dimensions of the term 'law' 
in Kafka's works, and this study attempts not to neglect them, 
it is nevertheless clear from the unaging quality of the 
doorkeeper and the entire circumstances of Vor dem Gesetz 
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(a door to the Law, etc.) that here Kafka's primary concern 
is with the term in its ultimate,' transcendent sense (cf. 
Pascal, 1982: 149). 
3. (p.164) Others who essentially support this view include 
Pongs (1960:30ff.), Binder (1966:199f.), Thorlby (1972:67f.), 
Krusche (1974:4lf .) , Gaier (1974), Kuna (1974: 132ff .) , 
Rolleston (1974; l976b), Corngold (1976), Sussman (1977:48ff.), 
Goodden (1977) and Steffan (1979: especially 144f). 
4. (p.164) Similar conclusions have been reached by many 
interpreters, including' Emrich ( 1958: 269) , Allemann ( 1963), 
Sokel (1964:199ff.), Henel'(l963; 1967), Politzer (1965:258), 
Baumer (1965:90f.), M. Greenberg (1968:140ff.), Beutner (1973: 
212f.), Neumann (1975) and Sokel (1976a;1980). s.a. Beicken, 
19 7 4: I 7 6ff. 
5. (p.165) Sokel (1967:273), Kudszus (1970:312£.), Krusche (1974: 
20) and Pascal (1982:150) all acknowledge a distanced, 
impersonalised or 'authorial' narrator in the work, but none 
of them notes the significance of his unobtrusive commentary 
and its advantaged knowledge. 
6. (p.166) cf. Rosteutscher (1974:362): ''Der Tilrhliter ist der 
Verhinderer, <lessen Werk in unserer Zeit gerade den Suchenden 
verhindert, die Wahrheit im absoluten Sinne, d.h. als 
gottliche Lehre, zu sehen". 
Schakale und Araber 
1. (p.172) Of the commentaries discussed in Chapter 1, Flores 
lists only Tauber (1941) and H. Richter (1962). He also 
omits Emrich (1958:139£.), Weinberg (1963:46), Tornberg (1964: 
9), Binder (1966:330ff.) and Fingerhut (1969:149f .) . · 
Apart from Binder, who concerns himself exclusively with the 
work's narrative point of view, Emrich is the only one of 
these scholars not to allegorise the work in some way. 
According to him, the jackals are the expression of a self-
contradiction in man which can be overcome only through death, 
but a death, "der Selbsterkenntnis, 'ein verstandiges Tun', 
bedeutet und daher nicht mit dem leiblichen Tod identifiziert 
werden kann, sondern die tib.erwindung der empirisch beengenden 
Grenzen, den Sprung in eine universelle Existenz meint" (op. 
cit.: 139). In addition to Tauber and H. Richter, other, 
sometimes tentatively allegorical interpreters of this piece 
among the scholars mentioned in Chapter 1 include Flach 
(1967:137£.), Gray (1973:134f.) and Neumann (1979:327ff.). 
2. (p.172) In this context, it is interesting to note that in 
Grimm's entry on Schakal, he quotes two verse extracts 
from Grillparzer and Heine in which precisely the same 
equation occurs. Religious allegoresis of a different persu-
asion is to be found in Tauber (1941:71) and Weinberg (1963: 
46). 
3. (p.172) The other forms of allegoresis include politico-
ideological interpretations (H. Richter, 1962: 144f.; 
Tombcrgj 1964:9; Flach, 1967:137f.) and biographical 
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reductions (Sokel, 1967; Fingerhut, 1969;149f.; Neumann, 
1979:327ff.). In the latter, much is made of Kafka's 
remark to Milena, years later, that he was "endlos schmutzig, 
darum mache·ich ein solches Geschrei mit der Reinheit" 
(Bm 208) and the links he draws between 'Schmutz', sexual 
intercourse and impediments to love'(Bm 149,181£.). 
Ein Besuch im Bergwerk 
1. (p.173) Apart from Pasley (1965) and the scholars mentioned 
in Chapter 1, it would appear that only two others have publish-
ed commentaries on this text: W. Kraft (1968:47-49) and H. 
Kraft (1972:71). The latter regards the theme of the work as 
"die Gegens~tze zwischen den Klassen der Gesellschaft" (loc. cit.), 
with the Kanzleidiener causing the hierarchic order of socie.ty 
to become "verfremdet, auff1Hlig" (loc.cit.). The former, 
however, construes the piece as a comment on levels of know-
ledge: "Dern vom Nichtwissen begrenzten Wissen des Wissenden 
entpsricht das vom Wissen begrenzte Nichtwissen des Betrachters. 
Dieser erkennt, daB der Diener ohne Wissen ist, und erkennt 
auch, daB die Macht des Wissens ihn erhebt. ( .•. ) Die 
dialektische Bewegung des Betrachters ist Unwissenheit, Wissen, 
Begrenzung des Wissens. Die dialektische Bewegung der 
Wissenden ist Wissen, Nichtwissen und statt Weisheit: 
Autoritat" (op.cit. :49). Nevertheless, the dominant view 
remains Pasley's allegoresis (cf. Binder, 1975:212f.; 
Neumann, 1979:339f.). 
2. (p.173) H. Richter (1962:43) and Politzer (1962:94) wrongly 
talk about eleven eng~neers. 
Das nachste Dorf 
1. (p.182) In addition to the previously mentioned commentaries 
on this work, at least three others have been published. 
W. Kraft (1968:16f.) inte"rprets the work as dealing with two 
different kinds of time, the quantitative and the qualitative, 
the former denoting the long stretch of life, the latter the 
ride to the nearest village, "welcher gleichnishaft mit dem 
ganzen Leben identisch ist, <lessen MaB Menschen nicht haben 
( ... ). In dem Ritt ist beides gleich lang und die Kilrze der 
qualitativen mit der quantitativen Lange des Lebens identisch, 
und so lieBe sich, qualitativ betrachtet, vielleicht auch 
umgekehrt sagen, da3 auf jeder Stufe des Lebens der Mensch das 
ganze Leben vor sich babe" (loc.cit.). Schlingrnann (1968: 128-
131), on the other hand, regards the work as being both para-
doxical and parabolic, from which he concludes: "Das verfrem-
dende Licht, unter dem sich hier der Zeitbegriff auflost, 
weist auf etwas AuBerzeitliches. Es wird ahnbar, daB man 
sein Ziel eigentlich gar nicht mit Hilfe eines in der Zeit 
verlaufenden Weges erreichen kann. Das Ziel liegt jenseits 
der Zeit, und der GroBvater rnit seinern 'Mangel an Zeitsinn' 
scheint ihm schon nahe zu sein" (op.cit.:130). Philippi 
(1966:154) is discussed below. 
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2. (p.182) cf. Kafka's other corrunents on transience (e.g. 
Hv 115,116f.,125) and the effects of war on man's 
relationship to time (Gk 175). 
3. (p.182) About the grandfather's view of time, Philippi 
(1966) remarks: "In seiner 'Zeit' haben Leben und Handlungen 
kaum noch Raum, so sehr ist sie zusannnengeschrumpft. Anstatt 
Leben zu ermoglichen, scheint sie es zu verhindern" (op. ci t.: 
154). While this is perfectly reasonable, he then adds the 
unjustified footnote: "Das Erleben der Zeit als Korrelat der 
eigenen BewuBtseinswirklichkeit wird damit auf die Spitze 
getriebe~, denn wo die Zeit kein Handeln mehr erlaubt, weil 
sie da'Zu nicht ausreicht, ist sie selbst nicht mehr <lurch 
das eigene Tun erlebbar und meBbar. DaB der GroBvater 
dennoch 'GroBvater' werden konnte, zeigt, daB sich schlieB-
lich hier das BewuBtsein ad absurdum filhrt" (lac. cit .) . 
There are two main fallacies in this argument. First, the 
grandfather's comment does not present a vision of time that 
precludes all 'Handeln' ; it excludes only that which is asso-
ciated with resolution (sich entschlie/3en) and the pursuit of 
some goal, that is, all those actions which imply a definite 
distance between resolution and realisation. Second, even 
if one's view of time were such as to preclude the possibility 
of action, this would not necessarily prevent any further 
experience of time, for time is not only "<lurch das eigne 
Tun erlebbar und meBbar". The totally paralysed, for example, 
can simply be and yet experience and measure time through that 
which goes on about them. Since time is inseparable from 
consciousness, it must always be 'erlebbar und meBbar' among 
the conscious. It is the quality of the experience and 
measurement that will differ, as Thomas Mann's narrator makes 
plain in Der Zauberberg. 
Eine kaiserliche Botschaft 
1. (p.183) Except for Politzer (1962:86£) and H. Richter (1962: 
146-!48), A. Flores (1976:164) lists none of the studies 
mentioned in Chapter 1. He also omits important commentaries 
on thiE:' piece by E.Heller (1948:206ff.), Anders (1951 :7Jff.), 
Brinkmann (1961:53-57), Baumer (1965':119f.) and, of course, 
Pascal (1982:164-167). 
2. (p.183) The text in BkI differs from that in Se only in 
the following respectc: (a) three cases of punctuation (BkI 
78 H.4,7,21); (b) the position of 11noch" (BkI 78 H. 11-12); 
and (c) the omission of "ins Ohr" before "zugeflilstert" 
(BkI 7 8 L 29) . 
3. (p.185) Even here a vestige of hoping against hope remains 
and, with it, the implied wish that, in spite of the insuper-
able barriers, the message might still be delivered. As 
the speaker in Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer concludes, 
after telling the parable-legend: "Genau so, so hoffnungslos 
und hoffnungsvoll, sieht unser Volk den Kaiser" (BkI 78). 
cf. Pascal, 1982:166 on the implications of the verb 
'ertr[.iumen'. 
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Excursus: The Law 
1. (p.186) e.g. Tauber (1941:124), Anders (1951:82ff.), 
Zimmermann (1954:165ff .) , C. Greenberg (1958:57), 
Brinkmann (1961:57), Politzer (1962:86), Philippi (1966: 
221), Bridgwater (1974:10f.). P. Heller (1971) also links 
Kafka's world-view with Nietzsche's thought, but maintains 
that Kafka's "distrust of temporal spheres of awareness is 
a corollary - not to his denial, but to his total affirmation 
of the good, true, absolute - which Nietzsche considers to 
be arch-villains" (op.cit.:75). Osborne (1967) comes closer 
to the truth when he describes Eine kaiserZiche Botschaft 
as 1'the quietly desperate cry of an agnostic yearning for a 
faith his reason.will not allow him to accept" (op.cit. :45). 
However, probably the best available summary of Kafka's 
position is still that by E. Heller (1948:206; 1974:Il-3f.): 
"Thus he knows two things at once, and both with equal 
assurance: that there is no God, and that there must be 
God." 
2. (p.186) Anders' statements on this matter are actually 
rather confused. Earlier in his study he also calls Kafka 
an agnostic (op.cit.:48) and later a Marcionist (ibid.:87f.). 
His atheistic theory, however, is supported by Lukacs (1958: 
45) • 
3. (p.186) Although it is true that, in his more philosophical 
works, Nietzsche vehemently rejects the notion of a God, 
especially of the Judaeo-Christian variety, one has only to 
read his Dionysos-Dithyr01nben, especially the KZage rler 
Ariadne, which was composed after Die frohZiche Wissenschaft, 
to recognise the profound ambiguity in his position. 
4. (p .188) e.g. Ein Landa1~2t (Se 125) , Beim Bau rler 
chinesischen kauer (BkI 72j. 
5. (p.188) Emrich (1958:55f .) , opposing Brod (1948:235; 1954: 
182)~equates Kafka's notion of the Law with his ideas on 
'das Unzerstorbare' (cf. Hv44,47,89,90,96,96f.; Gk 167) and 
identifies both with Tillich' s concept of a "Gott liber Gott" 
(op.cit.:56), although Kafka could not possibly have been 
familiar with the latter's theology. Basing themselves on 
the cJ.csenes,s between Kafka' s aphorism: "Theoretisch gibt es 
eine vollkommene Glticksmaglichkeit: An das Unzerstorbare in 
sich glauben und nicht zu ihm streben" (Hv 47,96) and his 
remark to Brod in August, 1920: "Es gibt theoretisch eine 
vollkonunene irdische Gllicksmoglichkeit, namlich an das 
entscheidend Gottliche glauben und nicht zu ihm streben" (Br 
279f.), Foulkes (1967:50ff.) and Walther (1977:72ff.) also 
identify the 'Indestructible' with the Divine, the second 
explaining it in the neo-Platonist, Christian mystical sense 
of 'Got-theit' as opposed to 'Gott'. But what both fail to 
point out is that, in his letter, Kafka's statement is actually 
an attempt to paraphrase Brad's notion of paganism, a notion 
he explicitly rejects, so that there can be no question of 
equating 'das entscheidend Gottliche' with the 'Indestructible'. 
Others to deal with this cqncept in some detail are Reed (1965), 
who interprets it as synon~nous with Schopenhauer' s 1will to 
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live, and Kobs (1970:346ff.), who construes :it as an exist-
entially unifying principle realised only in the dream state, 
when man is 11bei sich und damit bei den Dingen, er ist 
recht eigentlich Ding an sich. Die geistige Welt des gelebten 
inneren Lebens und die Wirklichkeit der AuBendinge sind 
miteinander identisch" (op.cit.:348). 
Owing to the elusiveness of Kafka's thinking and the 
extreme generality of his few statements about this concept, 
it is doubtful whether its significance within his total 
world-view will ever be explained with complete precision. 
However, in the light of other works from the same period as 
the aphorisms, it is possible to suggest a more likely,though 
necessarily more general interpretation then those already 
mentioned. It is true, as Emrich indicates, that the term is 
evidently related to Kafka' s views on the L.aw, but the two 
cannot simply be equated. Rather, 'das Unzerstorbare' seems 
intended to signify an inborn, specifically human, largely 
intuitive and confused sense of lasting purpose and value, 
or at least of the need for them, in life. If this is true, 
then the concept also has associations with hope, which even 
in Kafka's world remains ultimately 'unzerstorbar', however 
'unsinnig' (Se 135). 
6. (p.188) In Beim Bauder chinesischen Mauer, the "oberste 
Flihrerschaft" assumes a similar significance (cf. BkI 72,74, 
75, and the effect of its leadership on the people: BkI 70, 
71). It would appear that Kafka also regarded Napoleon as 
such a leader (cf. Binder, 1974). 
7. (p.188) cf. the court in Der ProzeB, which provides the most 
detailed and complex of Kafka's statements on this topic. 
A further equivalent of the 'Kaisertum' is to be found in the 
'Adel' of the piece Zur Frage. der Gesetze (end Oct., 1920). 
This association may seem to be contradicted by the statement: 
"der Adel steht auBerhalb des Gesetzes ( ... ) " (BkI 90) . But it 
must be remembered that the law referred to here is nothing more 
than the will of the nobles as imposed on the ordinary people. 
It is not the Law as ultimate Absolute. And since the people 
cannot even penetrate the mystery of the.nobility, which is 
the "einzige, sichtbare, zweifellose Gesetz, das uns auferlegt 
ist ( ..• ) "(BkI 92), they are clearly in no position to go beyond 
it, so that the reader, dependent for information on a very 
limited, uncertain spokesman, is also prevented from estab-
lishing what the relationship between the nobility and the 
Law might be. 
8. (p.188) Although Emrich (1958) is one of the very few 
critics to draw attention to the distinction between the 
'Kaisertum' and the Emperor as mortal man (op.cit.:199f.), 
he misses this point and therefore arrives at the mistaken 
generalisation that, in Kafka' s view, "das Verbal tnis zwischen 
Menschheit und oberster Instanz seit jeher und zu allen 
Zeiten 'unklar' ist ( ... )" (op.cit.:202). FromDerneue 
Advokat it should be evident that this is not the case. In 
Emrich's defence, however, it must be acknowledged that the 
historical perspec tiv~ in Beim Bau der• chinesischen Mauer is 
by no means unclouded. On the contrary, the whole chronology 
of the work is quite confused. At the beginning, the reader 
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is told that the wall has been completed (BkI 67), though 
later (BkI 74) it would seem to be still going on. Similarly, 
the speaker says that he was 20 years old when the building 
began (BkI 69) and that the work was not to be accomplished 
1
'selbst in einem langen Menschenleben" (loc.cit.). Yet, 
the building evidently has been completed (s.a. BkI 75) and 
he is still very much alive. 
9. (p.189) cf. couriers in aphorism 47 (Hv 44,89). 
10. (p.189) s.a. Beim Bauder chinesischen Mauer and Zur Frage 
der Gesetze. 
11. (p.189) e.g. the countryfolk in Ein Landa.rzt.,the tradesmen 
and merchants in Ein aZtes Blatt:J the imperial subjects 
in Beim Bauder chinesischen Mauer {s.esp. EkJ 81). 
12. (p.189) That these two stories were intended to portray 
punishments is evident from Kafka's letters (Br 134). The 
sudden change in Herr Bendemann towards the end of Das Urteil 
is a less acceptable form of the same process. 
13. (p .189) s. Vor dem Gesetz., note 1 above. 
14. (p.191) Walther also doubts that Kafka had read any of the 
Middle Platonists (op.cit.:76), but it seems extremely un-
likely that in his strongly classical education he could 
possibly have failed to read at least some of one of the most 
prominent Middle Platonists, namely, Plutarch of Chaeronea. 
Furthermore, there is an extraordinary proximity between Kafka's 
repeated description of the creative artist's aim as raising 
15. 
the world "ins Reine. Wahre, Unver1inderliche" (Tb 534; Ck 84) 
and Plutarch's reference,jn his De Iside-et Osiride., to the 
divine realm as "the region of the pure, invisible, and 
changeless" (Copleston, 1946: 197). This proximity is not 
lessened by the fact that Griffiths (1970:243) translates 
the same passage as "the formless, invisible, dispassionate 
and holy kingdom", since he is using a modern, reconstructed 
Greek text unavailable not only to Coples ton, but cle.arly 
also to Kafka and his teachers. 
(p.194) cf. Emrich (1958:140), Fingerhut (1969) and Bridg-
water (1974:118). The mistake in all three of these studies 
is that they treat all of Kafka's animal figures as if their 
nature and purpose were, in each case, the same, whereas this 
study attempts to demonstrate that such a view is unjustified. 
16. (p.194) Fingerhut (1969:170£.) provides a convenient and 
accurate summary of the disagreement among Kafka scholars 
about the applicability of this term to Kafka's works. 
Die Sorge des Hausvaters 
1. (p .194) Al though Pasley' s previously mentioned allegores is 
of this work has been questioned or rejected by Politzer (1965: 
151), Kobs (1970:80), David (1971), Gray (J973:128f.) and 
Beicken (1974:146f.), it continues to dominate critical opinion 
and discussion. cf. Pasley (1971:198£.), Bansberg (1974), 
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Binder (1975:230ff.), Nicolai (.1975) and Neumann (1979). 
Important alternative interpretations are provided by 
Bense (1952:63-67), Emrich (1958:92-96; 1968:112-120), 
Polit;zer. (1962:96-98), H. Richter (1962:148£.), Philippi 
(1966:103££.), Kassel (1969:68-72) and E. Heller (1974:31£.). 
Among English-speaking scholars there has also arisen a 
disagreement about the meaning of the title. Gray (1973: 
128) insists that it should be translated as "A Worry to the 
Caretaker", and Pascal (1982:14,16,40) consistently refers 
to the wprk as "The Worry of a Caretaker". To interpret 
'Hausvater' as 'caretaker', however, is to miss the whole 
point of the work, especially its last paragraph. This study 
therefore agrees with the Muirs, Pasley (1971:198) and E. 
Heller (1974:3lf.) in construing 'Hausvater': in its familial 
sense. 
2. (p.194) 'Although this word is now archaic, its revived use 
is made necessary by the corruption of 1 fabulous 1 • 
3. 
1. 
I 
(p~l97) I Brod (1951/52:385), H. Richter (1962:149) and, 
above all, Backenkohler (1970) have offered alternative 
etymological explanations of the word, but none of them is 
as convincing as Emrich's, and they are all, in any cnse, 
entirely' compatible with his. 
(p.200) 1 Apart from the relevant studies mentioned in 
Chapters, .1 and 2, the only other. detailed commentary on , 
this work appears to be that by W. Kraft (1968:49-62), who 
concludes: "der Sinn des ·Ganz en ist versiegel t" (op. ci t ~: 
62) . 
2. (p.201) ! cf. Kafka' s own doubts about marriage (Tb 310££.; 
Bf; Hv 238), his letter to his sister Elli (Br 345f.), and 
his own undelivered letter to his father (Hv 162ff .) . 
3. (p.202) H. Richter (1962:149f .) makes very much the same 
point, but is wrong in suggesting that the eleventh son 
differs from all the others in being the only one who does 
not strive "sich in dieser oder jener Form mit der Gegenwart 
abzufinden und ihrenAnforderungen zu genligen" (op.cit.:150). 
Compare, for example, the third son: "Auch flihlt er sich 
fremd in unserer Zeit; als gehore er zwar zu meiner Familie, 
aber liberdies noch zu einer andern, ihm flir immer verlorenen, 
ist er oft unlustig und nichts kann ihn aufheitern" (Se 141). 
4. (p.203) cf. the discussion of AZZegorik above. 
Ein Brudermord 
1. (p.204) A. Flores (J976) has no entry on this work at all. 
Yet, apart from the eleven scholars mentioned in Chapter. 1, 
W. Kraft (1968:21-19) and H. Kraft (1972:70) have also 
published commentaries on it. By far the most useful study 
is that by H. Richter (1962:151-154). 
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2. (p. 204) cf. Politzer ( 1962) who calls the work ·"a melodrama 
among marionettes" (op. cit.: 94) . 
3. (p.205) In his autobiography, Brod surmises that Kafka 
adapted the name 1 Schmar' from Flaubert' s "Smarh, 'vieux 
mystere" (s. Binder, 1975:216), but it is difficult to 
see what light, if any, this sheds on the work. 
4. (p.206) Apart from H. Richter (loc.cit.), W. Kraft (1968: 
28) and Binder (1975:216) are the only scholars to have 
recognised this allusion. 
Ein Tiu.wn 
1. (p.210) The entry on this work in A. Flores (1976:159) is 
extremely deficient, omitting nine of the scholars mentioned 
in Chapter 1 as commentators on the work, namely, Tauber, 
H. Richter, Politzer, Osborne, Flach, Kauf, Gray, Hibberd 
and, understandably, Kittler. Among others, the same entry 
also omits the studies by Konig (1954: 11 If.), Emrich (1958:296£.) 
and Sokel ( 19 64: 282-286; 1977.: 335-338) • Al though Sokel makes 
some very useful comparisons between this work and Der ProzeE~ 
he still allegorises the piece as a veiled statement about 
Kafka's conception of his own art: 'Tiie Funktion der Kunst 
' ist es, nicht nur zu verewigen, sondern auch zu opfern. 
Sie verlangt das Opfer des Lebens" (Sokel, 1964:283; cf. 
1977;·338). But, if this were true, the headstone engraver 
should be the one committing suicide, not Josef K. From the 
viewpoint of this study, the most.valuable commentary is still 
Emrich's. 
2. (p.212) That Kafka, himself, had frequently contemplated 
suicide before the composition of this piece is well attested 
by his diaries (Tb 171f,266,272,275,317,336f.,360f.) and a 
letter to Brod (Br 107ff.). Foulkes (1967:21-25) discusses 
the matter in some detail. 
- 3. (p.214) cf. Kafka 1 s letter to Brod in mid-November, 1917, 
where he develops a very similar argument about his own 
failure to commit suicide (Br 195). 
Ein Bericht [Ur ei.ne Akaderrrie 
1. (p.215) In his own, extremely perceptive analysis of this 
work, Sokel ( 1964) remarks that it has been "mit Unrecht von 
der Kritik vernachlassigt" (op.cit.:345). However, as Beicken 
(1974:307-312) and Neumann (1975:178f.;l979:344f.) have shown, 
this is no longer the case, the latest detailed commentary 
being that by Pascal (1982:192-201). Nevertheless, most inter-
preters have allegorised the story in terms of Judaism 
(Brod, 1918:4f.; Rubinstein, 1952; Kauf, 1954; Beck, 1971: 
181-188; Gray, 1973:135f.), Kafka's life and writing (Binder, 
_l966:387ff.;-Fingerhut, 1969:143ff.; Hibberd, 1975:83; Neumann, 
1975; 1979:332ff.), philosophical or political ideology 
(Magny, 1942:89-92; Emrich, 1958:127-129; H. Richter, 1962: 
155-159; Bridgwater, 1974:127-131) and psychoanalysis (Kaiser, 
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1931; to some extent, Sokel, 1964:e.g. 330, 334; Binder, 
1979a:159). The most valuable studies are those by Sokel 
(1964:330-355), Philippi (1966:116-147) and Pascal (1982: 
192-201). 
2, (p.219) On this point, the present study agrees with Sokel's 
view (Sokel, 1964: 348) rather than Philippi v s heavy s tres,s 
on Rotpeter's essential humanity (Philippi, 1966:127f., 
137) . 
3. (p.220) Philippi (1966), overstressing the essential 
humanity of Rotpeter's nature, misses this point and thus 
construes the ape-man's reaction on this occasion,as well 
as his being in general, as comical (op.cit.:143f.). 
4. (p.221) In a diary entry of 18th October, 1916, Kafka quotes 
from one of his letters to Felice (Bf 728f£ .) , in which the 
sentence occurs : "Ich, der ich meistens unselbstandig war, 
habe ein unendliches Verlangen nach Selbstandigkeit, 
Unabhangigkeit, Freiheit nach allen Seiten" (Tb 514; Bf 729). 
Perhaps this explains one of his earliest statements about 
the purpose of his own writing: "Aber jeden Tag soll zumindest 
eine Zeile· gegei;i. mich gerichtet werden (.,.)" (Tb 12) • 
Binder (1975:228) and Spann (1976:125) are the only other 
scholars to have noted Kafka's self-quotation. On Kafka's 
real at_titude to freedom, s.a.Hv46,48,50,ll3,114,117£°.; 
BkI 279f.,280,286f. 
5. (p.222) Contrast Philippi, 1966:130ff., esp. footnotes 37 & 
55; s.a. Sokel, 1964:344,349. 
6. (p. 223) Although Pascal ( 1982: 199) agrees with this positive 
interpretation, most scholars do not, e.g. Tauber, 1941: 73; 
Emrich, 1958:129; Politzer, 1962:92; H. Richter, 1962:159; 
Osborne, 1967:47f.; Fingerhut, 1969:103ff.,143ff.; Kassel, 
1969: 149; Bridgwater, 1974: 129; Beicken, 1974:311; Neumann, 
] 9 7 5: 175; 19 79: 334 . 
7. (p.224) It is Philippi (1964:142f.) who maintains that 
Rotpeter's situation is equivocal because of his position in 
the variety theatre, that is, because of his existence as an 
artist: "Diese Existenz ist als klinstliche Daseinsform 
fragwlirdig flir den Klinstler, der sich in der Scheinexistenz 
verwirklichter Freiheit - wie sie, von den Menschen aus 
gesehen, im Variete vorgeflihrt wird - in einen neuen Zwiespalt 
von Sein und BewuBtsein der Scheinexistenz begibt, um diese als 
bewuBt gestaltete eigene Lebensform den Menschen als wesent-
lich menschlich vorzutauschen" (lac. cit.). For this to be 
true, one would have to know for certain (a) that Rotpeter 
regards all other variety performers in the same way as he 
regards the trapeze-artists, and (b)that the audience shares 
his supposed general view of variety artists, even to the 
extent of regarding him in the same way, that is, as part of 
a 'Scheinexistenz'. 
But there is nothing in the text to confirm these assump-
tions. Since Rotpeter refers only to the trapeze-artists 
among his fellow performers, there is no way of knowing 
whether his attitude towards them extends to all other variety 
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artists or not. Similarly, for all the reader is told, the 
audience may not even share his opinion of the trapeze-
artists, let alone apply it to the other variety performers. 
Indeed, the very fact that Rotpeter has been invited by the 
academy to give his report is, in itself, an acknowledgment 
by at least part of the general public that, in his case, 
they do not share his alleged general view'of the variety 
artist, that they actually regard him as being essentially 
humanised and not as merely pretending to be so. That, in 
spite of his essential humanity, he is nevertheless limited 
to performance.in the variety theatre as an 'Ausweg' is a 
result of his undeniable oddity and rarity as an ape-man.It 
does notnecessarily imply pretence on his or anyone else's 
part. 
8. (p.224) Pascal (1982:196) quite wrongly translates this 
idiom as 'to take cover'. 
9. (p. 224) Because of the importance Rotpeter attaches to 
this idiom and the strongly ironic, even comic nature of his 
report, it is assumed here that there is a play on the literal 
and figurative meanings of the expression, as is so often the 
case in Kafka's works (cf .Ein Landarzt; Die Sorge des Ha:us-
vaters). 
10. (p. 226) Fingerhut ( 1969) takes as common knowledge the fact 
that "der GreiffuB des Affen gar keine Ferse besitzt" (op. 
cit.:105) and therefore construes this remark as Kafka's 
indirect, ironic conunentary on Rotpeter. In doing so, however, 
he assumes that Kafka's zoological knowledge was as good 
as his own and that the author was concerned with zoological 
exactitude, when it is obvious from Schakale und Araber that 
neither of these suppositions is true, since it has also 
been conunon knowledge for a long time that jackals do not 
live exclusively on carrion. 
ll. (p.226) Although Philippi (1966) also stresses the broad 
significance of the tension in Rotpeter's existence, he 
relates it exclusively to the nature and realm of art, 
since he regards Rotpeter primarily as representing the 
artist in general (op.cit.:138,139,142). That such an inter-
pretation is unjustified should be evident from the fact that, 
far from generalising the significance of his being as artist, 
Rotpeter explicitly draws attention to its singularity, 
when he distinguishes between himself and the trapeze-
artists. Furthermore, if Philippi's interpretation were 
correct, then one would have to draw the extreme conclusion 
that Rotpeter actually regards all earthly creatures as 
arti?ts-, for, in speaking of the tension in his own being, 
he unequivocally states that it characterises "jeden, der 
hier auf Erden geht" (Se 148). As Pascal (1982: 198) 
correctly observes, Sokel (1964) also "overestimates the 
. significance of art in the ape's.' sublimation process'". 
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